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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of institutions on fixed capital accumulation 
over time in two developing countries, both former German colonies: Namibia and Tanzania. 
This is motivated by two recent underpinning theories: the new institutional theory, which views 
institutions as fundamental determinants of economic outcomes and income variations among 
countries (the institutional hypothesis); and the theory of irreversible investment under 
uncertainty, which emphasis the impact of uncertainty on investment and capital-stock 
accumulation.  
 
The first part of the thesis deals with the measurement and definitions of institutions. Empirical 
measures of political and economic institutions have been previously produced; however, most 
cover short periods of time. The short time span of the institutional indices makes them practical 
in cross-countries and panel studies, rather than in country-specific studies. The importance of 
country-specific studies is underscored by the notion that different historical paths led to 
different ways of organising economic activities and political structures, yielding the differences 
in economic development across countries. To overcome this challenge, this thesis presents a 
database on institutional measures for Namibia and Tanzania for the period 1884 to 2009. These 
indicators are used to assess the nature of political and economic institutional transformation 
from the colonial legacy to the modern outcome, using Namibia and Tanzania as a natural 
experiment. 
 
Relying on archival information on formal laws in Namibia and Tanzania, the thesis constructs 
institutional indicators that are de jure in nature representing political freedom, property rights 
and judicial independence. These allow for the assessment of rules the game, rather than 
outcome. The formal codification of rights and freedoms is of little significance if those rights 
cannot be enforced. Therefore, the de facto element is also considered through the construction 
of separate indicators on political instability and judicial independence. A clear theoretical 
framework on each indicator provides the selection and combination of each sub-component. A 
meaningful composite measure is based on the techniques of principal components and factor 
analysis. 
v 
 
The thesis argues that despite changes in colonial identity in these countries (i.e. German, then 
British or South African), the broader framework of institutions remained partly the same, 
particularly in the case Namibia. It is true that, with the attainment of independence in Namibia, 
many institutions did change, particularly in the areas of political freedom, and judicial and 
political instability. Measures such as property rights, on the other hand, are slow to change. 
However, the overall long-lasting effect of these colonial institutions on economic outcomes 
remains an empirical question. Similarly, the case of Tanzania reflects the notion of institutional 
persistence as the country continued to undermine political freedom even after the attainment of 
independence. Tanzania is among the few countries which adopted a constitution without a bill 
of rights at independence.  
 
Also, the new indicators for both countries, while covering a long time period (1884–2009), 
correlate fairly well with some of the widely used institutional indices produced by Freedom 
House and the Heritage Foundation.  
 
The second part of thesis establishes the impact of institutional variables on capital accumulation 
in Namibia and Tanzania, applying the Johansen Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
technique. The data span for Namibia is from 1923 to 2009, and that for Tanzania is from 1946 
to 2009. The findings highlight the importance of uncertainty (political instability) in explaining 
capital accumulation over time in Namibia. The results also show that other institutional 
variables are important in explaining uncertainty. Rising levels of property rights and political 
rights lower political instability in Namibia.  
 
The empirical evidence for Tanzania indicates the importance of property rights in explaining 
capital accumulation over time. The most interesting result is the importance accorded to the 
judicial independence, which showed a positive correlation to gross domestic product (GDP). It 
is also shown that other institutional variables (property rights and political rights) have a 
positive correlation to judicial independence. A further finding is that uncertainty (political 
instability) has a negative effect on economic development over time in Tanzania. 
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Chapter 1  
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
Explaining income variation across countries remains one of the most important research 
question in the field of economic growth and development. Recent debate has witnessed a shift 
away from purely looking at traditional (proximate) determinants of economic growth to 
considering deeper, fundamental (ultimate) determinants of growth. The proximate determinants 
are conventionally held to refer to capital accumulation, labour and technology, among others. 
The two most notable hypotheses being postulated as fundamental causes of economic growth 
are the geography and the institutional hypotheses.  
 
The geography hypothesis underscores the force of nature as the main source of income variation 
across countries. It is argued that geography may determine the technology available to a society, 
particularly in agriculture, and this is linked to the country’s location in facilitating the import of 
investment goods. Geography may also affect growth through the level of productivity because 
of fundamental geographic reasons, such as differences in productivity between temperate and 
tropical agriculture, and differences in endemic health conditions. The main contributions to this 
line of enquiry include the work of Myrdal (1968), Diamond (1997), Gallup et al. (1998) and 
Sachs (2001).  
 
The institutional hypothesis, on the other hand (which constitutes the thrust of this thesis), 
focuses on humanly devised constraints (rules of the game) that influence long-term economic 
performance. One main assumption under the institutional hypothesis is that of institutional 
persistence. Several mechanisms that make the persistence of institutions plausible have been 
pointed out in the literature1 and these, to a greater or less extent, can be related to the Namibia 
and Tanzania case studies. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001), in areas where Europeans 
showed strong settlement patterns, they created institutions characterised by strong protection of 
property rights and efficient enforcement of contracts. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argued that these 
                                                             
1  See North (1997), Davis and North (1971), Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); among 
others.  
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institutions have persisted over time and they continue to influence economic performance after 
independence. La Porta et al. (1998) showed that the colonisers’ identity, through the various 
judiciary institutions they set up, has an effect on current institutions across former colonies. This 
notion underscores the country’s experience under the early period of colonisation as a 
fundamental key determinant of current income levels.  
 
Namibia and Tanzania, like many other developing countries, find themselves at the heart of 
these debates. Although they might be distinct in many aspects of economic development, they 
share important commonalities. Both were colonised by Germany, and then handed over to other 
countries through the League of Nations mandate system. Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations and the different mandate agreements led to the classification of dependent 
territories as A,2 B and C mandates3 according to the degree of involvement of the mandatory 
and the corresponding degree of self-governance (Matz, 2005). Tanzania was handed to Britain 
under a category B mandate,4 while Namibia came under the mandate of the Union of South 
Africa under category C.5 Of the German colonies in Africa; these were the only ones with 
sizeable German populations, which underscore the presence of significant European settlement 
in these countries.  
 
Considerable work in the empirical growth literature has therefore placed institutions at the 
centre stage in explaining long-run economic growth6 and its determinants. The studies that have 
recognised and made contributions in terms of institutional measurement within the domain of 
                                                             
2 These included the former Ottoman Empire colonies and were deemed to “have reached a stage of self-
determination where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering 
advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone”(Matz,2005). 
3 The classification of the territories had far-reaching consequences on the outcome of the right to self-government 
of the territories.  
4 Comprised of German territories which were deemed to require a greater level of control by the mandatory power 
for preparations towards to self-determination.  
5 It is generally argued that Category C mandates come closest to colonial rule, due to the far-reaching powers of the 
mandatory (See Matz, 2005). According the mandatory agreement, the former German colonies were to be 
administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory. 
6 Notable in this contest has been the work of Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2004); Hall and Jones (1999); La Porta et al. 
(1998, 1999); Beck et al. (2001, 2006) 
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long-run economic growth include Fedderke et al. (2001); Knack and Keefer (1995); Gwartney 
and Lawson (1996); Kaufman et al. (1999); Jaggers and Marshall (1995) and Bollen (1980, 
1990). This has led to the construction of a number of indicators that proxy institution in the 
form of institutional quality (enforcement of property rights), characteristics of political regimes 
(elections, constitutions, and executive powers), and political instability (riots, strikes, coups, 
civil wars). 
 
As part of the broader debate on institutions and economic growth, some literature focuses on the 
link between institutions and capital accumulation. This is based on the fact that sustained 
economic growth, particularly in Africa, will require a substantial capital formation. The recent 
investment literature suggests that the economic and political instability suffered by many 
African countries can pose a formidable obstacle to the take-off of capital formation (Serven, 
1997). Serven (1997) argues that a great part of weak investment performance in sub-Saharan 
Africa is explained by weak institutions, such as lack of property rights and political instability. 
If investment is costly or impossible to reverse, investors have an incentive to postpone 
commitment and wait for new information in order to avoid costly mistakes.  
 
This value of waiting can be quite considerable in highly uncertain environments. As a 
consequence, uncertainty can become an investment deterrent, a notion that is supported by an 
increasing amount of empirical evidence. One of the arguments put forth through the institutional 
hypothesis is that the enforcement of property rights and contracts determines the incentives to 
invest in capital (North, 1981). Poorly enforced property rights create a wedge between the 
marginal product of capital and the rate of return that can be privately appropriated by investors.  
 
The theoretical link between democratic institutions, economic performance and capital 
accumulation remains an empirical problem and thus has led to two main strands of theoretical 
analysis of the relationship with different outcomes. The first strand of literature emphasises that 
quality institutions might help promote economic growth (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; 
Clague et al., 1996). The argument is that democracy might reduce uncertainty and raise private 
investment.  
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The counterargument states that broadened political participation might lead to deterioration in 
economic performance (Huntington, 1968; Olson, 1982). The main theoretical support is that 
broader participation might generate increased pressures for redistribution, thus lowering 
allocative efficiency.   
 
Theoretically, there is a great deal of agreement in the definition of institutions and the 
institutional role in explaining economic development. However, there is much less agreement 
on how to measure institutions empirically (Glaeser et al., 2004; Arndt and Oman, 2006; Kurtz 
and Shrank, 2007(a) & 2007(b); Voigt, 2007), posing a challenge for empirical work. Firstly, 
long-run measures of institutions do not exist to permit rigorous tests of hypotheses such as 
institutional persistence, particularly for developing countries such as Namibia and, to some 
extent, Tanzania. Virtually all the evidence of the effect of institutions on economic performance 
is derived within a short-term framework7 of analysis, thereby limiting the ability to test the 
long-run effect.  
 
Secondly, new difficulties have arisen from the development of measures for institutions based 
on the judgments of ‘‘experts’’. According to Glaeser et al. (2004), the standard measures are 
outcomes, rather than the inputs required by the theory. This has led to measures of institutions 
used in the growth literature being volatile, uncorrelated with constitutional constraints, and 
closely correlated with short-run government policies and election outcomes.  
 
Given the systematic divergence in growth per capita over a long period among many developing 
countries and the possibility of country heterogeneity,8 long-time series are crucial for explaining 
the differences in growth trajectories evident in many developing countries. An alternative 
approach is to consider constructing long time series of indicators of a de jure and a de facto9 
nature to allow for testing the effect of institutions on countries’ economic growth over time. 
                                                             
7 Generally, the coverage is the late 1960s and 1970s, which typically overlap with the post-independence period of 
many developing countries. 
8 According to Durlauf et al. (2001), the approach of entering institutional quality measures in regression imposes 
strong homogeneity assumptions: all countries are assumed to have identical aggregate production functions. See 
also studies by Fedderke et al. (2011), Dawson (2007), and Minier (2007) that have addressed the parameter 
heterogeneity and institutions. 
9 This captures the enforcement component of the institution definition i.e. the realization on the ground.  
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Therefore the methodological challenges of measuring institutions are worth investigation, which 
is conducted in part one of this thesis.  
 
Numerous studies that have focused on the effect of institutions on economic growth strongly 
support the indirect effect that institutions have on economic growth via the capital accumulation 
channel (Dawson, 2007). Given this indirect channel, there has been a growing interest in the 
determinants of capital formation in developing countries, in the light of the past poor 
performance that has characterised African economies in general. This thesis draws on the new 
investment theory and its nexus with new institutional economics, and the second part examines 
the effect of institutions on capital accumulation in Namibia and Tanzania.  
 
1.2  Objectives of the study  
 
The study has two key objectives. The first objective is to examine the nature of the institutional 
environment in Namibia and Tanzania for the period 1884 to 2009. This is done through the 
construction of institutional indicators, i.e. property rights, political rights and civil liberties, 
judicial independence and political instability. The aim is to explore whether it is possible to find 
institutional persistence from colonial times up to the present via institutional design. The 
distinct trajectory in colonial powers in Namibia and Tanzania constitutes a unique natural 
experiment. The thesis contributes to the existing growth empirics, in several ways. It delivers to 
growth economists useful datasets to assess how institutions shape economic development in 
Namibia and Tanzania.  
 
The second objective is to examine the effect of institutions on capital accumulation in Namibia 
and Tanzania. This is based on country-specific time-series data. The focus on moving to country 
studies is motivated by the fact that in future, when put together; they might be able to provide 
guidance on which specific institutions have larger effects on the economy and what the overall 
effect might be.10 
                                                             
10 See Woodruff (2006) for a general discussion on institution measurement at country level. 
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The two countries chosen are both members of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), and also coastal countries. However, their economic classification differs significantly, 
according to the World Bank. Namibia is classified as an upper-middle-income country, with a 
gross national income (GNI) per capita of $4270 in 2009, while Tanzania is a low-income 
country with a GNI per capita of $490 in 2009. However, they do have a few other things in 
common. Both were colonised by Germany, and then handed over through the League of Nations 
mandate system, Tanzania to Britain and Namibia to South Africa, before gaining their 
respective independence. Despite the differences in the political and economic trajectories of 
these two economies, they manage to attract almost equal shares of investment.  
 
1.3  Organisation of the thesis 
 
The thesis comprises of two main parts, accounting for seven chapters. The first chapter serves 
as the introduction. 
 
The first main part of the thesis then focuses on the measurement and definitions of institutions 
as presented in chapter two which deals with the theoretical framework of constructing 
institutional indices. Chapter three then applies the theoretical framework and the construction of 
institutional indices for Namibia. Chapter four presents the construction of institutional indices 
for Tanzania. The period covered is 1884 to 2009 for both countries.  
 
The second part of the thesis contribute to the literature by carrying out a detailed time-series 
study that explicitly introduces indicators of institutions and investment determinants in the 
context of a developing country, with Namibia and Tanzania as specific case studies. Chapter 
five present the capital formation literature review and the underlying theoretical and empirical 
models used in the thesis. Chapter six presents the institutional dynamics and capital formation 
analyses for Namibia and Tanzanian, respectively. 
 
The thesis conclusion and policy recommendations are presented in chapter seven.  
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Chapter 2  
2.0 Measuring Institutions  
2.1 Introduction  
 
The thesis evaluates the nature of institutions that characterise Namibia and Tanzania in the form 
of property rights, judiciary systems and political rights for the period 1884 to 2009. This is done 
through the construction of de jure and de facto indicators of property rights, political rights and 
civil liberties and judicial independence, using legislation as an indication of the rules of the 
game (see North, 1990). The lengthy time period is chosen following the suggestion by Kaufman 
et al. (2003) that the likelihood of observing significant changes in institutional variables 
substantially increases with the length of time under consideration ( see for example Gwenhamo 
et al.,2008;Fedderke et al.,2001). 
 
Namibia has been subjected to colonialism for a period of over a century, and in line with the 
foundations of New Institutional Economics11, the colonial legacies are traceable in most 
institutional indicators, even after 18 years of independence. Namibia’s colonial record starts 
first with German Empire’s protectorate in 1884 which ended with defeat of Germany in the 
First World War in 1915. The 30 years of German colonial rule termination, initiated yet another 
new phase of colonial history with more profound and longer term effects under the South 
Africa, lasting for 75 years, before an independent Namibia in 1990.  
 
Despite the similarities and continuities assumptions between the two colonial regimes, 
dissimilarities and discontinuities are observed in many laws12 that were passed during the period 
under review. Namibia gained her independence from South Africa in 1990, with a government 
committed to multiparty democracy. The period from 1990 to 2009 is marked with peaceful and 
declared free and fair elections.  
 
                                                             
11 See the work of North (1990); Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2002; 2004) and La Porta et al. (1998; 1999).  
12 These laws will be used to constitute formal measures of institutions in line with North’s definition of 1990 in 
chapter 3 and 4. 
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Tanzania’s, like Namibia colonial history started in 1884, when large tracks of land were granted 
to members of the Society for German Colonization (James, 1971). This led to the establishment 
of German Administration over Tanzania in 1891, which lasted until 1918, when Germany 
renounced all rights over her colonial possessions in favour of the Allied powers. Great Britain 
was given the right to administer Tanganyika in 1919, while the official mandate was conferred 
in 1922 by the League of Nations under category B. Tanzania mainland (Tanganyika) became 
independent from Britain in 1961, with a government committed to building a socialist society. 
The year 1964, saw a formation of the United Republic of Tanzania, between Tanzania mainland 
and Zanzibar.13 Politically, Tanzania operated under a single-party system from 1965 until 1992, 
when a transition to multiparty democracy occurred.  
 
The thesis traces the genesis and the developmental transformation of institutional framework in 
Namibia and Tanzania from 1884 to 2009, using various legislations promulgated during the 
period under review.  The legal foundations of most the institutional indicators are traceable in 
many laws, in the form of acts, ordinances, proclamations and Administer General (AG) 
Proclamations because legislative authority over South West Africa and Tanganyika vested in 
various different offices and bodies at different points in the country’s history.  
 
Using the technique of principal components and factor analysis in aggregating the composite 
indicator, guided by the conceptual framework as developed by Fedderke et al. (2001), the thesis 
constructs institutional measures for Namibia and Tanzania separately. This thesis contributes to 
the growing institutions-growth empirical literature by providing alternative indices of political 
freedoms, property rights, judicial independence and political instability for Namibia and 
Tanzania for the period 1884-2009.  
 
The relevant literature is reviewed, followed by the methodology which is employed for the 
construction of the present indices in chapter 3 and 4.  
                                                             
13 The focus is on institutional framework as shown in mainland Tanzania. This is due to the fact that Zanzibar 
maintains a separate judiciary and a House of Representatives which acts as a Parliament for Zanzibar. Furthermore, 
the legal system in Zanzibar is derived from a distinct history from the mainland and combining these two systems 
would be overambitious and might result in unfair treatment to the subject under review.  
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2.2 Literature review 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical framework  
 
The recent debate has witnessed a shifting away from purely looking at traditional (proximate) 
determinants of economic growth to deeper fundamental (ultimate) determinants of growth.14 
Three strands of competing literature have emerged in the study of fundamental determinants of 
long-run economic growth. A first strand of literature argues that geography is the dominant 
factor in determining a sustained level of economic growth in the long run. According to the 
geography hypothesis, countries that are located in zones that are disadvantaged by the climate, 
quality of soil, or the prevalence of diseases, were originally and remained poorer than those 
favoured by geography. Cited papers in this literature include Myrdal (1968), Diamond (1997) 
Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999), Sachs (2001, 2003), and Olsson and Hibbs (2005).  
 
A second strand of literature emphasises participation in international trade as a growth-inducing 
factor leading to unconditional convergences of income between poor and rich countries. This is 
attributed to the work of Sachs and Warner (1995) and Frankel and Romer (1999).  
 
A third strand of literature puts emphasis on the role of institutional changes as a critical 
determinant of long-run economic growth. Acknowledgment of the importance of institutions for 
economic development has been posited in the growth literature since the writing of Adam 
Smith, and more recently by Douglass North and Robert Thomas, who observed that factors such 
as capital accumulation or innovation “are not causes of growth: they are growth” (North & 
Thomas, 1973, p.2; North 1987, 1990). The theory has its roots in the work of Ronald Coase 
(1937, 1960), which connected neo-classical theory, transactions costs and institutions. Coase 
(1960) argued that zero transactions-cost conditions lead to a market solution that maximises 
income irrespective of the institutional arrangement. North (1987) argued, however, that 
transaction costs are pervasive and, as such, institutions matter.  
                                                             
14 The proximate determinants are conventionally held to refer to capital accumulation, labour and technology, while 
ultimate determinants are institutions, legal and political systems, socio-cultural factors, demography and 
geography. 
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A useful framework for thinking about what institutions are and how they can best be measured 
is provided by North (1990). According to North (1990: 3) institutions are “human devised 
constraints that structure human interactions composed of formal (law and regulations) and 
informal (sanctions and customs) rules and they are devised by human beings to create order and 
reduce uncertainty in exchange”. Three fundamental elements can be deduced from North’s 
definition. Firstly, institutions consist of formal constraints devised by human beings to shape 
human interaction, such as the statute of laws, common laws and regulations. Secondly, the 
informal rules or unwritten rules (represented through culture, traditions, and norms of 
behaviour) are transmitted within the society and imposed by society itself. Thirdly, enforcement 
mechanisms play a crucial role in ensuring that institutions are effective in order to create order 
and reduce uncertainty. 
 
Hall and Jones (1999)15 revived the modelling of institutions as deeper determinants, with the 
recent institutions-versus-geography debate being accredited to the work of Acemoglu et al. 
(2001, 2002 &2005). The institutional hypothesis explains the long-run differences in economic 
development across countries by lasting differences in the quality of endogenously generated 
institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2005) argue that Europeans adopted very different 
colonisation policies in different colonies, resulting in diverse institutions today. In places where 
they could not settle due to high mortality rates, they tended to set up extractive institutions16 to 
oppress the native population and facilitate the extraction of resources in the short run. In places 
where they faced low mortality rates, the colonisers set up favourable institutions for their own 
future benefits. These institutions persisted over time and tend to explain much of the differences 
in economic development across countries.  
 
The broad aim of this review is to look closely at the measurement of institutions.  The main 
motivation for this interest is that despite the emphasized importance of institutions, measuring 
of institutions remains a critical question.  
 
                                                             
15 Earlier empirical studies linking institutions and economic performance include the work of Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985), Scully (1988), Barro (1996), and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), among others. 
16 These institutions did not introduce protection for private property, nor did they provide check and balances 
against the government.  
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2.2.2 Empirical literature review 
 
2.2.2.1  Measures of political and economic institutions 
 
The way that empirical institutional measures are categorised is important for interpreting their 
effects. The institutional framework, as provided for in the definition by North (1990), comprises 
both formal and informal constraints. From this widely cited definition, good institutions are 
viewed as establishing an incentive structure that reduces uncertainty and promotes efficiency, 
hence contributing to improved economic performance.17  
 
(i) Property rights indicators 
 
 In the literature, property rights are often argued to have the greatest effect on economic 
growth.18 However, the quantification and operationalisation of property rights has proved to be 
challenging. Nevertheless, this has not stopped researchers from creating indices to measure 
property rights. The most frequently used indicator of property rights is provided in the 
compilations of the Economic Freedom Index by the Frazer Institute. According to Gwartney et 
al. (1996), an index of economic freedom should measure the extent to which legally acquired 
property is protected and individuals are engaged in voluntary transactions. This indicator was 
based initially on objective quantifiable variables in most of its components, in the form of 
macroeconomic indicators, while omitting key elements of law and regulations affecting 
economic freedom.  
 
However, this has been corrected in Gwartney and Lawson (1997) and subsequent publication of 
the data sets for 1997-2000; additional components on legal and regulatory elements have been 
added to the data sets. Since 2000, the Fraser Institute has been looking at 38 components which 
are divided into five major components to rate the countries19 on a scale of zero to ten on an 
annual basis. A score of ten means a country is the most free, and a score of zero means a 
                                                             
17 See North (1991) for a general discussion.  
18  See North (1990, 1991) and North & Thomas (1973). 
19 By 2006, Tanzania was rated 79 of 141, with a score of 6.5. 
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country is the least free. Ratings are available for some countries since 1970 (at five-year 
intervals).  
 
Another database that provided an indicator of property rights protection is the Heritage 
Foundation (see Johnson et al., 1995). The degree to which property rights are guaranteed is 
scored between one (very high) and five (nonexistent). Unlike the Fraser Institute, the property 
rights index is reported as a separate score and it is available annually since 1996.  
 
A longer time run of property rights is provided by Fedderke et al. (2001) for South Africa dating 
back as far as 1950 and spanning up to 1997, while recently Gwenhamo et al. (2008) provided a 
similar index for Zimbabwe, Fedderke and Garlick (2010) for Malawi and Lourenço Jr et al. 
(2010) for Zambia.  This is based on the legal statutes that govern immovable property.20 For the 
purpose of this study, the key point to note is that all of the proxies used in constructing property 
rights are broadly defined,21 while the focus of this study is specifically on the right to own 
immovable property and the qualities of these rights.  
 
(ii) Political rights and civil liberties indicators 
  
While the property rights indicators experience some deficiencies, recent developments in 
political economy have quantified political institutions. Despite the availability of several 
empirical measures of political institutions, there is however no universal agreement among 
scholars on the ways of empirically measuring political freedom or political democracy. Among 
the indices are quantitative measures of political rights and civil liberties produced by Freedom 
House on an annual basis since 1972, for almost 165 countries. The political rights measure 
looks at a number of issues that allow for degree of political competition and permit people to 
choose their leaders freely. The civil liberties measure on the other hand considers measures of 
the rule of law and judiciary independence. Each right is scaled from 1 (free) to 7 (not free).  
 
                                                             
20 The concept of property rights is based on the Honore’s definition of ‘full liberal ownership’ as adopted by 
Waldron (1988).  
21 Except for work by Fedderke et al. (2001) and Gwenhamo et al. (2008). 
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Another data set is the Polity IV database popularised by the work of Gurr (1975) and Jaggers 
and Gurr (1995). The main variables captured are institutionalised democracy, which signals the 
existence of institutions or procedures through which citizens can express their political 
preferences meaningfully, and the institutionalised autocracy index, which signals an autocratic 
state in which competitive political participation is suppressed or prohibited. These data are 
available for few independent states for the period 1800-2007.22 Most countries are included in 
the sample upon attainment of independence status.  
 
The Database of Political Institutions (DPI) compiled by the Development Research Group of 
the World Bank is among the latest developments on political indicators.  Beck et al. (2001) 
present the database and demonstrate its use. The database covers around 177 countries for the 
period 1975-200623 and it contains a variety of variables mainly measuring aspects of the 
political system and electoral rules. The major categories are the chief executive variable, 
looking at years in office, the chief executive’s party affiliation; electoral rules looking at the 
type of the voting system and whether or not elections are affected by fraud. Others are measures 
of the political party fractionalisation index, indices of checks and balances and federalism.  
 
(iii) Judicial Independence Indicators 
 
This is the least-considered indicator compared to the previously discussed indicators. This is 
partly due to the difficulties of measuring and defining the concept. A couple of researchers have 
published several criteria or variables the judiciary must meet, based on specific laws or 
procedures, to constitute judicial independence (La Porta et al., 2004; Feld and Voigt, 2003), 
while others focus mainly on the concept of the rule of law (Kaufmann et al.,2009) and courts’ 
dispute-resolution mechanisms (Djankov et al., 2003).  
 
The literature or measurements that focus on the number aspects of judicial institutions mostly 
agree that a truly independent judiciary has three main characteristics. First, there is clear 
                                                             
22 Data on Tanzania are available from 1961 to 2007. 
23 Tanzania data are available from 1975 to 2006. 
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separation of the judicial system from other branches of government. Second, the judicial system 
is impartial; i.e. the judicial decisions are not influenced by the judge’s personal interest in the 
outcome of the case. This also includes the idea that judges are not selected primarily because of 
their views, but on merit. Lastly, judicial decisions, once rendered, are respected.  
 
The work of La Porta et al. (2004) covered the power and reach of the judicial system for 71 
countries in a single database in 2004. The measure of judicial independence is based on two 
factors: (i) whether judges of the highest courts have life tenure, and (2) whether judicial 
decisions are a source of law. 
 
Closest to the current work is Feld and Voigt (2003), which provided a de jure and de facto 
judiciary independence index that covered the 77 countries for the year 2000. The de jure 
indicator comprises twelve variables, including life tenure and appointment by professionals. 
The de facto indicator is composed of eight factors; including the average length of actual 
judicial services and how often laws relating to courts have been changed. These indicators are 
available cross-sectional only.  
 
The work of Djankov et al. (2003), on the other hand, focuses on measures of dispute resolution 
in courts. The study provided the legal origin and legal formalism index for 109 countries for the 
year 2000. The legal formalism index is made up of seven broad aspects, including the use of 
professional judges as opposed to lay judges and self-representation, and the need to make 
written as opposed to oral arguments at various stages of the process.  
 
The rule-of-law dimension which constituted one of the components of the governance indicators 
compiled by the World Bank (Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005, 2009, and Kaufman, Kraay, 
& Zoido-Lobatón, 1999) is a perceptions-based indicator. This captures the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. This variable is available annually for 2002 to 2008, although data exist for 1996, 
1998 and 2000.  
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It is clear from the above discussion that most of the available indicators either represent a 
snapshot at a point in time or  are cross-sectional in nature, thus limiting their usefulness in 
single-country time-series empirical work.  
 
(iv) Political Instability Indicators 
 
Many different variables have been employed to reflect the concept of political instability in 
literature. While there have been several attempts to construct a single indicator, there is no 
universal agreement among scholars given the dimensionality embodied in the concept of 
political instability. Therefore, a number of data sets exist which provide many indicators that 
can be used as possible proxies of political instability. This includes among others the Banks 
(1971) Cross-Polity-Time-series, which includes variables measuring civil protest (general 
strikes, riots and anti-governmental demonstrations), politically motivated aggression (guerrilla 
warfare, assassinations and purges) and political regime instability (coups d’état and 
revolutions). The data coverage for Namibia starts from 1980, while Tanzania is covered from 
1961.  
 
The other source of political instability proxy data are major rating services such the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG henceforth), which covers political risk evaluations. 
The commonly used indicators are government instability, internal conflicts, external conflict, 
military in politics, religious tensions and ethnic tension. The indicators are available on an 
annual basis starting from 1984.  
 
The Database of Political Institutions by Beck et al. (2001) also offers indicators that can be used 
as political instability proxies. These include indicators such as polarisation and tenure of the 
chief executive. The database covers around 177 countries for the period 1975-2006. 
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2.2.3 A Framework for the evaluation of measurement of institutions 
 
Recent debates question the manner in which institutions are defined and measured. According 
to Glaeser et al. (2004), the frequently used measures of institutions24 do not abide by the 
definition of institutions as postulated by North (1990). Glaeser et al. (2004) argued that most of 
these indices do not capture the formal constraints. Instead, these variables tend to measure 
outcomes. As such they do not meet the criterion of permanency that North refers to.  
 
Similarly the work of Arndt and Oman (2006), criticise the World Governance Indicators as 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003). Their arguments are that the World Governance indicators 
lack comparability over time. Kurtz and Shrank (2007) additionally express their concerns with 
regard to subjectivity in the construction of the World Governance Indicators. Their argument is 
that these indicators are perception-based measures of governance and highly correlated with 
each other.  
 
As a way forward, the work of Voigt (2007: 23) makes a proposal on how to measure institutions 
empirically. According to Voigt (2007: 23), the measures of institutions should be precise, 
objective and take into account de jure as well as de facto elements. By doing so, the definition 
of North (2006) is embraced. The current study aligns itself with this argument and attempts to 
limit the common outlined problems by constructing measures that are de jure in nature based on 
formal legislation. These allow for the assessment of the rules of the game, rather than outcome. 
To minimise the influences of the authors’ biases, multivariate techniques are used to compile 
the overall indices.25 Separate de facto indicators are constructed using observable statistical 
data. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
The study employs techniques and methods that minimise problems as outlined in section 2.2.3 
of this paper. Fedderke et al. (2001) argue that in order to avoid outcome-based measures and to 
develop measures in line with North’s definition, detailed analysis of formal legislation ought to 
                                                             
24 Glaeser et al. (2004) cite the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), The World Governance indicators and 
Polity IV data sets. 
25 See the discussion in the next section on the techniques employed. 
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be used. This involves annual ratings of the status of rights based exclusively on formal 
legislation in constructing the de jure position in the evolution of property rights, political and 
civil liberties, and the judicial system. The application is to Namibia and Tanzania during the 
period 1884-2009. The formal codification of rights and freedoms is of little significance if those 
rights cannot be enforced. Therefore the study constructed defacto judicial independence 
indicator which are of relevance to political freedoms, property rights and judicial independence 
indices.  Also, the political instability index also serves to separate the formal de jure political 
and civil rights from their de facto realization.  
 
In view of Voigt’s argument the study constructs two indices postulating the ex ante position or 
de facto position in the independence of the judiciary and political stability. To limit the 
subjectivity concerns, the actual outcomes of unwritten rules using statistical datasets are 
employed.  
 
2.3.1 Technique and the method  
 
The construction of indices is much like mathematical or computational models. According to 
Nardo et al. (2005), the robustness of any index depends as much on the craftsmanship of the 
modeller as on universally accepted scientific rules for encoding. The construction of indices 
generally involves four steps, i.e. the development of a theoretical framework; scaling and rating; 
weighting and aggregation; and verification (McGranahan et al., 1972), steps which are applied 
in this thesis. 
 
2.3.1.1 Development of a clear theoretical framework 
 
The first step in constructing the composite indicators is the development of a clear theoretical 
framework which provides the basis for the selection and combination of each sub-component 
into a meaningful composite measure. The following institutional indicators based on the 
accepted definitions are constructed for the period 1884-2009.  
 
(i) Property rights indicators 
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Demsetz (1967) defines property rights as the liberty or permission to enjoy benefits of wealth 
while assuming the costs which the benefits entail. Our indicator is constructed with particular 
reference to immovable property. This covers all legislation passed that affects the issue of 
immovable property, with special reference to land rights in Namibia and Tanzania.   
The ideal set of property rights will comprise of the following seven incidents, based on 
Honore’s definition of “full liberal ownership” as adopted by Waldron (1988) and used by 
Gwenhamo et al. (2008).  
 
1. Right to possess: The owner at his own discretion is allowed to posses and dispose of his 
property. 
2. Right to use: An owner is allowed to use his/her property at his/her own discretion, 
without contradicting the law.  
3. Right to manage: An owner is allowed to manage his/her property at his/her own 
discretion without interference – in case of leaseholds. 
4. Right to capital: The right to use property in financial transactions, including as 
collateral. Also includes the freedom to use of property for sublet and rent to earn capital.  
5. Right to security: Ownership is protected from expropriations and interference by others.  
6. Incident of transmissibility: An owner can transfer the rights to a specific person. This 
includes the right to sell, or give away, or mortgage, or buy or inherit. 
7. Liability to execution: An owner could be held liable for liabilities emanating from his 
property which injuriously affect others. 
 
The understanding is that any interference with any of these bundles of rights may restrain the 
freedom that can be enjoyed from the property.  The fact that in rural Africa a lot of land is not 
privately owned but rather people have user rights or may be allocated land by chiefs is not what 
most commonly used measures of the security of property rights are pickup up. This form of 
property rights is however important for economic incentives and development in Africa. 
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(ii) Political freedom 
This measure is composed of indicators of political rights and civil liberties based on theoretical 
dimensions of a contemporary liberal democracy advanced by Jaggers and Gurr (1995). The 
political rights indicators are based on the degree to which individuals in a state have control 
over those who govern. The civil liberties indicator measures the rights of the individual, 
including freedom of expression, assembly, association and religion. The following key features 
are evaluated in accordance with the written laws:  
 
1. Voting Rights/ Franchise: This refers to universal suffrage where the right to vote is 
not restricted by race, gender, belief, wealth or social status.  
2. Freedom of Association: The right of individuals who share similar interests to come 
together and form organisations that represent their interests and views.  
3. Freedom of Assembly: These uphold the right to peaceful assembly and limit the use 
of force by authorities in controlling the assemblies.  
4. Freedom of Expression: The right to freedom of expression upholds the rights of all to 
express their views and opinions freely. This also includes media freedom.  
5. Extension of Arbitrary Executive Power: This deals with constitutional provisions that 
limit and exclude the use of discriminatory discretionary powers vested in the 
executive in the applications of laws.   
6. Freedom of Movement: The right of movement and the right to reside in an area of 
choice within the territorial boundaries of the relevant polity.  
7. Independence of the judiciary and Legislature: This relates separation of power 
between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.  
8. Academic Freedom: The right to freely teach or learn without unreasonable 
interference from authority. This also encompasses the right to access any institution 
of education irrespective of race, gender, belief, wealth or social status.  
9. Government Secrecy/ indemnity: Deals with the applications of laws that act to 
conceal information to the public.  
10. Due process of law: Is based on the principle that the government must respect all of 
the legal rights that are owed to a person according to law.  This calls for protection of 
individual persons from the state. 
20 
 
11. Freedom of religion: Freedom of belief and freedom of worship.  
12. Others: is a residual category that captures all rights and freedom relating to political 
freedom that cannot be classified under any of the specific dimensions. One key right 
relates to labour repression which was quite important during the colonial period of 
Namibia and Tanzania, and other African countries in general. 
 
 (iii) Judicial independence26  
 
The judicial independence index reflects the independence enjoyed by legal enforcement 
institutions, here proxied by the judges, in passing their judgement (Feld et al., 2003). It is 
important to recognise the differences between the independence of the judiciary and political 
freedom as measured in this study. The Political freedom index has to do with whether or not 
political and civil rights are guaranteed, while judicial independence is about ensuring that 
citizens of that country are treated fairly and political and civil rights are protected. The judiciary 
plays an oversight role to ensure liberal democracy. To achieve the oversight role, the judicial 
independence relies on the principle that judges must decide cases fairly and impartially, relying 
only on the facts and the law. 
 
The conceptual framework for assessing judicial independence captures the dynamics that 
encourage or impede judicial independence. This framework consists of two parts. The first part 
focuses on the influence of the legal foundations as provided for in the legislation over the 
judicial system. This forms the de jure measure of the judicial system. Based on Feld et al. 
(2003), these are summarised by five broad categories assessed to highlight the status of the de 
jure judicial independence. 
1. Establishment of courts according to law (constitutional separations of power from arms 
of government in law). 
2. Appointment procedures, including compensation 
                                                             
26 For the purpose of this thesis the judicial independence and the independence of judiciary is used interchangeably 
to mean the same concept.  
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3. Impartiality: Judicial decisions are not influenced by the judge’s personal interest in the 
outcome of the case. Judges selections are based primarily on merits and not on their 
political views or affiliations.  
4. Access to Courts and Courts record: The people rely on courts to protect their access to 
justice and to protect their legal rights; public access to court information.  
5. Judicial Accountability: Ability to do what is right, for instance, the ability of high courts 
to reverse erroneous lower court decisions on appeal. Enforcement of ethical standards 
and administrative rules between judges and their peers.  
The second part examines the factual implementation of various unwritten constraints that 
influence and control the judiciary. This indicates the de facto indicator focusing on actual 
country experience. The approach is guided by the work of Feld et al. (2003), whose eight 
variables are summarised and accessed in these five broad categories for indication of the de 
facto judicial independence status. 
 
 Number of judges removed from office (includes reassigned duties such as 
ambassadorship, etc.) 
 Number of times the court’s decision is over-ridden by other branches (Contempt of 
Court)  
 Annual number of corrupt judicial officials who either are arrested or whose cases are 
dismissed or reprimanded. This reflects judicial corruption (bribery) which tends to 
undermine the impartiality of the judicial process within the court system.  
 Number of harassed judicial personnel; this includes issues of verbal and physical attacks 
directed towards judges due to rulings that are unpopular with some cliques. 
 Incidence of side-stepping the judiciary 
 
 (iv) Political instability:  
 
This constitutes socio-political unrest and disturbance; the choice of the sub-components is 
guided by the work of Fedderke et al. (2001).  
1. The number of politically motivated arrests per year 
2. The number of political parties and publication banned per year 
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3. The number of declarations and renewals of states of emergencies per year 
4. Incidents of war-related armed attacks on the general public per year 
5. Township strikes and riots 
 
 
 
2.3.1.1  Scaling and rating of indices27 
 
According to Booysen (2002), scaling of indices entails the ordering of subcomponents/variables 
in some meaningful way. This entails the transformation of variables into ordinal scales. 
Accordingly, the scaling entails the reading of enacted legislation to translation into numbers. 
Relying on the scaling categories in Fedderke et al. (2001) as reference point, the conventional 
linear scaling transformation method28 is applied. The composite indices are scaled from 0-100, 
with 100 representing an ideal state or type of rights being guaranteed under the respective 
composite index.  In terms of the sub-components, the raw points are awarded using scales, 
which together aggregate to a hundred score.29 This process entails some inter-subjective 
judgements.  
 
(a) Property rights indicators 
 
It is argued that property is a general term for the rules that govern people’s access to and control 
of things like land, natural resources, the means of production and also inventions and other 
intellectual products. These systems of rules are assumed to exist in any society to avoid conflict 
and ensure cooperation, production and exchange.  The common property arrangements are 
common property and private property and thus form core of this study. Guided by the normative 
ideal criteria, the rating instrument is based on list of seven incidences of rights as discussed in 
section 2.3.1.1. 
                                                             
27 This is relevant for the construction of the de facto indicators due to the use of qualitative data.  
28 This requires points of reference relative to which indicators can be scaled (Drewnoski, 1972). A minimum and a 
maximum value are usually identified for each of the variables.  
29 The sub-component weights are adopted from the work of Gwenhamo et al. (2008), to maintain comparability in 
the datasets and these reflect the intersubjective judgements due to the independent verification by experts.  
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The initial weights are derived from the work of Gwenhamo et al. (2008), which followed a 
Delphi technique in soliciting the appropriate weights. The right to possess are scaled from 0-20, 
the right to use, right to capital, right to security and right to transmit are scaled from 0-15. The 
right to manage and liability to execution are scaled from 0-10 (see table 2.1). Based on the 
weights, the following rating criteria are developed within the paper to guide the readers on the 
outcome of the rating the pieces of legislation. 
 
Table 2:1 Property rights index: scaling matrix 
Description of scales 0-10 0-15 0-20 0-100 
Full protection by law; all seven incidence of rights are 
protected. 
10 14-15 18-20 88-100 
Property protection by law; incidence of rights are 
protected.  
8-9 11-13 15-17 75-87 
Property protection by law; very few incidence of rights are 
not guaranteed 
6-7 8-10 11-14 51-74 
Partial protection of property rights by law; few incidence 
of rights are guaranteed, weak property expropriations 
4-5 5-7 8-10 38-50 
Minimal protection by law; Property expropriations are 
possible, unwritten customary laws, verbal treaties 
2-3 2-4 3-7 13-37 
All rights are curtailed; Properties are subject to full 
expropriation 
0-1 0-1 0-2 0-12 
Source: authors’ breakdown 
 
Scores are awarded to various sub-components using varying scales. A lower score indicates an 
enactment of legislation that curtails the liberty or permission to enjoy the property, while the 
opposite is true for a higher score. Summing30 across all incidences gives a total score of 100, 
representing an ideal set of property rights being guaranteed under the respective tenure index.   
 
(b) Political freedom 
 
The rating instrument is based on the twelve key features covering both notions of political rights 
and civil liberties. Based on the work of Gwenhamo et al. (2008), eight of the sub-components 
were scaled from 0-10, yielding a total of 80 raw points. This category includes voting rights, 
                                                             
30 Factor analysis technique was used in obtaining the component weights contribution into the single composite 
indicator.  
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freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, the extent of arbitrary 
executive power, government secrecy or indemnity, due process of law and freedom of 
movement.31  
The other four categories were scaled from 0-5, and these include academic freedom, religious 
freedom, independence of the judiciary and the legislature32 and a residual category. The 
following scaling matrix (see table 2.2), is compiled to guide the outcome of the rating 
instrument. 
 
Table 2:2: Political freedom index: scaling matrix 
Description of scales 0-5 0-10 0-100 
Fully developed liberal democracy with recognitions of all 
rights 
5 10 88-100 
Entrenched procedural justice and freedom of association 
and assembly 
4 8-9 75-87 
Considerable scope for procedural justice; reasonable scope 
for political and social associations 
3 6-7 51-74 
Degree of arbitrariness in governmental action is more 
constrained 
2 4-5 38-50 
High degree of arbitrariness in state action; exclusive 
franchise arrangements and discriminative laws 
1 2-3 13-37 
Indicative of de jure totalitarian state 0 0-1 0-12 
Source: authors’ breakdown 
Raw points are awarded to the various sub-components based on scales, whereby an increase in 
the score indicates a move toward contemporary liberal democracy, and a decrease in the in the 
score indicates a move away from the ideal.  
 
(c)  Judicial independence (de jure) 
 
The rating instrument is based on five factors that serve as guiding principles in ensuring the 
formal (de jure) independence of the judiciary (see table 2.3). Due to the importance of both the 
high and lower courts in the countries under review, the five indicators were evaluated at both 
levels, thereby leading to ten sub-components. In this paper, these sub-components enjoy equal 
                                                             
31 The freedom of movement is increased to a 10-point scale due to the importance of the right for Tanzania due to 
colonial history. 
32 It should be noted that in the paper of Gwenhamo et al. (2008), this sub-component was initially given a 10-point 
scale. The different treatment in this paper is to limit its influence on the specific indicator, to avoid a web of 
association with the judicial independence indicator.  
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weighting of 10-point scale. Summing across all sub-components33 gives a total score of 100, 
representing an ideal state of judicial independence.  
 
Table 2:3 Judicial independence (de jure) index: scaling matrix 
Description of scales 0-10 0-100 
A full Constitutional seal off the judicial from the influence of other 
branches. Fully structural protection of judicial personnel by the 
Constitution with regard to tenure and remuneration.  
10 88-100 
Constitutional separation of powers; Professional appointments of 
some judicial officers.  
8-9 75-87 
 6-7 51-74 
Some degree of separation with some procedural and substantial 
restrictions on the judiciary embedded within the laws / 
Constitutions. 
4-5 38-50 
Limited separations between arms of government; No clear 
appointment procedures.   
2-3 13-37 
Lack of separations between arms of government; no proper 
function courts; lack of judicial professionals 
0-1 0-12 
Source: authors’ breakdown 
 
(d) Judicial independence (de facto) 
 
This index relates to the de facto measure of the independence of the judiciary. The idea is to 
capture the quantitative information as reported through the variety of materials ranging from 
newspapers to political magazines as well as governmental and non-governmental reports.34 
Information on some sub-components is seldom available due to non-reporting of certain 
activities, particularly the sub-component judicial corruption. In order to standardise the sub-
components, five scales are compiled in table 2.4. 
 
 
                                                             
33 The importance of certain components over others in the overall composite index was determined through the use 
of factor analysis to minimise the authors’ biases. 
34 The index is based on verifiable facts and not on subjective evaluations. 
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Table 2:4 Judicial independence index (de facto): scaling matrix 
Subcomponents Scaling Criteria 
Annual number of  judges reassigned 0 = None ; 1 = 1 case  ; 2 = 2 Cases ; 3 = 3 cases ; 4 = 
more than 3 cases 
Annual number of contempt of Court cases   0 = None ; 1 = 1 – 2 cases ;  2 = 3 to 4 cases; 3 = 5 to 6  
cases 4 = more than  6 cases 
Annual number of corrupt judicial officials cases  ( 
Arrested or dismissed or reprimanded) 
0 = None ; 1 = 1 – 2 cases ;  2 = 3 to 4 cases; 3 = 5 to 6  
cases 4 = more than  6 cases 
Number of  unfair verbal / physical attacks on Judicial 
officials  
0 = None ; 1 = 1 case  ; 2 = 2 Cases ; 3 = 3 cases ; 4 = 
more than 3 cases 
 Number  of Incidence of side-stepping the judiciary 
(use of other informal courts) 
0 = None ; 1 = 1 – 2 times ;  2 = 3 to 4 times ; 3 = 5 to 6  
times; 4 = more than  6 times 
Source: authors’ breakdown 
 
(e) Political instability 
 
Some episodes of instability have effects that are disproportionate to their fatalities. In order to 
standardise the variables, five scales for recording annual magnitudes for each variable are 
discussed in table 2.5. 
Table 2:5 Political instability index: scaling matrix 
Subcomponents Scaling Criteria 
Annual number of  political 
fatalities  including genocides 
0 = less than 100 fatalities ; 1 = 100 – 1000 fatalities ; 2 = 1000 to 5000 
fatalities ; 3 = 5 000 to 10 000 fatalities ; 4 = more than 10 000 fatalities 
Annual number of politically 
motivated arrest  
0 = less than 10 arrest; 1 = 10 – 25 arrest  ; 2 = 25 to 50 arrest ; 3 = 50 to 100 
arrest ; 4 = more than 100 arrest 
Township strikes and riots (number 
of demonstrators involved) 
0 = less than 100 demonstrators; 1 = 100 – 500 demonstrators ; 2 = 500 to 
1000 demonstrators; 3 = 1000 to 5000 demonstrators; 4 = more than 5 000 
demonstrators; 
Number of political parties and 
publications banned per year 
0 = None ; 1 = 1 – 2 parties or publications ;  2 = 3 to 4 parties or 
publications; 3 = 5 to 6  parties or publications ; 4 = more than  6 parties or 
publications 
Number  of declarations and 
renewals of state of emergencies per 
year 
0 = None ; 1 = 1 – 2 times ;  2 = 3 to 4 times ; 3 = 5 to 6  times; 4 = more 
than  6 times 
Source: authors’ breakdown 
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2.3.1.3  Weighting and aggregation of index components  
 
The study relies on multivariate techniques by applying principal component analysis and factor 
analysis, which present an empirical and relatively more objective option for weight selection 
(Ram, 1982; Slottjie, 1991). Principal component analysis is applied to the de facto indicators 
while the factor analysis is used in obtaining the components weights contribution into the single 
composite indicator for all de jure indicators. The two concepts are related but not identical.  
 
In the principal components analysis, the components are weighted with the proportion of 
variance in the original set of variables explained by the first principal component of that 
particular component. According to Ram (1982), the technique has the advantage of determining 
the set of weights that explains the largest variation in the original component.  
 
Factor analysis assigns the largest weights to the indicators that have the largest variation, 
independently of prior views on their economic importance. These properties are particularly 
desirable in order to minimise the inherent subjectivity in the construction of indicators. In this 
way, the authors’ biases are kept to a minimum. 
 
2.3.1.4  Checking of robustness and validity of the composite indices 
 
Composite indices also need to be validated. The common used measure of validity is the use of 
statistical correlation with other such measures35. The thesis relies on the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient, which is appropriate for ordinal measures.   
 
2.3.2 Data sources  
 
The data used to construct the de jure institutional measures relied mainly on primary sources. 
Detailed pieces of legislation with regard to land, political rights and civil liberties were obtained 
from the Colonial Gazette and Statutes of Tanzania and Namibia respectively. This was mainly 
                                                             
35 See Arat (1991) and Fedderke et al. (2001), among others.  
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obtained from the National Libraries and National Archives of the two countries under review 
and cover mainly period of colonial authority. The post-independent period, pieces of 
legislations are obtainable from the Tanzanian and the Namibian Parliamentary data bases 
respectively. 
 
The construction of de facto indicators, i.e. political instability and independence of judiciary, 
relied on archival materials ranging from newspapers to political magazines. The other sources 
of such information include the human rights groups and NGO reports both in Tanzania and 
Namibia. 
 
2.3.3 Anticipated caveats 
 
The thesis recognises a number of caveats that are inherent in long-period studies such as this 
one, particularly when it involves the development of composite indicators and data gathering.  
 
Coherence and continuity: The period under review is characterised by major changes such as 
changes in colonial powers, World War I and II, and a protracted period of socialism for 
Tanzania and a suppressive apartheid era in Namibia. The issue of commensurability arises given 
the longer period to be covered, particularly given the dynamic changes in the socio-economic 
and political situations that underscore these countries. 
 
Reliability: This underscores the issues of conformity in interpretation of historical meaning of 
different rights. Of particular concern to Namibia is the dichotomy in the application and 
interpretation of rights that was very markedly different for different racial structures36.  
  
                                                             
36 See Fedderke et al. (2001) on the exposition of this issue, and Namibia being a colony and latter incorporated as a 
fifth province into South Africa was subjected to some extent to the laws and interest of the former South Africa 
regime.  
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Chapter 3  
 
3. Indicators of political and economic institution in Namibia: 1884-2009 
 
3.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the interpretation of property rights, political freedoms and political 
instability indices for Namibia for the period 1884 to 2009.  
 
3.1   Property rights in Namibia 
 
The nature of property rights in Namibia has evolved over a number of years and is presently an 
outcome of the land tenure system implemented during both the German and South African 
colonial times; and as inherited and partly modified after independence in 1990. Namibia is 
largely a pastoral country; only relatively small areas in the north are suitable for crops. The pre-
colonial period was characterized by traditional pastoral systems and individual property rights 
on land were almost non-existent. The pastoralists and their stock ranged widely over the semi-
arid rangelands in response to the varying availability of water and grazing. In the pastoral 
system, most chiefdoms or political institutions were loosely based on the number of their stock 
and their ability to defeat neighbouring tribes to gain water and grazing rather than the need to 
assign land to individual or families within their own tribes (Werner, 1998). The Ovambo 
kingdoms in the northern part of Namibia, however, enjoyed centralized decision and resource 
allocation powers. 
 
The concept of non-freehold tenure sometimes referred to as customary land rights, applied to 
black owned communal and resettlement land. Many conflicting views exist on the existence of 
land ownership during the pre-colonial period and in Africa in general. Based on the discussion 
in James et al (1973), the study assumes the existence of rights of occupancy in the pre-colonial 
period as part of African traditional culture exercised in the unwritten customary laws. Due to a 
lack of unwritten laws, customary land ownership was and it is still regarded as an inferior form 
of ownership in many parts of Africa (Peter, 1997). For instance the lack of written title deeds 
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and customary laws in Africa marginalized the majority of the blacks during the colonial regime, 
with the passing of formal laws, due to difficulties in proving individual ownership. 
On the other hand the colonial period between 1884 and 1990 was characterized by measures of 
ensuring secure property rights under the freehold tenure system, mainly granted to whites and 
transnational corporations to the detriment of the blacks or non-whites of Namibia.  A number of 
restrictions of rights to immovable property in Namibia were instituted along racial lines and 
legalised under a variety of laws. This created dualism in land ownership as expressed in the four 
main systems of land tenure, freeholds (private), state land, non free hold (customary land) and 
leaseholds systems. The post independence land rights ownership in Namibia reflects the 
colonial tenure system.  
 
3.1.1  Outcomes of rating 
 
Due to differences in the nature of tenure systems in Namibia, the rights held were not of the 
same character. As such the liberty or permit to enjoy benefits, were different across the tenure 
systems. Therefore, the development of a single property rights indicator would not be reflective 
of the limitations to property rights enjoyed by different holders. The paper therefore first 
introduces two property rights indices reflecting the freehold and non-freehold tenure systems, 
respectively. Then, a composite based on this two tenure system is constructed taking into 
account the methodological difficulties involved in creating a single index in such environment. 
The work of Fedderke et al (2001) and Gwenhamo et al (2008), suggest an approach to this 
problem, by creating a single property right indicator based on the proportions of land available 
to the different tenure systems, and or the population distribution between racial groupings.   
 
To maintain comparability between the indices in this thesis with the above-mentioned studies, 
three composite indices of property rights were constructed. The first was based on proportions 
of land available to the two tenure systems; the second was the population distribution between 
different racial groupings. The final was based on applying the factor analysis techniques to sub-
components under two tenure systems to obtain an objective weight contribution of each 
component.  The resulting scores by sub-components were aggregated into a single property 
rights indicator by weighting each sub-component according to its relative contribution.  
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Figure 3-1 Sub-components of property rights index (freehold tenure):1884-2009 
 
 
Figure 3.1 presents the sub-components of freehold tenure system, whereas the resulting 
aggregated freehold tenure index is shown by figure 3.3 below. The non-freehold tenure system 
property rights index sub-components are plotted in figure 3.2. The graph is cumulative showing 
how each of the components contributes to the overall index as plotted in figure 3.3. 
Figure 3-2 Sub-components of property rights index (non-freehold tenure): 1884-2009 
 
 
The discussion below presents the two tenure system indices (freehold and non-freehold) before 
reporting the composite indicator results for Namibia. 
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3.1.2 Freehold versus Non-freehold tenure system in Namibia 
 
The differences in the qualities of rights in freehold against non-freehold tenure system was 
introduced with the application of formal laws in 1891 (figure 3.3).  The passing of these formal 
laws guaranteed protection of individual property for European settlers to the detriment of the 
local black Africans. Furthermore, legal instruments were enacted to provide colonial authorities 
with properties that in turn were allotted and registered under ownership of the white minority. 
For example, the Land Acquisition of Real Estate’s Imperial Ordinance of 1 September 1895 
declared all land as crown land, and vested in the German Empire.   
 
The period between 1904 and 1915 marked the beginning of the significant persistent divergence 
in security of rights in the freehold as compared to non-freehold tenure system. At least two 
reasons can explain this observed trend: the type of ownership under the two tenure system and 
the massive land expropriations that took place during this period. First, the written legislation 
such as the Land Rights Ordinance of the Emperor in 1902 and Land Rights Ordinance of the 
Governor of 1910 conferred legal ownership only to white settlers through land titles (deeds) 
registration, while blacks were served with verbal occupational rights. Second, the passing of the 
Sequestration of Natives Movable and Fixed Property Imperial Order of 1905 (December 26), 
which was applied between 1905 to 1908 fuelled land expropriations owned by the black 
Africans in the greater part of Namibia which later became to be known as the Police zone. The 
legislation made provisions for full expropriation of all land under the occupation of all blacks 
who took part in the uprising in Namibia.37  Accordingly, under the German law for the period 
between 1907 and 1915, blacks in the southern and central parts of Namibia were prohibited 
from occupying land and owning large live-stock.  
 
The divergences in the security of rights in freehold and non-freehold tenure system continued 
throughout the entire period of South African occupation from 1920 until 1990.  This was mainly 
due to the fact that the new legislation passed during the period strengthened all types of 
ownership rights under the freehold tenure system. The marginal improvements observed in the 
                                                             
37 The uprising culminated in genocide between 1904 and 1908 in Namibia.  
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non-freehold tenure system were merely in the form of occupational rights which were 
minimally restored for the landless blacks’ class which was a product of the German 
administration.  
 
The initial period of South African occupation between 1920 and 1924, marked a disproportional 
improvement in both tenure systems. The freehold tenure system index was strengthened with 
the introduction of legislation such as the South African Land Settlement Act of 1912 as 
amended in 1917 and in 1920. Among other things, the Land Settlement Proclamation 14 of 
1920, made provision for the establishment of Land Board in order to strengthen and manage 
allocations of farms under the free hold tenure system.  This was followed by the establishment 
of a Land Bank in 1921, which provided farmers under the freehold tenure system with much 
needed capital to invest in their operations. This led to further consolidation in the structure of 
land ownership in the freehold tenure.   
 
The 1920s saw a slight improvement in the non-freehold tenure index due to the Crown Land 
Disposal Proclamation 13 of 1920, which made provision for the proclamation of native reserve 
for the use of land-less black African. The South African regime only conferred occupational 
rights on the black Africans and confined their land holding to the designated black reserve or 
communal land. The rights enjoyed under this system were very limited as compared to the 
freehold tenure system. This was observed through regulation such as the Native Reserve 
regulation of 1924 which imposed a limitation on the number of stock to be owned and grazing 
fees on all stock grazed in the reserve or communal land. 
 
Between 1926 and 1948 the legal framework concentrated on the improvements and security of 
rights under the free hold tenure system with minimal or no focus on non freehold tenure system. 
Among others things, the period between 1926 and 1936 witness the consolidation of laws that 
enhances the financial assistance in land settlement under the freehold tenure system and further 
protection of title rights thereby improving the security of property rights under this system.  Of 
particular importance is the Land settlement Consolidation and Amendment Proclamation no.310 
of 1927, which made provision for the establishment of the land board with a view of acquiring 
more land for allotments to overseas applicants on behalf of the government.  The Farmer’s 
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Special Relief Proclamation no.18 of 1934 provided for advances of livestock to certain farmers 
affected by drought to enable them to continue or resume farming.  
Figure 3-3 Freehold vs. non-freehold property rights indices in Namibia: 1884-2009 
 
The period between 1940 and 1948 saw further improvements in the rights to occupy and 
ownership under the freehold with enactment of the Land Settlement Act of 1940 and Land 
Settlement Proclamation no.310 of 1948. These two pieces of legislation made provisions for the 
granting of temporary grazing licenses to more settlers and conversion of the temporary grazing 
licenses into full ownership of the land, respectively. By the end of this period, almost all crown 
land in Namibia had been allocated, and the property rights were firmly secured under the 
freehold tenure system.  
 
Given that the majority of black Africans were confined to the newly created reserves or 
communal land during the early 1920s, the quality of rights in non-freehold tenure remained 
largely unchanged during the entire period of the South African colonial regime. The marginal 
improvements noticeable in 1936, 1939 and 1956 are merely increases in the coverage of 
occupational rights additional land added to native reserve through the Development Trust Act 
18 of 1936; Native Trust Proclamation No.23 of 1939 and Native Reserve Ordinance No.4 of 
1956. The year 1968 witnessed the introduction of the homeland policy in Namibia through the 
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adoption of the Development of Self Government for Native Nations Act no. 54 of 196838. The 
Act made provision of segregation based on racial and ethnic groupings and a large number of 
blacks were to be relocated from their ancestral land to newly formed homelands. This marked a 
second land expropriation in the history of Namibia, although less severe than that of 1905 to 
1908. This concluded most pertained issues regarding property rights under the South African 
regime, no major legislations were issued until 1990.  
 
The adoption of the Republic Constitution in 1990, which guarantees protection of all rights 
including property rights, improved the status of both tenure systems. The year 2002 marked a 
changed in the two tenure system as measures of addressing the persistent divergences were 
initiated. Fundamental change in the formal structure of rights in the non-freehold tenure system 
came in 2002, twelve years after independence with the passing of the Communal Land Reform 
Act no. 5 of 2002. For the first time in the history of Namibia recognizable ownership under 
customary land rights is documented and acknowledged and extended for the natural life of the 
holder. On the other hand, the right to own and security under freehold tenure were threatened in 
2002 with the buying of land for resettlement purposes from foreign absentee landlord under the 
Agricultural (Commercial land reform) Act no. 13 of 2002.   
 
3.1.3 Interpretations of the property rights in Namibia 
 
This review is based on the composite property index (PCA Composite prop) derived using 
factor analysis due to its objectivity, which is plotted below (figure 3.4). The trend in the quality 
of property rights index (PCA Composite prop) in Namibia emerge from a very low protection 
based on informally written rules, governing the interaction between blacks and whites.  
Securing of property rights were ensured through customary laws under which Chiefs traded 
with the European settlers. The period 1890-1900 signified the notable change in the property 
rights index, as Germans settlers intensified land acquisition through the implementation of 
formal laws in favour of white settlers.  
 
                                                             
38 This based on the recommendation of the Odendaal Commission which was published in 1964.  
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Deterioration in the status of property rights occurred between the periods 1904 to 1908, the 
period 1915-1918, and the period 1968 to 1990 (figure 3.4). Although Namibia remained under 
repressive occupation until 1990, the process of land expropriations from the blacks was virtually 
concluded during the period between 1904 to 1908 under the following laws:  Expropriation of 
Lands and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation of 1902; Land Expropriation Ordinance of the 
Emperor of 1903; The Expropriation of land of dissident tribes, Imperial Ordinance of 1905 and 
Crown Land Disposal Ordinance of the Imperial Chancellor of 1907.  
All these legislations made provisions for full expropriations of all land under the occupation of 
all blacks who took part in the uprising which led to a genocide war in Namibia. Accordingly, 
under the German law for the period between 1907 and 1915 blacks or blacks in southern and 
central part of Namibia were prohibited from occupying land and owning large live-stock. 
Figure 3-4 Composite property rights indices in Namibia: 1884-2009 
 
 
The decline of the composite property index in 1915-1918 was due to the outbreak of World War 
I of 1914, which caused a structural break in property rights as landlords mainly from the 
freehold tenure system renounced their titles rights in favour of new South African landlords.  
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The period from the 1920-1960s saw an improvement in the status of property rights index, more 
pronounced for freehold tenure system and to a lesser extent in the non-freehold system. The 
sections on the two tenureship systems already discussed the reason behind the nature of this 
institutional framework. It should be noted, however, that the African blacks under the South 
African administration were allocated limited occupational rights on smaller sizes of land.  This, 
however, was an improvement compared to the situation of non-occupational rights that 
prevailed in southern and central part of Namibia after the genocide in 1908 until 1920.  
 
Between 1968 and1990, the property rights index deteriorated, mainly due to the introduction of 
homeland policy through the adoption of the Development of Self Government for Native 
Nations Act no. 54 of 1968. The Act made provision of segregation based on racial and ethnic 
groupings. The realisation of independence in Namibia in 1990 brought hope to many Namibians 
with regard to restoration of land ownership rights. Notable improvements are realised in 1996 
and 2002 with the introduction of the land resettlement programme and communal land reform, 
respectively.  
 
In summary, the legal land instruments passed during the Namibian colonial period from 1884 to 
1990, served two purposes i.e. provision of properties  and protection of already earned or 
acquired properties by the white settlers. The process of land expropriations from the blacks was 
completed in the first stage of the colonial period under the German regime and has persisted 
until today. The South Africans upheld the institutional framework by enclosing the blacks into 
smaller sizes of pieces of land known as the reserve or homelands. Finally, the Namibian 
democratic government is making rather a slow progress in addressing the disparity in land or 
property rights distribution, although they are generally firmly secured under the law. 
 
3.2 Political freedom in Namibia 
 
In large parts of Africa and especially among the pastoralist society of Namibia, the pre-colonial 
political systems were highly decentralized with law-making, social control and allocation of 
resources carried out by local entities such as lineage groupings and homestead communities.  
According to Legesse (2000; 1973), this type of system normally guaranteed consensual 
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decision-making arrangements due to its ability to curb the concentration of power in an 
institution or a person. Likewise, in other parts of Namibia as in Africa, centralization and 
concentration of power in the hands of the leaders also existed. 
 
The advent of colonial authority in Namibia in 1884 introduced a highly organised form of 
government that exerted foreign colonial authority over the black Africans. The German colonial 
period was marked by forcible restructuring of political and social relations by means of 
legalised dispossession of property (Bley, 1971) and the creation of labour coercive system 
through the introduction of pass laws and curfews.   
 
The South African administration retained the repressive general framework of the German 
forced labour system with minor modifications. Upon confirmation of the mandate, the South 
African regime introduced a more rigorous system of control which lasted until the late 1980s. 
The major focus was on the control of movement of all blacks in the territory and the control of 
blacks in urban areas. With the introduction of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1948, 
racial segregation intensified whereby fundamental political and civil rights of the black Africans 
were curtailed and minority rule by whites was maintained until 1990 when Namibia gained its 
independence.  
 
Due to the long period under review by this study, issues of commensurability arise. From 1884 
to 2009, Namibia went through various complex phases of political regimes, and it is thus 
impossible to assume a unified political system. Important synthetic observations can 
nevertheless be made from the observed data.  
 
3.2.1  Outcome of rating 
The three dimensions of contemporary democracy as measured by the Freedom House indices 
are evaluated as a single index in the study. Unlike other indices in this arena, this index is based 
on the formal rules and as such does not establish the de facto position of the freedoms as 
specified within the legislation.  
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  Figure 3-5 Sub-components of political freedom index for Namibia: 1884-2009 
  
 
The sub-components weights were adopted from the work of Gwenhamo et al (2008) and the 
outcome of the sub-components ratings are depicted in   figure 3.5.  The discussion below 
presents the composite political freedom index as shown in figure 3.6. The aggregation into a 
single composite was accomplished by the use of principal factor analysis technique.  
  
3.2.2  Interpretations of the political freedom in Namibia  
 
During the period under review, Namibia experienced a steady decline in the quality of political 
freedoms from 1896 with the proclamation of the Criminal Jurisdiction over the Natives 
Ordinance of the Imperial Chancellor. This decline is witnessed throughout until 1980, when 
slight improvements in terms of formal structure of the law were experienced. The marked 
improvement in 1989 is a result of the first democratic general election held on 11 November. 
The major overall improvements are witness in 1990 with the adoption of the Namibian 
Constitution of 1990 which provides for multiparty democracy and a bill of rights.  
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   Figure 3-6 Political freedom index for Namibia: 1884-2009 
 
 
The year 1899, witnessed the establishment of the first self-government for the white settlers and 
henceforth set the legal basis that impinged on fundamental political and civil rights of black 
Africans for the next century. The deterioration in the institutional framework reflected the 
notions of sovereignty derived from the European system of states and a direct exploitation of 
black Africans.   
 
The first severe deterioration in the quality of political and civil rights is observed between 1902 
and 1915 (figure 3.6).  This was manifested through the legislation of the Emigration of the 
Natives Ordinance of 1902 and Pass Law Ordinance of 1907, which restricted the movements of 
the blacks in Namibia. The Pass Law Ordinance of 1907, among others stipulated that all blacks 
above the age of seven should be registered and carry a metal badge around the neck as a pass. A 
provision was made for any white person to arrest a pass-less black man and handover to the 
police. The same period witnessed repressive labour system stifling personal freedom of the 
blacks with the adoption of the Contracts of Service Ordinance of the Governor of 1907. The 
ordinance calls for registration and employment of every male whose age is above seven years. 
Other constraints on individual freedom were perpetuated through laws such as the Prohibition 
of Mixed Marriages Act of 1905, which served to prohibit sexual relations across the statutorily 
defined racial boundaries.  
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The period 1915 to 1919 marks a slight improvement in the formal rights, largely on the revision 
of the Masters and Servants Ordinance in 1916, and then again in 1918. The revision raised the 
age limit for compulsory labour of blacks from age seven to 14 years. It made provision for 
centralised control and punishment of offences under these laws. Further the practice of “fatherly 
correction” (whereby white employers had the right to beat their servants) and flogging was 
outlawed.  
 
The improvements in formal rights for the majority of the black Africans were transitory as more 
stringent laws for the control of movements, assembly and expression were enacted. This 
included the Suppression of Vagrancy and Idleness Proclamation no.25 of 1920 and the Pass 
Law Proclamation no. 11 of 1922. These were reinforced by the   Natives (Urban Areas) No. 34 
of 1924 and the Natives (rural) Regulation of 1924. Universal suffrage was denied through the 
provision in the first South West Africa Constitution Act no.42 of 1925. The Act made provision 
for the establishment of an all white Legislative Assembly and Executive Committee elected by 
the white electoral community.  
 
In terms of formal structure of the law, the situation remained largely unchanged from 1925 to 
1948, despite some introduction of some few new laws and amendments to existing legislations. 
This is followed by deteriorations in formal rights observed during 1949 through to 1980. The 
period is underscored by a passing of discriminative laws that extended and specified more fully 
the arbitrary power of the executive.  First, the year 1949 witnessed a de facto incorporation of 
Namibia into South Africa, through the amendment of the South West Affairs Constitution Act 
no.23 of 1949. The whites of Namibia were given direct representations in the South African 
Parliament. Then a stream of laws were enacted in the South African Parliament and made 
applicable to Namibia. Included in this legislation were Riotous Assemblies and Suppressions of 
Communism Act no.15 of 1954 and no.17 of 1956.  
 
 There is a further worsening in formal rights again in 1966 and the subsequent year with the 
passing of the Suppressions of Communism Act of 1966 and the Terrorism Act of 1967. These 
pieces of legislation authorised detention without charge for an indefinite period and provided 
for the death penalty for persons convicted of terrorism. More repressive laws were enforced in 
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1970s throughout Namibia. Included in this volume of laws are the Proclamation R17 of 1972, 
The Internal Security Act of 1976, Proclamation AG9 of November 1977, Proclamation AG26 of 
April of 1978 and Proclamation AG50 of 1978. In all this legislation, a general ban is placed on 
all meetings, applied curfews at night and provisions for the detention and deportation of persons 
considered a threat to the SA authority.  
 
The amendment to the South West Africa Constitution Act 95 of 1977 saw the abolishment of 
Namibian representation in the South African Parliament in 1977. A slight change in the 
legislation occurred in 1980 with the passing of the Representative Authorities Proclamation 
AG8 of 1980 which made provision for second tier governmental authorities based on ethnic 
division of Namibia. A few amendments and repeal to laws were made with a view of improving 
the extension of arbitrary power of the executive. These include the Abolition of Racial 
Discrimination Act no.10 of 1980 and Abolition of Racial Discrimination Act No.21 of 1981. 
These pieces of legislation mainly removed the restrictions on use of public amenities based on 
race. All other repressive legislations, however, remained intact.  
 
The marked improvement in 1989 is a result of the first democratic general election held on 11 
November. The major overall improvements are witnessed in 1990 with the adoption of the 
Namibian Constitution of 1990 which provides for multiparty democracy and a bill of rights 
(figure 3.6). Furthermore, the Racial Discrimination Prohibition Act no.26 of 1991, makes all 
certain acts of racial discrimination and apartheid a criminal offense and punishable by law. The 
first amendment to the Republic Constitution in 1998 which made provision for the first 
President of Namibia to hold office for three terms showed some degree of extension of arbitrary 
executive power. There has been, however, no major attack on the quality of rights, in terms of 
the formal structure of political and civil freedoms in Namibia since Independence in 1990.   
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3.3  Judicial independence39 
 
Prior to the establishment of colonial rule in many parts of Africa, likewise in Namibia there was 
no central machinery for the administration of justice, and therefore the practice of settling 
disputes was not uniform.  
 
The German colonial period, saw a formalisation of judicial institutions that was characterized 
by a dichotomy. The court system was developed along racial lines and thus provided for a 
different structure of administration of justice between whites and black Africans.  In the case of 
whites clear separation of powers between the executive and judiciary existed, while in the case 
of blacks the division was non-existent. The local administrative authorities under District 
Officers exercised civil, criminal and contentious jurisdiction over the blacks. 
The South African colonial authority saw a clear separation of the judiciary from the executive 
power by law. The administration procedures, however, remained dichotomise as the judiciary 
tended to adhere to racial laws passed by the legislative, until the abolishment of these laws 
during the post- independence period.  
 
3.3.1 Outcomes of rating 
 
It should be noted that for the purpose of the de jure indicators, the study relied on formal 
structural guarantees of independence of the judiciary as specified in the law, without 
ascertaining the degree of judicial independence de facto.40  It is irrelevant to this indicator 
whether or not interference took place or not. Due to colonial history in Namibia, the 
construction of realistic measures of independence of the judiciary should encompass both 
consideration of the Higher and Lower courts, as the majority of the black African had access 
only to Lower Courts. This is shown in figure 3.7 below. The resulting index is based on initial 
                                                             
39 For the purpose of this study the judicial independence and the independence of judiciary is used interchangeable 
to mean the same concept.  
40 This is captured in the de facto measure of the Independence of the Judiciary discussed in the next section under 
3.4 of this paper. The idea is to separate the two to allow for close scrutiny of the measures as they portray two 
different realities in general. 
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equal weighting of the sub-components and then combined together using the factor analysis to 
reduce subjectivity in the indicator.  
 
Figure 3-7 Sub-components of judicial independence (de jure): 1884-2009 
 
 
3.3.2 Interpretations of the judicial independence index (de jure) 
 
One of the main characteristics of traditional communities’ judicial institutions was collective 
responsibility either in the centralised or the decentralised system. As such, the separation of 
powers and checks and balance were virtually non-existent.  
Despite the lack of separation of powers, all other measures were present such as access to tribal 
authority, representation procedures and respect and uphold of decisions.  
 
As a result, the introduction of the German Law for the protection area in 1886 saw the first 
attempt in the separation of powers, between the various branches of government. This was 
rather weak given that the broader sections of the society were served by a combined system in 
the Lower Courts. The Criminal Jurisdiction over the Natives’ Ordinance of the Imperial 
Chancellor of 1896 compromised the impartial in practise of the judicial system (figure 3.8). 
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A slight improvement was noticeable in 1919 with the passing of the Administration of Justice 
Proclamation No.21 of 1919. The proclamation provided for the establishment of High and 
Lower courts in Namibia and the application of Roman Dutch law. The Appellate Division Act 
No.12 of 1920, however, placed the appeals of High Court of Namibia under the jurisdiction of 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa thereby denied Namibians 
impartiality. Their fate was left to be determined in another country as the court sitting were 
taking place in Pretoria, South Africa. Although the, SWA Constitution Act No.42 of 1925 
underscored a clear separation between the executive, legislative and judicial authorities. The 
judicial matters, however, remained one of the reserved issues under the direct jurisdiction of the 
Union of South Africa.  
 
The period between 1920 until the late 1940s witnessed a rather stable formal structural 
protection of the independence of the judiciary (figure 3.8). Judges enjoyed security of tenure 
and of salary and courtrooms were generally open to the public throughout the period under the 
South African regime.  The legal system, however, only served the white minority who had 
working knowledge of the law and also excluded the black majority from any meaningful 
education system and the legal profession. 
Figure 3-8 Judicial independence (de jure) index for Namibia: 1884-2009 
 
Deteriorations in the independence of the judicial framework were witnessed as from 1948 
throughout to 1990 as the National Party government directly sought to undermine the judiciary. 
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One such an early attempt was application of Appellate Division Quorum Act of 1955, which 
made provision for the President to appoint additional judges to higher court to sit in cases 
concerning the validity of an Act of Parliament. These created a bench where judges would be 
more likely to approve, or at least tacitly accept, apartheid laws. 
 
Further declines are witnessed in 1959, when the Namibian High Court was merged into that of 
South Africa with the application of the Supreme Court Act no. 59 of 1959. According to the 
Act, the Namibian High Court became part of the provisional division of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa. This subjected Namibia to all application of apartheid laws which among others 
things affected appointment and tenure system of judicial personnel. Blacks were denied 
membership to bodies such as the Pretoria Bar whose members were heavy utilised by the 
National Party government in the appointment of judges as from the 1950s. 
Apart from intervening in the judicial administration the South African government passed laws 
that affected the black majority in Namibia and by upholding these laws the formal judicial 
framework compromised its independence away from executive or legislature. This practise 
underscored the parliamentary supremacy over the legal system.  
 
The period from 1985, witnessed a change in the Supreme Court of South West Africa/Namibia 
as they started questioning some of apartheid laws application in Namibia with the adoption of 
Proclamation R101 of 1985. This marked a major departure from the earlier period as the 
country prepared for transition to independence. It should be, however, noted that interim 
government sought refuge in the Appellate division of South Africa to uphold the draconian laws 
which were in contradiction of the Proclamation R101 of 1985.  
A large improvement in formal judicial independence institutional framework was realised with 
the adoption of Namibian Constitution in 1990 which created the judiciary as one of the main 
organs of the state. Article 78, (1) (2) and (3) of the Republic of Namibia Constitution of 1990 
provide for the establishment of the judiciary and its independence, consisting of the Supreme 
Court, a High and Lower Courts.  
 
In 1991, the Attorneys Amendment Act no. 17 of 1991 and the Admission of Advocates 
Amendment Act no. 19 of 1991 were amended to allow Namibian who obtained legal 
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qualification from other University than South African’s Universities to practice law in Namibia. 
More improvements are witnessed in 1992 with the establishment of the Labour Court which 
belonged to the Superior Courts of Namibia with the adoption of the Labour Act no.6 of 1992 
(figure 4). The Act also established the District Labour court which is the hierarchy of the lower 
courts. The composition of judges and acting judges were to be determined by the Judge 
President thereby limiting any interference from the other arms of government directly. 
 
A further improvement was observed in 1995 with the adoption of the Legal Practitioners Act, 
1995 (Act 15 of 1995) which made provision for the merging of the advocates and attorneys 
profession. This reduced legal cost and improved access to legal representation without being 
referred from the attorney to obtain services of an advocate who is an expert in a specific field of 
law.  
 
The formal structure of judicial independence in Namibia has been amplified to join the ranks of 
countries which have explicit declaration of judicial independence in their constitution. This is 
important in countries which had elevated the Constitution to be supreme law of the land.  
 
3.4  Judicial independence (de facto) 
3.4.1  Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework for assessing judicial independence is capturing the dynamics that 
encourage or impede factual judicial independence. The judiciary plays an oversight role to 
ensure liberal democracy. To achieve the oversight role, the judicial independence relies on the 
principle that judges must decide cases fairly and impartially, relying only on the facts and the 
law.  
 
To assess de facto judicial independence, five sub-components have used. Each of the five sub-
components were standardised to takes on values between 0-4, where a greater value in this 
instance indicates a constraint of the degree of Judicial Independence. The index is constructed 
by applying the method of principles component analysis on the sub-components. 
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3.4.2 Interpretations of the judicial independence (de facto) index41 
 
The period between 1950 and 1985, shows a little movements in the index as the judiciary was 
highly intertwined with executive and legislative. Under colonial rule the judiciary largely acted 
as an instrument of administration rather than protecting the people and overseeing the exercise 
of executive power. There are no reported cases of judgments invalidating repressive legislation, 
thereby rendering the judicial to be seen as independent. There were no contempt of court cases 
and judicial harassment as the two organs represented the same ideology.  
 
The period from 1985, witnessed a change in the working between the two branches of the state. 
With judicial defending few cases in the application of apartheid laws, the executive sought to 
undermine its working by side-stepping the judiciary. This included the formation of para-militia 
groups42 that took the handling of justice in their own hands.  
 
Figure 3-9 Judicial independence (de facto) index for Namibia: 1884-2009 
 
 
                                                             
41 Due to the limited reliable data on sub-components of this index, the period of coverage is from 1950 to 2009.  
42 This refers to formation of the koevoet or crow bar by the governing regime in Namibia in 1980s.It should be 
noted that the formation of this group is not whole attributable to the above illustrated event, but also is due others 
factors which are beyond this study.  
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Since 1990, the judges in Namibia have enjoyed a relative independence in passing the decision. 
Cases of contempt of court are very rare and judicial bribery is not prevalent which has become 
evident in many developing countries upon attainment of independence.  
 
A slight movement is noticeable in 2004, when attacks on unpopular ruling by a High Court in 
the case of treason were attack by some members of the ruling political party. In the case of 
Namibia it appears that the de jure nature of Judicial Independence as formally guaranteed in the 
Namibian Constitutions is factually enjoyed.  
 
3.5  Political instability 
3.5.1  Conceptual framework 
 
The measure of instability developed in this study captures various dimensions of social unrest 
and disturbances.  According to Alesina and Perrotti (1996), one may argue that when instability 
reaches high levels, social unrest disrupts market activities and increases economic uncertainty. 
In the past the Namibian political economy was underscored by social unrest as opposed to 
executive instability.  This study, therefore adopts the social unrest approach in measuring 
political instability.  
 
The inclusion of sub-components in the indicator is based on the work of Fedderke et al (2001) 
to maintain a fair level of comparisons. In addition, township riots and strike was added as sub-
components given the multitude occurrences of this event in Namibia.  The index is constructed 
by applying the method of principal component43 to the following sub-components: 
 
1. The number of politically motivated arrests per year 
2. The number of political parties and publication banned per year 
3. The number of declarations and renewals of states of emergencies per year 
4. Incidents of war-related armed attacks on the general public per year 
5. Township strikes and riots 
                                                             
43 This technique is chosen to overcome the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate weighting of the components as 
expressed in the work of Fedderke et al (2001) and Gwenhamo et al (2008).  
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3.5.2 Interpretations of political instability index 
 
High episodes of political and social instability occurred as early as 1904 to 1908, an uprising 
that led to the genocide in Namibia (figure 3.10).  The next peak is witnessed in 1915 as Namibia 
was subject to war-related armed attacks due to the World War I. The declared state of 
emergencies in 1915 lasted until 1918.  
Figure 3-10 Political instability index for Namibia: 1884-2009 
 
 
The 1922 and 1925 instability is attributable to rebellions amongst the Bondelswart ethnic group 
of Warmbad and the Rehoboth unrest respectively. The 1940 and 1950s witness the formation of 
a number of African nationalist parties opposing the minority white rule economic and political 
domination through petitions to the United Nations. The mid-1960s signifies the commencement 
of serious hostilities in the country. This intensified during the period 1970s up to the time of 
independence in 1990. The year 1999 witnessed further political unrest due to attempted 
secessionist attacks in the Caprivi region.  
 
3.6   Comparative analysis 
In this section, two types of comparative analyses are undertaken. First, a comparison is made 
between the newly constructed indicators for Namibia with other measures widely used in the 
literature. The second comparison focuses on the evolution of three countries’44 formal 
                                                             
44 This includes Namibia, Tanzania, and South Africa and the datasets was constructed along the same dimension.  
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institutional frameworks. The analysis seeks to disclose how historical associations among these 
countries have changed over time. A comparison is made between Tanzania45 and Namibia. This 
is motivated by the fact that these countries shared a close alignment of the initial legal 
frameworks under the German regime. Due to their institutional frameworks historical ties, direct 
comparison between Namibia and South Africa46  is made.  
 
3.6.1  Comparison of new indices 
3.6.1.1  Namibia formal institutional framework 
Table 3.1 shows the non-parametric Spearman correlation coefficients for the new series of 
formal institutional indices and the widely used indicators of political freedoms and property 
rights in Namibia. The sign of the spearman correlation coefficient (r) indicates the direction 
between variables. The value of the coefficient varies between -1 and +1; with r = 1 indicating a 
perfect positive correlation, r = -1 indicating a perfect negative correlation and r = 0 indicating 
no correlation between the variables concerned. As the values moves towards 0, the relationship 
between the variables is weaker.  
Table 3:1Spearman correlation coefficients for Namibia 
Indices The New Constructed Indices Freedom House 
indicators 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Index 
Fraser Institute 
index 
 NAM-
Prop 
NAM-
Polfree 
NAM-JI 
de jure 
NAM-
Pol Inst 
Polfree-
FH 
Civil-
FH 
Prop -HR Prop-FR 
NAM-Prop 1.00        
NAM-
Polfree 
0.18* 1.00       
NAM-JI de 
jure 
0.73** 0.34** 1.00      
NAM-Pol 
Inst 
-
0.43** 
-0.39** -0.36** 1.0000     
Polfree-FH -0.32 0.36 -0.56** -0.0044 1.00    
Civil (FH) -
0.62** 
0.47* -0.59** -0.1393 0.62** 1.00   
Prop -HR -0.58* -0.45 0.00 0.0000 -0.70* 0.31 1.00  
Prop-FR 0.17 -0.48* 0.67** 0.3303 -0.68** -0.39 0.52 1.00 
Notes: * denotes significance at 5 %;** denotes significance at 1 % level 
                                                             
45 The Tanzania data is obtained from the work of Zaaruka et al. (2011). 
46 The South African data is derived from the work of Fedderke et al. (2001).  
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The property rights index is compared to the Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute indices 
of property rights. There is a correlation between the constructed property rights index (Nam-
Prop) and the Heritage Foundation property index (Prop-HR) with a coefficient of -0.58 and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The negative sign between these indices is due to inverted 
scale. The Fraser Institute index (Prop-FR) is poorly correlated with a coefficient of 0.18 and 
statistically insignificant. This might demonstrate the assessment of alternative rights measures 
based on de jure factors as argued by Glaeser et al (2004).  
 
The political freedom index is compared to the Freedom House indices of political freedom and 
civil liberties, which runs from 1989 -2008. The newly constructed Political Freedom index 
(Nam-Polfree) is poorly correlated with the Freedom House political freedom (Polfree-FH) with 
at a coefficient of 0.37 and statistically insignificant, while a statistically significant correlation is 
detected between the Political Freedom index and the Freedom House civil liberties (Civil-FH). 
The negative sign between these indices is due to inverted scale.  
 
When comparing the new indices, there is a low and insignificant correlation of 0.18 between 
Property rights index and the Political Freedom index. The correlation between property rights 
index and political instability (Nam-Inst) is -.0.43 and statistically significant. The judicial 
independence (Nam-JI de jure) maintains a weak correlation with the political freedom and 
political instability with correlation coefficients of 0.34 and -0.39 respectively. This confirms the 
differences in the forms of rights. 
3.6.2  Evolution of formal institutional framework  
 
3.6.2.1  Namibia and Tanzania 
 
Figures 3.11; 3.12 and 3.13 depict the status of property rights; political freedom and judicial 
independence de jure indices for Namibia and Tanzania respectively.  
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(i) Property rights index 
The status of property rights in Tanzania fared comparatively better than in Namibia from the 
early 1900s to the early 1960s. There are two possible explanations for this. The first relates to 
the type of economic activities that were undertaken in these countries. The second relates to 
German responses to wars that took place in the 1900s.  
 
Figure 3-11 Comparison of property rights indices: Namibia vs. Tanzania 
 
 
A majority of the Tanzanian population practiced crop cultivation and proof of ownership for 
blacks could be shown through effective occupation. Namibia, in particular the central and 
southern part which experienced a great deal of western influence, was occupied by pastoral and 
semi-pastoral communities for whom proof of ownership was difficult. Secondly, after the period 
of the internal wars, the German colonial power issued various pieces of legislation to 
expropriate land in Namibia, thereby causing an irreversible deterioration in the status of 
property rights in Namibia.  
 
Tanzania ratings started deteriorating in the mid-1960s under the new socialist government, as 
individual ownership was virtually extinguished. The only improvements came after 1984 and 
1999 with the introduction of the new laws which addressed the issues surrounding bills of right 
and customary land rights respectively.  
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(ii) Political freedom indices 
 
With regard to political freedoms, the two countries seem to be more at par. However the 
extreme harsh laws, i.e. the pass law and the contract law of 1907 in Namibia, compromise 
Namibian freedoms severely. Generally, under the period of colonialism, political freedoms were 
equally stifled in the two countries. The improvement in Tanzania in 1961 was quite short lived 
as the situation reversed, with the declaration of the one-party state under the post-colonial 
government.  
 
Figure 3-12 Comparison of political freedom indices: Namibia vs. Tanzania 
 
 
In Namibia, the deteriorating trend could be ascribed to the application of the apartheid doctrine 
in the late 1940s. However, since independence in 1990, political freedoms are legally better 
respected than in Tanzania. 
 
(iii)  Judicial independence de jure indices 
 
The judicial independence framework statuses of the two countries appear to be at parity both 
under the German colonisation period and the respective British and South Africa regime for 
Tanzania and Namibia.  
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Figure 3-13 Comparison of judicial independence (de jure) indices: Namibia vs. Tanzania 
 
 
Since the 1960s, with Tanzania gaining independence, a divergence is noticeable, but is not 
carried out in full. This is due partly to the notion of supremacy of the party over the arms of 
government. Namibia experienced strong improvements in 1990 with the adoption of the 
Constitution, which enshrined the independence of the judiciary.  
 
3.6.2.2  Namibia and South Africa 
 
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show the status of property rights and political freedom indices for 
Namibia and South Africa. The status of property rights between the two countries shows some 
good degree of association from the mid-1940s till mid-1970s due to application of apartheid 
legislation. The situation improved significantly in South Africa in the early 1980s onwards with 
the repeal of black discriminatory laws. Noticeable improvements in the case of Namibia are 
only seen after independence in 1990. It should be noted however, that the Namibian government 
has been slow in addressing issues related to property rights i.e. land issues in Namibia, hence 
the bigger divergence in the status of property rights between the two countries. 
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Figure 3-14 Comparison of property rights indices: Namibia vs. South Africa 
 
 
The political freedoms however remained at par during the period under review. Namibia for 
first time showed a slightly better measure in the mid-1960s and this could be party explained by 
the interference of the United Nations in running of the mandate of South Africa over Namibia. 
There were some delays in the application of repressive laws to Namibia, while the period from 
1977, shows the abolition of Namibian seats in the South African parliament. The period 1980-
1989 gave the Namibian Legislative Council powers to make its own laws on all matters. Some 
repressive laws were repealed in preparation for the country transition to democratic rule.  
 
Figure 3-15 Comparison of political rights indices: Namibia vs. South Africa 
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3.7  Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of the chapter is to present new long time series of institutional characteristics 
for Namibia. In measuring of institutions, the thesis used written rules in line with accepted 
definition of formal institutions being postulated in the literature. This led to institutional 
indicators that are de jure in nature representing property rights, political freedom and judiciary 
independence for Namibia covering a long period from 1884 to 2009.  The de facto element is 
also considered through the construction of separate indicators on political instability for the 
period from 1884 to 2009 and judicial independence defacto covering the period 1950 to 2009. 
The new indicators while covering a long time period (1884-2009), correlate fairly well with 
some of the widely used institutional indices produced by the Freedom House and the Heritage 
foundation.  
 
The cross-country comparisons between Namibia and Tanzania reveal a comparable pattern in 
political freedom and judicial independence both under the German colonial administration and 
subsequently, under the British colonial administration over Tanzania and the South African 
colonial administration over Namibia. The property rights patterns however, remain divergent 
between the two countries under the German colonial rule. The comparison between the Namibia 
and its former coloniser i.e. South Africa shows a similar close pattern in terms of political 
freedom and property rights for most of the period. The early-1980s, witness huge improvements 
in property rights in South Africa, while Namibia improved slowly over time.   
 
Another feature of the study, covering this long period underscores the notion of persistence in 
institutions. The paper argued that despite changes in colonial regimes, the broader framework of 
institutions remained partly the same. This is reflected in the institutional framework such 
contract labour system and pass laws which were applicable during the German era and upheld 
by the next regime. In Namibia, the expropriation of land during German colonial administration 
led to creation of smaller size land units known as reserve for the African blacks. The smaller 
sizes of unproductive land could partly explain the problem of income inequality in Namibia 
today.  
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Chapter 4  
4. The nature of the institutional framework in Tanzania 1884-2009 
4.0  Introduction 
 
This section discusses the interpretation of property rights, political freedoms and political 
instability indices for Tanzania for the period 1884-2009.  
 
4.1 Property rights in Tanzania 
 
The nature of property rights that evolved over a number of years in Tanzania is an outcome of 
the land tenure system implemented during both German and British colonial times, and 
modified after independence by the socialist government and again by the new democratic 
government in 1992. This led to four distinct major transformations in the land tenure system as 
identified in the subsequent paragraphs (see James, 1971; Fimbo, 1992; Kironde 2004):   
1. The introduction and promotion of plantation agriculture under German administration 
introduced the formal distinction between the freehold tenure and non-freehold land 
system in the country. Prime agricultural land was generally allocated in freehold titles, 
to white settlers. All arable land which was at the disposal of the chiefs or indigenous 
communities was vested in the German Empire and could be alienated by the Governor.   
2. The system of all arable land holding continued to change under the British 
Administration, whereby all rights over land were placed under the control of the 
Governor. The rights of occupancy were introduced in the country and in 1928 it was re-
defined to include the rights of black African in land holding.  
3. The third transformation was introduced in the post-independence period, when all 
freehold titles were converted into leaseholds, thereby abolishing the freehold tenure 
system created under German occupation. A new tenure emerged known as the Ujamaa 
village or collective ownership land rights. Compulsory acquisition of black African land 
by the government and land disposition was prevalent as the controlling power of chiefs 
over land was rendered obsolete after independence in 1963; and   
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4. The final transformation started in 1984, with the introduction of a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution of 1977 that provided for the protection of land ownership. The 1999 Land 
Act no.4 and Village Act no.5 re-introduced the concepts of the communal land village, 
as well as individual and family land ownership. 
 
4.1.1 Outcomes of rating 
Due to the distinct time periods that characterised the history of Tanzania, a single property 
rights indicator would not reflect the differences in rights enjoyed by different holders. The 
evaluation of the security of rights over property was undertaken separately for the two different 
tenure systems, i.e. the freehold tenure system and the customary or non-freehold tenure system. 
An attempt was made to construct a single indicator using a multivariate technique.47 The 
discussion begins with the evaluation of the freehold and non-freehold tenure systems, before 
focusing on the single composite indicator of property rights in Tanzania. Figures 1 and 2 present 
the sub-components of the freehold tenure system and customary or non-freehold tenure system, 
respectively.   
Figure 4-1 Sub-components of property rights index (freehold tenure):1884-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
47 In the case of Tanzania it is impossible to obtain figures based on racial groupings since 1960, due to the Census 
design. Therefore, the composite index is based on factor analysis.  
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Figure 4-2 Sub-components of property rights index (non-freehold tenure):1884-2009 
 
 
4.1.2 Freehold versus non-freehold tenure system in Tanzania48 
 
The distinction between the qualities of rights in freehold against non-freehold tenure systems 
was introduced as early as 1895, through the introduction of formal laws regulating land rights in 
Tanzania. The passing of the Imperial Decree regarding Creation, Acquisition and Conveyance 
of Crown land in 1895 recognised the conveyance of ownership or lease through issued title 
deeds for settlers, while the proof of ownership for blacks was recognised through effective 
occupation. Black Africans therefore were defined to have occupational rights on the land.   
 
The period between 1903 and 1915 witnessed a noticeable improvement in both tenure indices 
(see figure 4.3). This was due to the Imperial Ordinance of 1902 and Land Registration 
Ordinance of 1903, which formalised land registries for whites and blacks respectively. It should 
be noted, however, that registration of land for black Tanzanians was only permissible as long as 
it was located within the boundaries of the communities or villages. The period between 1917 
and 1920 marked a decline in the status of the property rights index in the freehold tenure 
system, as all German-owned properties were transferred to the Custodian of Enemy Property49 
                                                             
48 The terms “customary tenure system” and “non-freehold tenure system” are used interchangeably in this study.  
49 It was a British colonial department that was empowered to appropriate property in Tanzania owned by German 
nationals.  
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through proclamation no.5 of 1917. The Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act of 1919, 
however, instituted compensation to the affected owners.  
 
 During 1923 to 1928, an improvement in the freehold tenure system was witnessed, due to the 
passing of Land Ordinance No. 3 of 1923 and Land Registry Ordinance no.15 of 1923. Both 
ordinances recognised and allowed for registration of freehold titles held dating back from the 
German era. All freehold titles that were granted by the German administration continued to 
exist. On the other hand, a slight improvement in the security of rights in non-freehold tenure 
came in 1928 with the application of the Land Ordinance of 1928, which accorded the status of 
deemed right of occupancy for the black Africans.  
 
The difference in the quality of rights between the two tenure systems between 1926 and 1945 is 
mainly on account of colonial state intervention on the rights of use and management through 
regulations, orders and by-laws imposed on black Africans. The by-laws were made through so-
called native authorities who were established by the Governor under the Native Authorities 
Ordinance no.8 of 1926. The native authorities were empowered to make orders in terms of land 
cultivation and failure to obey resulted in a fine or imprisonment. Other pieces of legislation 
which restricted the ability of individuals to use the property included the Native Coffee (Control 
and Marketing) Ordinance no.26 of 1937 and the Native Tobacco (Control and Marketing) 
Ordinance no.39 of 1940. These Ordinances prescribed stringent measures governing sowing, 
planting, cultivation and preparation to modify farming habits of black Africans. In 1946, the 
Declaration of the Trusteeship Agreement, under Article 8, which guaranteed the respect and the 
protection of Africans’ customary land rights, signified some improvement under the non-
freehold tenure system.  
 
The improved status of rights under the freehold tenure system continued in the 1950s under the 
British Administration, while a systematic decline in the non-freehold tenure was observed. The 
enactment of the Land Registration Ordinance no. 36 of 1953 strengthened the rights under 
freehold tenure system. The act made special provision for all granted rights to be registered, 
including former German titles of absolute ownership. This act repealed and replaced all earlier 
ordinances. However, all forms of ownership held dating back to the German period were 
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recognised. On the other hand, the application of the National Parks Ordinance of 1959 
weakened the rights under the non-freehold tenure system. The ordinance made provision to 
extinguish customary land rights formally in all areas declared to be national parks.  
 
Figure 4-3 Freehold vs. non-freehold property rights indices in Tanzania: 1884-2009 
 
 
With independence in 1961, the Socialist government made land ownership and control its major 
pre-occupation. This resulted in a major deterioration in both the security of rights in the non-
freehold and freehold tenure systems. The period between 1963 and 1974, served a major blow 
to rights under the freehold tenure system, while heavy attacks on non-freehold rights was 
witnessed between 1973 and 1992.  
 
In 1963 the first deterioration in the status of property rights under freehold tenure as a result of 
the enactment of Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act no.24 of 1963 was 
witnessed. The act converted all estate into government leases for 99 years, thereby limiting the 
perpetual time frame of interests in land. It should be noted that this law did not include 
expropriation of land. The nationalisation of properties, between 1973 and 1974, led to a further 
decline in the status of the property rights index under freehold tenure. Specific laws such as the 
Coffee Estates (Acquisition and Re-grant) Act of 1973 and the Sisal Estate (Acquisition and Re-
grant) Act of 1974 gave effect to that.  
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The passing of the Nyarubanja50 Tenure (Enfranchisement) Act no.1 of 1965, which was enacted 
to abolish future holdings in nyarubanja tenure, introduced the systematic decline in the non-
freehold tenure system. The act provided for land to be expropriated from landlords and to be 
offered to tenants. This was further re-enforced through the Customary Leaseholds 
(Enfranchisement) Act no.47 of 1968. A deterioration of the status of non-freehold tenure 
property right index in 1973 resulted from the enactment of the Rural Farm Lands (Planning and 
Utilization) Act no.14 of 1973. The act made provisions for government to seize land for 
planning purposes.  
 
The adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1984, by amending the Constitution of 1977, marked 
improvements in both indices. The Bill of Rights guaranteed for the first time in the history of 
Tanzania the right to possess and the protection of acquired property in accordance with the law. 
The non-freehold tenure system however, continued to be attacked as the Government enacted 
by-laws to extinguish customary land rights in certain parts of Tanzania in 1986 (see figure 4.3). 
These by-laws continued to be extended to other parts between 1987 and 1989. The biggest blow 
to the status of properties held under the non-freehold tenure system came in 1992, when the 
Government sought to extinguish customary tenure under the Land Tenure (Established 
Villages) Act no.22 of 1992. This was however ruled unconstitutional and removed in 1994 from 
the statute book by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania.  
 
Furthermore, improvements in both indices are also noticeable in 1999 with the new Land Act 
no.4 and the Village Act no.5 of 1999, which repealed the Land Ordinance of 1923 and other 
colonial laws. The new Land Act makes provision for increased security of tenure, increased 
possibilities of disposition such as inheritance, selling and sub-leasing.  
 
4.1.3 Interpretations of the property rights index 
 
Factor analysis was used to obtain a single indicator of property rights. The technique placed a 
51 percent weight contribution on freehold tenure, while the customary tenure system accounts 
                                                             
50 The nyarubanja system was a feudal kind of land holding in some parts of Tanzania, whereby one person (within 
the tribe) owned a large tract of land (called Nyarubanja) which was partitioned and rented out to tenants.  
64 
 
for 49 percent in the single composite (see figure 4.4). This is expected, given that most laws 
passed affected the two systems equally with special reference to the period after independence 
in 1961. The analysis is based on the composite property index, which represents the nature of 
the property rights framework for the rest of the study, as plotted in figure 4.4.  
 
Changes in the property rights index are observed as early as 1891, with the passing of the land 
acquisition imperial ordinance of 1891, which proclaimed that the colonial government had the 
right to own all un-owned land within the German spheres of interest in German East Africa. 
This was reinforced in legislation, through the Crown Land Ordinance of 1894, which declared 
that all land in German East Africa was un-owned, unless proof of documentation could be 
presented. In the case of blacks, proof of ownership could be shown through effective 
occupation.  
Figure 4-4 Composite property rights index for Tanzania: 1884 -2009 
 
 
The period 1903-1915, witnessed a slight improvement in the institutional framework due to 
changes in laws that allowed land registration for whites through the Imperial Ordinance of 1902 
and the Land Registration Ordinance of 1903. However, the commencement of World War I led 
to a decline of the property rights index as freehold title rights belonging to German nationals 
were deemed enemy property and renounced in favour of the Custodian of Enemy Property 
according to Proclamation no.5 of 1917.  
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
18
84
18
88
18
92
18
96
19
00
19
04
19
08
19
12
19
16
19
20
19
24
19
28
19
32
19
36
19
40
19
44
19
48
19
52
19
56
19
60
19
64
19
68
19
72
19
76
19
80
19
84
19
88
19
92
19
96
20
00
20
04
20
08
In
de
x
Year
65 
 
The period 1923-1960 saw an improvement in the status of the property rights index. Of 
particular interest was the introduction of the right of occupancy system in Tanganyika. The 
Land (Amendment) Ordinance no.7 of 1928 formalised the customary land rights, which were 
defined as a right to use and occupy land. Improvements were observed in 1946 and the period 
1953-1960, due to the declaration of the trusteeship agreement and the introduction of a number 
of land registries ordinances respectively (see figure 4.4). The initial period after independence 
in 1961 saw the adoption of most colonial laws with the substitution of the word “President” for 
the word “Governor” in the application of Land Ordinance of 1923 and its amendment in 1928. 
Therefore, the power of granting land became vested in the President of the United Republic of 
Tanzania.  
 
The year 1963 marks the start of deterioration in the status of property rights, a trend that lasted 
for almost 16 years (see figure 4.4). This was realised through the introduction of the Arusha 
declaration and the subsequent nationalisation policies that were enacted during the period 1967-
1983. This resulted in severe declines in formal ownership rights under the freehold tenure 
system as well as massive loss of customary land rights in favour of the Ujamaa Villages or 
government communal villages. The 1970s were arguably the most significant period of 
deterioration in the formal structure of the property rights index due to an attack on both the 
freehold tenure and customary tenure system.  
 
Improvements in the status of property rights were witnessed with the amendment of the 1977 
Constitution in 1984, with the introduction of the Bills of Rights, which guaranteed for the first 
time in the history of Tanzania the right to possess and the protection of acquired property in 
accordance with the law. Furthermore, improvements are also noticeable in 1999 with the new 
Land Act no.4 and the Village Act no.5 of 1999, which repealed the Land Ordinance of 1923 and 
other colonial laws.  
 
4.2 Political freedom in Tanzania 
 
The difference between the German and British administration can be classified into the nature 
of the system they had i.e. Native policy or direct rule versus Indirect rule (Austen, 1968). Before 
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1896, the German military administration was exercising a great deal of diplomacy by peacefully 
negotiating with black Africans. The period 1896-1906 introduced a forced change on black 
Africans’ traditional structures. The Germans exercised their authority with disregard and 
contempt for existing local structures and traditions. The British Colonial Administration ruled 
indirectly through African leaders, as a way of reconstructing the institutions existing before the 
German rule (Iliffe, 1979).  
 
The post-independent political developments in Tanzania are characterised by three distinctive 
events, which affected political and economic institutional formation. First, there was a 
declaration of a one-party state in 1965, after multi-party elections prior to independence in 
1961. Secondly, the departure from parliamentary supremacy to party supremacy in 1975 
compromised the functioning of all other arms of government. Article 3 of the Interim 
Constitution amendment called for all political activities in Tanzania to be conducted by or under 
the auspices of the party. The final event is the transition to multiparty democracy in 1992, which 
witnessed the restoration of multi-party political democracy. Tanzania is among the very few 
countries at independence which had adopted a constitution with no bill of rights (Martin, 1974; 
Shivji, 1990).  
 
4.2.1 Outcomes of rating 
 
In assessing the quality of political freedom in Tanzania, the base is the period before 1884, in 
which customary law only was applicable. This is contrasted with the period of imperialism 
which followed, with codification and the application of German law to the territory from 1886 
until 1920. Afterwards, the period that followed witnessed the application of common law under 
the British Foreign Jurisdiction Act, and lasted until 1961, when Tanzania gained its 
independence. Given the long period of coverage, the manner in which rights are conceived and 
defined change; hence the indicators should be treated with caution.  
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Figure 4-5 Sub-components of political freedom index for Tanzania: 1884-2009 
 
 
Figure 4.5 plots the sub-components of the political freedom index. The figure shows how each 
of the 12 categories adds to the overall index. Figure 4.6 presents the composite political 
freedom index and is discussed next.  
 
4.2.2 Interpretations of the political freedom index 
 
The presence of colonialism in Tanzania was introduced by the passing of the protectorate law of 
1886. The stream of laws passed between 1895 and 1903, impinged on the fundamental political 
and civil rights of black Africans in the quest of consolidating a European elite base on the 
prevailing political and social structure in Tanzania. The electoral franchise and legislative 
functions were strictly limited to the Europeans (whites) through the provisions of the 
Governor’s Council Ordinance of 1903 and the Native Jurisdiction Order of 1896. The Council 
Ordinance made provision for the establishment of an advisory body to the Governor and its 
composition was limited to the white community only. Minimal improvements in the quality of 
the political freedom index are noticeable between 1908 and 1913 (see figure 4.6). This is mainly 
on account of the Germany Tanganyika Memorandum, which recommended the review of the 
corporal punishment orders that paved the way for the passing of the Civil Procedure Code of 
1908. The Code specified ways and procedures of conducting civil cases in an orderly manner.   
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The initial British occupation period saw enhancement in the formal structure of rights with the 
passing of the Whipping Regulation dated October 5, 1918. The Whipping Regulation made 
provision for corporal punishment to offenders exceeding 12 strokes to be approved by the lower 
courts rather than police officers. The application of the Criminal Procedure Code as applied in 
India in 1919, however, compromised due process of law and the independence of the judiciary, 
as the charges against the accused were not framed by the police until the magistrate had heard 
all the evidence for the prosecution.  
 
The period 1921-1935 was characterised by a decline in the quality of the political freedom 
index, with the passing of stringent laws that stifled the political and civil rights of the majority 
of black Africans. Freedom of movement, association and due process of law were stifled during 
this period due to the enactment of legislation such as Destitute Person’s Ordinance no.1 of 
1923. The ordinance made provisions for the control of movement of unemployed blacks 
through imprisonment or deportation. Furthermore, due process of law was highly compromised 
with the passing of the Deportation Ordinance of 1921-cap38. The ordinance gave the Governor 
wide discretionary powers to deport a person from one point to another within the country to 
ensure peace and order.  
 
Other lists of stringent laws were Collective Punishment Ordinance no.24 of 1921, Official 
Secrets Ordinance no.10 of 1922, Master and Native Servants Ordinance no.32 of 1923 and its 
subsequent amendments in 1926, 1928 and 1931. The Trade Union Ordinance no.23 of 1932 
imposed restrictions on the conduct of trade unions within the territory, thereby compromising 
the right to association and assembly during the period under review.  
 
The decline in the political freedom index continued further in the period between 1936 and 
1945. More rights-curtailing laws passed during this period were the compulsory military and 
other service ordinance no.23 of 1940, amendment to the Master and Native Servant no.29 of 
1941, which made a provision for penalty for breach of contract by the servant. The Penal Code 
Ordinance no.21 of 1945, section 176 criminalized vagrancy thereby curtailing the freedom of 
movement within the territory.  
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Figure 4-6 Political freedom index for Tanzania: 1884-2009 
 
 
The period between 1946 and 1959 saw a slight improvement in the political freedom index on 
the back of waves of strike movements in most parts of Tanzania. There was noticeable 
improvement in the employment rights of many workers with the introduction of the Master and 
Native Servants (Recruitment) Ordinance of 1946. The Worker’s Compensation Ordinance no.41 
of 1949 provided for the compensation to workers for injuries suffered in the course of their 
employment. The Employment Ordinance Cap.366 of 1957 consolidated all laws relating to 
labour and regular conditions of employment. This marked the end of an era of the Master and 
Servants laws. During this period, laws were enacted which sought to increase enfranchisement 
of black Africans and introduced an equal representation in the legislative council. The laws 
included, among others, the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Ordinance Cap359 of 
1955 and the Territorial Election Ordinance of 1959.  
 
The inception of independence in 1961 manifested slight improvements in the structure of formal 
political rights in Tanzania. The slight improvement followed the enactment of Education 
Ordinance no.37 of 1961, which repealed discrimination laws in the provision of education in 
Tanzania. The Local Government Elections (rural areas) Act of 1962 enhanced the 
enfranchisement of rural black Africans. The process of improvement in the formal structure of 
rights was not fully carried over as Tanzania adopted a constitution without a bill of rights. Laws 
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that curtail personal freedom which were passed during the colonial era, therefore, were upheld 
and other new legislation mimicking the old laws were enacted, in case of repeals. The new laws 
included the Preventive Detective Act no.60 of 1962, which in greater extent was similar to the 
Deportation Ordinance of 1921, which was still applicable. The ordinance gave the President 
powers to arrest and indefinitely detain without bail any person considered dangerous to the 
public order or national security. More additional powers of detention were provided under the 
Regional Commissioners Act of 1962 and Area Commissioners Act no.18 of 1962. These acts 
permitted regional and district commissioners to arrest and detain for 48 hours, persons who 
might disturb public tranquillity.  
 
Freedom of assembly and the right to organise which was enjoyed a few years before 
independence lasted only until 1964. The introduction of the National Union of Tanganyika 
Workers (NUTA) Act of 1964 banned independent trade unions. The period from 1965 to 1975 
saw a steady decline in the formal structure of rights, with the formalisation of a one-party 
system via the Interim Constitution Act no.18 of 1965. A variety of laws were passed which 
stifled the freedom of association and assembly such as the Cooperative Societies Act no.27 of 
1968, which curtailed the activities of cooperative unions. The Police Force Ordinance Act no.13 
of 1972, section 40, required permits to be obtained in order to hold meetings or to organise 
processions.  
 
The formal structure of rights worsened further between 1975 and 1985, with adoption of the 
supremacy of the party over the other arms of government. This was implemented through the 
Interim Constitution Amendment Act no.8 of 1975, which called for all functions of all organs of 
the state to be performed under the auspices of the party. This severely extended the arbitrary 
exercise of executive power, and hence decreased the independence of the judiciary and 
legislative and the due process of law. This status quo was further reinforced in the year 1977, 
through the adoption of the Permanent Constitution of 1977.  
 
The enactment of the Bill of Rights in 1984 into the Permanent Constitution of 1977 marked the 
beginning of a new era in the formal structure of political rights in the history of Tanzania (see 
figure 4.6). The amendments to the Preventative Detention Act no.2 of 1985 and Deportation Act 
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no.3 of 1991, provides some evidence of partial control on arbitrary actions of the state. The 
discriminatory Deportation Ordinance of 1921 was repealed in 1991. The introduction of 
multiparty democracy via the Political Parties Act no.5 of 1992 and Constitution Amendment 
Act no.2 of 1992 signified a turning point in the quality of formal political freedom in 
Tanzania.51 The enactment of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act 
no.7 of 2001 is another improvement in the formal political rights. In terms of the formal 
structure of political and civil freedoms (de jure), Tanzania is making progress in undoing 
restrictions on political freedom.  
 
4.3 Judicial independence in Tanzania 
Different traditional judicial institutions for administrating justice existed prior to the colonial era 
(Court of Appeal of Tanzania, 2004). These differed from one society to another, depending 
mainly on whether the society was centralised. Centralised and non-centralised societies differed 
in the way they ran their judicial institutions. However, despite these differences, both types of 
societies applied procedures52 characterised by mediation, conciliation, arbitration and 
compromise.  
 
The start of the German colonial period in 1884 marked the beginning of the disintegration of the 
traditional judicial institutions and their replacement by an adversarial system of dispute 
settlement. With the introduction of imperialism, the traditional legal system began to weaken, 
thereby establishing ground for the functioning of the imposed German colonial legal system. 
The British mandate of 1919 entrenched a colonial state in Tanzania by imposing British laws 
received directly from England and those adopted from India. During the colonial period, three 
forms of institutions were created, i.e., organised colonial government; appointment of chiefs as 
local leaders and the creation of regular courts headed by salaried magistrates. At independence, 
most of the imposed and imported foreign laws, institutions and procedures were retained and 
many others were created (Seidman, 1969; Peter, 1997; Shivji, 2004).  
                                                             
51 The study accepts that despite the introduction of multiparty competition in Tanzania, the legacy of the one-party 
state is still lingering until the opposition party is able to achieve a significant presence in the legislature.    
52 For a detailed discussion on the operations of judicial institutions, in both centralised and non-centralised pre-
colonial societies in Tanzania, see the work of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania, 2004.  
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4.3.1  Outcomes of rating 
 
It should be noted for the purpose of the de jure indicators, that the study relied on formal 
structural guarantees of independence of the judiciary as specified in the law, without 
ascertaining the degree of judicial independence de facto.53  It is irrelevant to this indicator 
whether or not interference took place or not. Due to colonial history in Tanzania, the 
construction of a realistic measure of judiciary independence should encompass both 
consideration of the Higher and Lower courts, as the majority of black Africans had access only 
to Lower Courts. The resulting index is combined using factor analysis.  
 
Figure 4-7 Sub-components of judicial independence (de jure) index: 1884-2009 
 
 
Figure 4.7 plots the sub-components of the de jure judicial independence index. The figure 
shows how each of the 10 categories adds to the overall index. Figure 4.8 presents the composite 
de jure judicial index and it is discussed next.  
 
4.3.2 Interpretations of the judicial independence index 
The German East Africa Company which governed the protectorate from 1884 to 1890 had no 
ability to set up administrative machinery different from the local conditions on the ground. 
                                                             
53 This is captured in the de facto measure of the Independence of the Judiciary, discussed in the next section under 
5.5 of this paper (to be added). The idea is to separate the two to allow for close scrutiny of the measures as they 
portray two different realities in general. 
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Notable changes are observable as from 1891 (see figure 4.8), when German colonial 
government took direct administration of German East Africa. The German Ordinance of 1891 
established two types of courts: District Courts and the Superior Court, both of which had 
jurisdiction over Europeans and applied pure German laws. The ordinance did not address the 
law and procedures in matters involving black Africans. The decree of the Chancellor of State 
regarding the exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction and Disciplinary Powers over the Natives, dated 
22 April 1896, confined the exercise of justice to local administrative authorities. The 
combination of the executive and judicial functions meant that the majority was condemned to 
executive justice in which impartiality and fair play could not be guaranteed.   
 
Impartiality for black Africans improved slightly with the passing of the Decree of the Governor 
no.105 of 1906, with regard to the Administration of Criminal Jurisdiction over Natives. The 
decree made improvements in the administration of corporal punishment and repeal rules 
regarding the implementation of corporal punishment dated 1 June 1896 (see figure 4.8).54  
 
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations gave Britain a mandate to administer 
German East Africa after the First World War. The development of administration of justice, 
however, remained dualistic, tracing the German colonial legacies in the British Era. Article 17 
and 22 of the Tanganyika Order in Council of 1920 established the High Court and Subordinate 
Courts charged with the administration of justice according to English law. The Courts 
Ordinance of 1920 also established a parallel structure to the Subordinate Courts, known as the 
Native Courts, to hear cases concerning black Africans only.  Noticeable improvements came in 
1925 with the Native Courts Proclamation of 1925, which developed black Africans’ courts 
according to law by vesting the appellate and supervisory powers under the High Court. 
 
A decline in the independence of the judiciary is noticeable in 1929, with the passing of the 
Native Court Ordinance of 1929, which gave the Provincial Commissioner extensive supervisory 
powers over Native Courts. The Ordinance of 1929 enhanced the role of the executive arm of the 
colonial state in the administration of justice with respect to black Africans. The Ordinance 
                                                             
54 This induces a slight separation of powers between the various arms of government or governing authority. 
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further took away the powers of the High Court to supervise and hear appeals from the Native 
Courts. The passing of Subordinate Courts Ordinance No.13 of 1930, which repealed and 
replaced the Courts Ordinance of 1920, did not make any radical change to the existing court 
system. The administrative officers still maintained their presiding roles over the courts. There 
was no formal separation of the executive and the judiciary at lower levels. The only notable 
change was the introduction of the court of the Resident Magistrate.   
 
A marked improvement in judicial independence is observed in 1951 with enactment of the 
Local Courts Ordinance of 1951. The ordinance introduced a policy of separation of the judiciary 
and the executive in the former Native Courts; however a link with the High Court remained 
non-existent. The initial post-independence period signified a substantial improvement in the de 
jure independence of the judiciary, with the adoption of the Independence Constitution of 1961. 
Stability of judicial tenure and broad-based appointment procedures were ensured through 
Article 58 of the Constitution. The Chief Justice was to be appointed by the Governor-General 
on the advice of the Prime Minister. Power to appoint the other judges of the High Court was 
vested in the Judicial Service Commission. Further improvements were instituted through the 
Local Courts (Amendment) Ordinance of 1961, which re-integrated the Local Courts with the 
High Court. 
 
This improvement was short lived, as the adoption of the Republic Constitution in 1962 
conferred the power to appoint all judges in the High Court to the President. According to the 
provision of the Constitution, the judges who were non-citizens were to serve on contract. The 
appointments of judges by the President were reinforced in the Interim Constitution Act no.43 of 
1965.55 The year 1963, however, marked a major improvement in the Lower Court with the 
passing of the Magistrates’ Act of 1963, which created a single hierarchy of courts based on a 
three-tier system. This Act abolished race as a test for jurisdiction of courts. Section 29 of the 
Act barred the appearance of legal or paralegal professionals before a Primary Court, as these 
courts were presided over by people with no formal legal training.  
 
                                                             
55 The Act empowered the President to appoint the Chief Justice; other judges were also appointed by the President 
in consultation with the Chief Justice.  
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Figure 4-8 Judicial independence (de jure) index for Tanzania: 1884-2009 
 
 
The adoption of the Interim Constitution Amendment Act no.8 of 1975 compromises the 
working of the judicial system. According to the amendment act all functions of the State, 
including the judiciary, were to be performed under the auspices of the party. This gave party 
supremacy over all other organs of the state. The adoption of the Union Constitution in 1977 
marked minimal improvements in the formal structure of the judiciary. According to the 
Constitution of 1977, the President appoints the Chief Justices and other judges of the High 
Court after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. Security of tenure was also 
strengthened, as the office of a judge could not be abolished and a judge could be removed from 
office only for inability to perform the functions of the office and on recommendation from 
tribunal investigation.  
 
Improvements in the formal structure of judicial independence are noticeable in 197956 due to the 
passing of the Union Constitution Amendment Act No. 14 of 1979. The Act made provision for 
the establishment of a Court of Appeal of Tanzania.57 This changed the court administration that 
existed since 1961, as the overall administration was now vested in the Court of Appeal. 
                                                             
56 The study recognises the widespread deteriorations in the working of the judiciary system from about 1970 
onwards that led to the appointment of the Msekwa Commission in November 1974. This is captured in the de facto 
index.  
57 This replaces the Court of Appeal for East Africa which was done away with, due to the collapse of the East 
African Community in 1977.  
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Noticeable improvements in judicial independence are witnessed in 1984 with the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights Constitution, vide Act no.16 of 1984. This improved the impartiality and 
accountability of the judges under the adversarial system. On the other hand, the passing of Basic 
Rights and Duties Enforcement Act No.33 of 1994, which deals with hearings related to 
constitutional, human rights and civil rights issues, might be viewed to compromise the 
impartiality of the High Court as the quorum provision caused delays in many cases.  
 
The last decade marked some improvements aimed at reforming the administration of justice and 
strengthening judicial independence in Tanzania. The Pensions (Additional Retirement Benefits 
to Specified Public Officers) Order of 1996 gave judges and justices of appeal several rights on 
their retirement which improved impartiality among judges to dispense justice without fear. This 
was similarly reinforced in 1999 with the passing of the Public Service Retirement Benefits Act, 
1999, which provides a new package for judges of the High Court of Tanzania, Justices of 
Appeal and the Chief Justice. The adoption of the Commercial Court Act of 1999 was observed 
as another improvement in access to court by the business community. The Act provides for 
judicial resolution of business disputes in the country.  
 
The year 2000 marked significant improvements in the formal structure of judicial independence 
with the adoption of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which eventually entrenched the 
independence of the judiciary (see figure 4.8). According to Article 107B of the Constitution, all 
courts of law in the performance of their work of dispensing justice, shall be independent and 
shall only be required to follow the Constitution and the laws of the country. Other pieces of 
legislation that enhanced the judicial independence are the Attorney General Act of 2004; the 
Judicial Service Act of 2005 and the Judges (Remuneration and Terminal Benefits) Act of 2007. 
 
Tanzania is making major strides in ensuring the institutional framework of judicial 
independence. Major accomplishment are noticeable  in the High Court and Court of Appeal, 
while leaving the other  levels of the judiciary, which feed into these higher sections of the 
judiciary, still in disarray. The issues of appointment procedures including tenure and 
remuneration, as well as adequate facilities, remain a stumbling block in the lower courts.  
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4.4 Judicial independence (de facto) 
4.4.1  Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework for assessing judicial independence is capturing the dynamics that 
encourage or impede factual judicial independence. The judiciary plays an oversight role to 
ensure liberal democracy. To achieve the oversight role, the judicial independence relies on the 
principle that judges must decide cases fairly and impartially, relying only on the facts and the 
law.  
To assess de facto judicial independence, five sub-components have been used. Each of the five 
sub-components were standardised to take on values between 0-4, where a greater value in this 
instance indicates a constraint of the degree of judicial independence. The index is constructed 
by applying the method of principal component analysis. 
 
4.4.2 Interpretations of the judicial independence (de facto) index58 
The lack of protection and oversight role by the judiciary during the colonial period might be 
interpreted in this case as an independent efficient judicial system. Their integrity, however, was 
compromised as they were viewed by the majority of the citizen as another tool of oppression.  
Figure 4-9 Judicial independence (de facto) index for Tanzania: 1950-2009 
 
In the post-independence period, similarities unfortunately persisted in a different form. The 
dominant power of the executive persisted, as marked by high episodes of contempt of court 
                                                             
58 Due to the limited reliable data on sub-components of this index, the period of coverage is from 1950 to 2009.  
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cases between the late 1960 and early 1980s (see figure 4.9). The substantial power of the 
President during this period hampered proper functioning of the judiciary. Furthermore, poor 
funding and poor training of judicial officials led to widespread judicial corruption. Although 
earlier data on this component are hard to come by, the period from the year 2000 onwards, 
witness a serious crackdown on corrupt judicial officials.59 
 
4.5 Political instability index 
 
The lack of unified political institutions among African rulers during the pre-colonial era caused 
a situation of political tension amongst these units. In-fighting over territorial dominion 
continued throughout until the arrival of colonial powers. This marked a shift in focus towards a 
new threat posed by the presence of colonial powers (Kimambo, 1969; Duignan, 1977; Iliffe 
1979).  
 
4.5.1 Interpretations of the political instability index 
 
Figure 4.10, shows that peaks in political and social instability occurred in 1906, the period 
1940-1955, and the period 1977-1984. Despite the uprising in the 1880s against the colonial 
power, the major active resistance is witnessed in 1906 with the uprising of the Maji-Maji war.60 
According to Iliffe (1979), the Maji-Maji rebellion was an explosion of African hatred of 
European rule. This is viewed as the last attempt to destroy the colonial order by force.  
 
In the period between the 1920s and the 1940s, Tanzania enjoyed relative stability, while 
rebellious activities were brewing underground. This culminated in the wave of workers’ 
resistance between 1940 and 1955. The post-independent period is marked by two major factors 
contributing to increased political instability during the period 1967-1983. First, the lack of a bill 
                                                             
59 This is a rather difficult sub-component to measure – as it shows two dimensions of the subject matter. It indicates 
the corruption level prevalent in the judicial system which compromises the judiciary independence. On the other 
hand, reporting and dealing with the corruption cases indicate the cleaning of the system and thereby should lead to 
an improvement in the judicial system.  
60 This represents the single most violent event in the history of mainland Tanzania. 
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of rights in the Constitution and the formation of a single-party system gave the state the power 
to detain and harass more people who opposed the party authority.  
Figure 4-10 Political instability index for Tanzania: 1884-2009 
 
 
Second, the enactment of the Preventative Detention Act in 1962, gave the state powers to detain 
people even if the security of the state was not at risk. This included a variety of cases in the 
process of the implementation of the Ujamaa Collective farms project during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Social problems such as cattle rustling incidences in 1967 were solved through 
detentions and deportation laws on orders from the President. It should be noted that mainland 
Tanzania had remained relatively stable since 1985. However, political violence was experienced 
in the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar and Pemba during the 1990s. 
 
4.6  Comparative analysis 
In this section, two types of comparative analyses are undertaken. First, the newly constructed 
indicators are compared with other measures widely used in the literature. The second 
comparison focuses on the evolution of two countries’61 formal institutional frameworks. The 
analysis seeks to disclose how historical associations among these countries have changed over 
time. A comparison is made between Tanzania and Zimbabwe62. This is to get insight on the 
formal institutional frameworks under the British colonial regime. 
                                                             
61 This includes Tanzania and Zimbabwe and the datasets were constructed along the same dimension, while the 
comparison with Namibia is discussed in thesis under section 3.6.2 
62 Data are obtained from Gwenhamo et al. (2008).  
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4.6.1 Comparison of new indices 
4.6.1.1  Tanzania formal institutional framework  
 
Table 4.1 shows the non-parametric Spearman correlation coefficients for the new series of 
formal institutional indices and the widely used indicators of political freedoms and property 
rights in Tanzania. The sign of the spearman correlation coefficient (r) indicates the direction 
between variables. The value of the coefficient varies between -1 and +1; with r = 1 indicating a 
perfect positive correlation, r = -1 indicating a perfect negative correlation and r = 0 indicating 
no correlation between the variables concerned. As the values moves towards 0, the relationship 
between the variables will be weaker.  
The correlation between the constructed property rights index (TZ-prop) and the Heritage 
Foundation property index (Prop-HF) is -0.73 and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
correlation with the Fraser Institute property rights index (Prop-Fr) is weak and insignificant 
with a coefficient of 0.25. A general observation is that the Fraser Institute index is available for 
Tanzania from 1980 and is very volatile, while the actual passing of land legislation was not so 
frequent. These again come to demonstrate the differences between the de jure and de facto 
institutional measures. 
Table 4:1 Spearman correlation coefficients for Tanzania 
 Newly constructed Indices for Tanzania Freedom House Heritage 
Foundation 
Fraser 
Institute 
 TZ-Prop TZ-Polfree TZ-JI-de 
jure 
TZ-Inst Polfree-
FH 
Civil-
FH 
Prop -HF Prop -
FR 
TZ-Prop 1.0000        
TZ-
Polfree 
0.0806 1.0000       
TZ-JI-de 
jure 
0.1726 0.6286** 1.0000      
TZ-Ins -0.4061** -0.2321** -0.5228** 1.0000     
Polfree-
FH 
-0.8581** -0.8445** -0.7927** 0.8096** 1.0000    
Civil -FH -0.8183** -0.9002** -0.7471** 0.7971** 0.8888** 1.0000   
Prop -FH -0.7303** -0.9621** -0.8473** -0.5979* 0.7303** 0.8758* 1.0000  
Prop-FR 0.2484 0.1321 0.1860 -0.1709 -0.4228 -0.1345 -0.1654 1.0000 
Notes: * denotes significance at 5 %, ** denotes significance at 1 % level.  
The political freedom index is compared to the Freedom House indices of political freedom and 
civil liberties. The newly constructed Political Freedom index (TZ-Polfree) is strongly correlated 
with Freedom House political freedom (Polfree-FH) and Freedom House civil liberties (Civil-
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FH), with correlation coefficients of -0.84 and -0.90 respectively, and both statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The negative sign between these indices is due to inverted scale. 
When comparing the new indices, there is a low and insignificant correlation of 0.08 and 0.17 
between the property rights index with the political freedom index and the judicial independence 
index (TZ-JI-de jure) respectively. This confirms the differences in the forms of rights. The 
correlation between the property rights index and political instability is -.0.40 and statistically 
significant. The judicial independence and political freedom bond well with a significant 
correlation of 0.62, while there is weak relationship between political freedom and political 
instability, with a correlation of - 0.23. 
 
4.6.2  Evolution of formal institutional framework  
4.6.2.1  Tanzania and Zimbabwe 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 depict the status of property rights and political freedom indices between 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe respectively.  
Property rights index 
The property rights status in Tanzania appeared to have been better than in Zimbabwe under the 
British colonial rule, given that laws such as the Land Ordinance of 1928 accorded the status of 
deemed right of occupancy. The year 1945 also coincides with the declaration of trusteeship 
agreement for Tanzania under the United Nations mandate.  
Figure 4-11 Comparison of property rights indices: Tanzania vs. Zimbabwe
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Tanzania ratings started deteriorating in the mid-1960s under the new socialist government, as 
individual ownership was virtually extinguished. The only improvements came after 1984 and 
1999 with the introduction of the new laws which addressed the issues surrounding bills of right 
and customary land rights respectively. The situation has since changed as the two countries 
have traded position, due to land reform process in Zimbabwe.63  
 
(iv) Political Freedom Indices 
On the political freedoms front, it appears that the two countries were more or less at par with a 
notable deviation only registered in the 1980s, with the attainment of independence in 
Zimbabwe. Despite the independence of Tanzania in 1961, political freedoms continued to be 
stifled under the socialist government until 1984, with the adoption of a bill of rights in the 
Constitution of 1977.  
Figure 4-12 Comparison of political rights indices: Tanzania vs. Zimbabwe
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of the chapter is to construct new dataset of institutional indicators for 
Tanzania. This is motivated by the fact that measures of institutions are time truncated in the 
existing literature. This renders it difficult to explain the persistence of differences in income 
levels across countries.  
                                                             
63 See Gwenhamo et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion. 
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The chapter argues that longer-dated series of institutional measures are vital, and it therefore 
presents formal measures of institutions on Tanzania. The measuring of institutions using written 
rules are in line with accepted definition of formal institutions postulated in the literature. The 
new indicators, while covering a long time period (1884-2009), correlate fairly well with some of 
the widely used institutional indices produced by the Freedom House and the Heritage 
foundation.  
The comparison between the British former colonies, i.e. Tanzania and Zimbabwe, shows a 
similar close pattern in terms of political freedom, while property rights appear to be better in 
Tanzania than Zimbabwe between 1945 and 1960. 
Another feature of the study, covering this longer period, underscores the notion of persistence in 
institutions. The paper argues that despite changes in colonial regimes, the broader framework of 
institutions remained partly the same. This is reflected in the post-independence period in 
Tanzania, where the title of the president was substituting the governor titles in some land laws.  
Similarly, draconian laws similar to the colonial laws were enacted to curtail political freedom.  
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Chapter 5  
 
5.  The impact of institutions on capital formation 
5.0  Introduction 
 
One of the key channels through which institutions affect long-term economic performance is 
capital accumulation. According to the institutional hypothesis, protection of property rights 
enhances the incentives to invest. North (1990, 1991) suggested that institutions shape the 
incentive structure that may impede or increase economic activity.  
 
Despite this assertion, studies have generally estimated the impact of institutions on capital 
accumulation within economic-growth models (see Scully 1992; Knack and Keefer, 1995; 
Easton and Walker, 1997). A few studies have examined the relationship between institutions 
and capital accumulation directly (Serven, 1997; Dawson, 1998, 2007; Svennson, 1998; 
Gwartney et al., 2006).  
 
Serven (1997) argues that a great part of weak investment performance in sub-Saharan Africa is 
explained by weak institutions, such as political instability and a lack of property rights. This 
paper builds on this assertion and the institutional hypothesis, and seeks to analyse the role of 
institutions in explaining investment performance in Namibia and Tanzania. The few studies that 
have used time-series techniques to establish causation links between institutions and capital 
formation (Fielding, 1999; Fedderke and Luiz, 2005), however, have focused their attention on 
South Africa, which is an emerging-market economy. They cannot, therefore, be generalised to 
developing countries with supposedly poor institutional arrangements and relatively low 
investment levels. This study, therefore, is contributing to the literature by carrying out a detailed 
time-series study that explicitly introduces institutional indicators and investment determinants in 
a context of developing countries, with Namibia and Tanzania as case studies.  
 
The study extends the empirical research by testing the impact of institutional indicators on 
irreversible investment behavior under uncertainty, using aggregate data from Namibia and 
Tanzania. This chapter begins with a brief overview of capital formation in Namibia and 
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Tanzania, followed by a review of the literature and the theoretical framework. The empirical-
model specification and data used in the study are also set out, and the econometric 
methodologies employed are described. Chapter six presents the estimation results and analyses 
for Namibia and Tanzania. 
 
5.1  A brief overview of capital formation in Namibia and Tanzania 
5.1.1  Capital formation in Namibia 
 
The Namibian economy is agrarian and resource-based, with heavy dependence on the 
contributions of mining and quarrying to output. Several structural features and characteristics of 
the Namibian economy pose significant challenges to capital formation and economic growth. 
Namibia is one of the most arid countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with low and erratic rainfall. 
The percentage of arable land is estimated at 1 percent. The harsh ecological environment 
therefore imposes a formidable constraint on the agricultural sector’s performance and overall 
economic development. As a result, Namibia has witnessed a gradual increase in government-
sector involvement in terms of public investment throughout the period under review.  
 
Before 1944, the trend of gross capital formation as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) fluctuated, recording an average of 13.8 percent between 1923 and 1943. The period 
between 1944 and the mid-1970s signify the status of a settlers’ economy in Namibia, as shown 
by growing confidence in the economy by the minority white South African government. Despite 
the start of the armed struggle and increasing international pressure64 over this period, both 
public and private investment continued to increase.  
 
In terms of sectoral percentage contributions to total gross capital formation, the tertiary sector, 
dominated by the provision of government services, accounted for an average of 48.3 percent 
over the sub-period 1920 to 1949. The primary industries accounted for an average of 39.3 
percent of total gross fixed investment over the sub-period 1920 to 1949.  
  
                                                             
64 This coincides with refusal of the South African government to place Namibia under UN trusteeship in 1945. 
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Figure 5-1 Composition of gross capital formation in Namibia (As % of GDP) 
 
Source: South West Africa/Namibia (1988), Statistical Economic Review 
 
Real fixed-capital formation grew gradually from the 1950s and reached a peak during the mid-
1970s, as seen in figure 5-1. Between 1960 and 1979, gross capital formation averaged about 30 
percent of GDP. In the period 1950 to 1979, the average contribution of tertiary industries 
increased from to 48.3 percent to 53.3 percent, thus continuing its dominance. The average share 
of primary industries declined from 39.3 percent to 34.1 percent over the same sub-period. This 
was mainly driven by the average decline in agriculture and fishing contribution to gross capital 
formation, which decreased from an average of 29.1 percent over the sub-period 1920 to 1949 to 
an average of 19.0 percent over the sub-period 1950 to 1979. 
 
From 1980 to the eve of independence in 1987, the average rate of investment fell to 17.9 
percent of GDP, from 30 percent for the period 1960 to 1979.  The uncertainty about political 
and economic policies of a prospective independent Namibia significantly dampen economic 
activity over  this sub-period.  
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Table 5:1 Average contribution to gross capital formation (%) 
Categories 1920–1949 1950–1979 1980–1987 1993–2010 
Primary sector 39.3 34.1 20.6 25 
Agriculture& 
Fishing 
29.1 19.0 4.9 7 
Mining 10.2 15.1 15.7 18 
Secondary 12.4 12.8 9.9 19 
Tertiary 48.3 53.1 69.5 56 
Government 13.8 29.7 48.0 20 
     
Source: South West Africa/Namibia (1988), Statistical Economic Review and National Income Accounts, CBS various issues. 
 
Table 5:1 reveals the neglect of the secondary industries during the major part of the review. 
Primary industries attracted almost twice as much investment as secondary industries, 
underscoring the high reliance on the primary-industry focus on the exploitation of Namibia’s 
vast natural resources. Within the primary sector, mining and quarrying attracted more 
investment than agriculture and fishing on average.  
 
At the time of independence, the Namibian government adopted a number of measures and 
programmes to entice local and foreign investment in the economy. These included, among 
others, the creation of an Investment Centre under the Ministry of Trade and Industry with the 
adoption of Foreign Investment Act of 1990. The aim of the centre is to co-ordinate the 
investment-promotion activities of the government and to identify potential investment 
opportunities in Namibia. Other initiatives include business-tax and special-investment 
incentives, as well as the creation of an export-processing zone through the adoption of the 
Export Processing Zone Act of 1995.  
 
In spite of all these incentives and secure property rights in Namibia, the first decade of the post-
independence period recorded a rapid decline in the rate of investment. Between 1990 and 1999, 
gross capital formation averaged about 15.8 percent of GDP. A slight improvement in the rate of 
investment is, however, noticeable, with an average of 21.7 percent of GDP over the sub-period 
2000 to 2009. Even so, investment performance failed to return to the levels of the 1960s and 
1970s, despite the all-inclusive institutional framework. 
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5.1.2  Capital formation in Tanzania 
 
Gross capital formation in Tanzania during the colonial period is tied to the establishment of the 
plantation-agriculture economy introduced by the German colonial government. Although 
official figures are hard to come by, the first German tobacco and sugar plantations were started 
in the 1880s in Pangani, extending to East Usambaras in the 1890s. The sisal plantations, which 
become one of the major export earners, started in 1893. By 1912, there were 750 European-
owned sisal plantations, mostly owned by individuals.  
 
In terms of public investment, railway development, which started in 1891, is viewed as the 
major contributor to gross capital formation in then Tanganyika. Transport development mainly 
centred on areas that promoted agriculture plantation. The railways started inland from Tanga 
along the Pangani valley, in the direction of Kilimanjaro, reaching East Usambara by 1893 
(Coulson, 1982). A similar development brought a railway to West Usambara by 1905. The last 
ten years of German rule, from 1905 to 1914, saw the creation of most of the colonial 
infrastructure, indicating a considerable investment in Tanganyika by then.  
 
Figure 5-2 Gross capital formation in Tanzania 
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From 1920 to 1960, the British maintained the balance among peasants, settlers and plantations 
inherited from the Germans (Iliffe, 1979). Capital formation was dominated by private 
investment in plantations and public-sector investment in infrastructure. No official data exist for 
the larger part of the period under review.  
 
In the post-independence period, the Arusha Declaration in 1967 instituted a structural 
transformation that increased state control in the economy. During this period, until the reforms 
of the mid-1980s, public-sector investment was promoted, while that of the private sector 
diminished, hampered by complex systems and regulations (Likwelile, 1998; Bigsten and 
Danielson, 2001). The public sector dominated investment activity, with bulk of the finance 
coming from donors. The country’s investment strategy gave heavy emphasis to long-term-
oriented investment activities, often infrastructure projects, rather than directly productive 
investments (Bigsten and Danielson, 2001). Between 1971 and 1974, public investment was 
dominated by an effort to improve transit routes with Zambia, involving the construction of the 
Tazara Railway, the Tanzam Highway and the Tazara Pipeline. During that period infrastructural 
investment accounted for 53.4 percent of total gross capital formation (Moshi and Kilindo, 
1999). Gross fixed-capital formation stood at 17 percent of GDP on average from 1967 to 1985.  
 
The reform period witnessed stable investment rates throughout, with 21 percent of GDP on 
average from 1986 to 2009. The launching of the Tanzania investment policy (1996) paved the 
way for the enactment of the Tanzania Investment Act 1997, which established the Tanzania 
Investment Centre (TIC) as the primary agency of government to co-ordinate, promote and 
facilitate investment in Tanzania. 
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5.2  Main theories and institutional determinants of capital accumulation 
 
Many theories have been constructed to assess the determinants of capital accumulation. For the 
purpose of this study, a brief review of the traditional theories is provided, while the main focus 
is on irreversible investment under uncertainty theory.  
 
5.2.1  Theoretical perspectives 
 
5.2.1.1 Traditional theories of investment 
 
The starting point of conventional capital accumulation theorisation is the Keynesian, or 
accelerator, theory of investment (1947),65 according to which investment is a linear proportion 
to changes in output. A more general form of the accelerator model is the flexible accelerator 
model.66 The basic notion behind this is that the larger the gap between the existing capital stock 
and the desired capital stock, the greater the firm’s investment.  
 
The neoclassical theory of investment attributed to Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson 
(1967) was an attempt to focus on optimal capital stock adjustment by incorporating the cost of 
capital. The key drawback of the initial Jorgenson neoclassical theory of investment was that it 
assumed that the firms have the ability to adjust their capital stock to desired optimal level 
instantly and without cost. The importance of the adjustment cost in theory of investment was 
recognised by Eisner (1964), Lucas (1967), Gould (1968), Uzawa (1969) and Treadway 
(1969).This led to the introduction of the cost of installing new investment in the firm’s 
optimization problem;67 and consequently a separation of the influence of output on investment 
from that of the cost of capital.  
 
                                                             
65 The acceleration principle has been at the heart of economic theory since the writings of Carver (1903), Aftalion 
(1909) and Clark (1917). 
66 Advocated for through the work of Chenery (1952) and Koyck (1954).  
67 This modification of the neoclassical theory was supported in the work Jorgenson (1971).  
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A seminal paper by Tobin (1969) provided a framework for incorporating the marginal cost of 
adjustment in the theory of investment. The Tobin q- theory of investment argues that investment 
is the function of the ratio of the market value of capital to its replacement cost, a ratio known as 
q.  The work of Abel (1979) and Hayashi (1982) made a theoretical contribution by introducing 
an observable average q in the q-model, given that marginal q is unobservable to the 
econometricians.  
 
5.2.1.2  Investment under uncertainty theory 
 
The modern theory of investment expenditure focuses extensively on the investment–uncertainty 
relationship.68 We distinguish between two strands of theoretical analysis with different 
conclusions on the sign and magnitude of the effect of uncertainty on investment applied in a 
dynamic stochastic environment.  
 
The first strand of literature using a neoclassical model without capital-stock adjustment costs 
predicts a positive impact of uncertainty on capital productivity (Hartman, 1972). The results 
depend on the assumptions of perfect competition, constant returns to scale, full reversibility of 
capital and convexity of the marginal product of capital. This implies that increased uncertainty 
will yield a raise in marginal valuation of investment, leading to a positive link between capital 
accumulation and uncertainty. This was supported by Abel (1983), who argued that regardless of 
the characteristics of the adjustment cost function, increased uncertainty leads to increased 
investment spending. According to Lee and Shin (2000), the balance between the positive and 
negative effects of uncertainty may depend on the labour share of firms’ costs. 
 
Another strand of literature on investment under uncertainty links uncertainty to the main 
characteristics69 of most investment decisions: (i) irreversibility and (ii) the timing of investment. 
                                                             
68 See Carruth et al. (2000) for an earlier survey on the investment–uncertainty literature.  
69 According Pindyck 1993, investment expenditure has two important characteristics. Firstly, it is irreversible, 
thereby instituting an adjustment cost i.e a large sunk cost. Secondly, the wait to invest due to uncertainty lowers 
investment. 
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For a neoclassical model with asymmetric capital adjustment costs, i.e. (partial) irreversibility of 
capital, greater uncertainty is likely to affect investment level negatively due to an option value 
of waiting (Bernanke, 1983; Mc Donald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Abel and 
Eberly, 1999). The central point to this theory is that uncertainty becomes an important 
investment decision because of the ability to delay an irreversible investment in anticipation of 
more information about the future. This makes investment decisions a real option problem, first 
developed by McDonald and Siegel (1986). It means that it may pay to wait before investment; 
as irreversibility attaches an opportunity cost to undertaking the investment expenditure.  The 
neoclassical model relates investments to user cost of capital, while the call-option approach 
underscores the irreversibility of investment as the main source of friction.  
 
Theoretically, the impact of irreversibility and uncertainty on long-run average investment and 
the capital stock remains unclear. Caballero (1991) and Abel and Eberly (1994) argued that 
under the assumption of constant returns and an infinitely elastic demand curve, an increase in 
uncertainty will increase investment, even in the presence of irreversibility. They show that for 
the relationship between uncertainty and investment to be negative depends on both the degree of 
market power, and aspects of the firm’s technology. According to Caballero (1991), higher 
uncertainty leads to lower investment under the assumption of decreasing returns to scale and or 
imperfect competition, either of which makes the marginal revenue product of capital a 
decreasing function of capital stock.  
 
Abel and Eberly (1999) argued that the relationship may be presented by an inverted U-curve. At 
low levels of uncertainty, the investment–uncertainty relationship may be positive, whereas at 
high levels of uncertainty the relationship starts to become negative. They showed that since 
firms with irreversible investment face a higher user cost of capital, investment and the capital 
stock tend to be lower. However, when the irreversibility constraint binds, the firm would like to 
sell capital but cannot, and this “hangover” effect tends to increase the average capital stock.  
 
Given these contrasting theoretical results and the ambiguity of the net effect of uncertainty on 
investment, empirical work is vital. 
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5.2.1.3  Institutional determinants of investment and capital accumulation 
 
The previous section focused on output demand and/or prices as the basic sources of uncertainty. 
This section looks at uncertainty arising from other sources, as it might have exactly the same 
effect on irreversible investment decisions (Serven, 1997). A variety of studies using different 
proxies of uncertainty have been carried out. At the forefront are the macroeconomic 
uncertainties70 such as volatility of the terms of trade, inflation and real exchange rate. However, 
few institutional indicators, such as property rights, political instability and the political and civil 
liberties index, are often used to offer insights into the determinants of capital accumulation.  
 
The issue of political freedom and its impact on capital accumulation is encompassed in the 
broader debate on democratic institutions and economic performance. The theoretical links 
among democracy, economic performance and capital accumulation remain an empirical 
problem and this has led to two main strands of theoretical analysis, with different outcomes on 
the relationship. The first strand of literature emphasises that democratic rights might help to 
promote economic growth (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Clague et al., 1996). It is argued that 
democracy might reduce uncertainty and raise private investment. The counterargument states 
that broadened political participation might lead to deterioration in economic performance 
(Huntington, 1968; Olson, 1982). The main theoretical support is that broader participation 
might generate increased pressures for redistribution, thus lowering allocative efficiency.  
 
As for the effect of political instability on factor accumulation, Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
showed that there is a negative correlation between political instability and investment. The 
theory is that political instability leads to uncertainty about future policies and hence reduced 
investment demand and, consequently, reduced physical capital accumulation.  
 
Economists have argued that the protection of property rights is a fundamental ingredient for 
investment and growth (Scully, 1992; Gwartney et al., 1996). The underlying theoretical 
argument is that greater respect for property rights and the fulfilment of contracts would 
                                                             
70 See, for example, Aizenman and Marion, 1993; Serven and Solimano,1993 and Bleaney and Greenaway, 2001. 
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encourage private investment. Furthermore, it has been shown by Leblang (1996) that economies 
that protect citizens’ property rights grow more rapidly than those that do not.  
 
The hypothesis that judicial independence (as a proxy of legal effectiveness) matters for long-
term economic development has also received attention in economic-growth empirics. The 
theoretical understanding underpinning this hypothesis is that independent courts ensure secure 
property rights and contract enforcements, and this encourages investment, which is vital for 
economic growth. North and Weingast (1989) argue that political institutions characterised by 
checks and balances can have beneficial effects on investment by allowing governments to 
commit credibly not to engage in ex-post opportunism with respect to investors.  
 
5.2.2  Theoretical framework 
 
The framework of the analysis is captured within the theory of (partly) irreversible investment 
under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Abel and Eberly., 1999). The focus is the 
incorporation of uncertainty in investment models that recognise the existence of adjustment 
costs in capital stock.71 This recognition places the focus on irreversible capital investment that 
shows diminishing returns. For simplicity we assume that the firm, whose production function is 
given by Y = G (K), where K is units of capital in place, faces an uncertain industry demand 
function for its output given by P = V.D(Y), where the shift variable denoted by V follows 
geometric Brownian motion,72 
 ܸ݀ = ߙܸ݀ݐ + ߪܸ݀ݖ                                                                 (1) 
 
where  ݀ݐ, is a time increment ݀ݖ is the increment of a Wiener process, α is the drift parameter 
and σ is the variance parameter. Equation (1) implies that the current value of output is known, 
but future values of output will be lognormally distributed with a variance that grows linearly 
                                                             
71 The discussion follows the work of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), with reference to chapter 11. See also Fedderke 
(2004). 
72 The Brownian motion is commonly used for three main reasons: (i) the process is a Markov process (ii) the 
probability distribution for a change in the process over a time interval is independent of other time intervals; (iii) 
over any given time interval, the changes in the process are normally distributed, and the variance increases linearly 
with the time interval. 
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with time. The future value of output is always uncertain. Another assumption is that there are no 
variable costs,73 so that the firm then experiences the profit flow given by: 
 
ߨ = ܸ.ܦ൫ܩ(ܭ)൯.ܩ(ܭ) = ܵ.ܪ(ܭ)                                                                                 (2) 
 
The marginal revenue product of capital is VH′K. We assume that there are diminishing returns 
to capital in the sense that the marginal revenue product is decreasing in K, or the revenue 
function is concave in K, such that H"(K) < 0.74Irreversibility and delay lead to the creation of an 
option to invest. Given the initial value of its capital stock, Ko, and the initial level of the 
stochastic demand shift variable V, the dynamic optimisation problem of the firm is to maximise 
its expected present value, its operating profits, net of the cost of investment. Suppose that the 
firm considers an increase in capital stock to ܭଵ at the end of the period, such that the expected 
value of the increase in capital stock is given by: 
 
ݓ = ܸ.ܪ(ܭ)݀ݐ +  ݁ି௣ௗ௧ܧ[ܹ(ܭଵ,ܸ + ܸ݀) − ݇(ܭଵ −ܭ଴ )]                                         (3) 
 
Where ܸ + ܸ݀ denotes the demand shift, k the price of capital, and ܧ is the expectations 
operator. The objective is to choose ܭଵ in order to maximize the expected value, providing the 
initial value  ܹ(ܭ,ܸ) of the Bellman function. Solution of the dynamic programming problem 
provides the investment frontier V (K): The threshold in this instance is given by: 
 ܸ(ܭ) =  ఉ
ఉିଵ
   ఋ
ுᇲ(௄)                                                                                                (4)             
 
Where β is the positive root of 
 ߮ = ଵ
ଶ
ߪଶ  ߚ(ߚ − 1) + ߙߚ − ߩ                                                                               (5) 
                                                             
73 Assume zero depreciation of the capital stock. 
74 There are justifications for the decline of the marginal revenue product of capital. This could be the case because 
of physical diminishing returns in production, ܩ″(ܭ) < 0, or because of the downward sloping industry demand 
curve (ܦ′(ܻ) < 0), or some combination of both. 
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Hence 
   ߚ = ଵ
ଶ
−
ఈ
ఙమ
+ ට( ఈ
ఙమ
)ଶ + ଶఘ
ఙమ
> 1                                                                              (6) 
     
The crucial result is the emergence of the investment threshold given by equation 4, which is 
shown to lie above the standard net present value rule of investment, due to the incorporation of 
uncertainty. The equation (investment threshold) above indicates that first, investment will occur 
only if the expected marginal profit from additional capital௏(௄).ு′(௄)
ఋ
, is greater than the cost of 
installation of the additional unit of capital by ఉ
ఉିଵ
 .This investment boundary depends on the 
discount rate (ߩ), the trend parameter (ߙ) and its associated volatility(ߪ). 
An increase in any of these variables will lead to a decrease in ߚ,75 which leads to an increase in 
the option value through ఉ
ఉିଵ
, raising the investment boundary. Note that even though ߪ is 
increasing the boundary, increased volatility may allow the boundary to be hit more often than in 
a situation with lower volatility, leaving the sign of the impact of uncertainty ambiguous a priori 
(see Fedderke, 2004). It is therefore unclear if there will be increased or decreased investment in 
the presence of increasing uncertainty. 
 
5.2.3  Empirical literature survey 
 
The empirical literature on investment determinants has developed substantially over the past 
two decades, drawing on larger and richer databases and utilizing better econometric tools. 
Given the many explanatory variables used in empirical literature, here we intended to focus on 
studies that have offered insights regarding the interplay between institutions and investment. 
The rest of this section discusses the impact of these institutional factors on capital accumulation. 
 
 
                                                             
75 
డఉ
డఈ
< 0, డఉ
డఙ
< 0, డఉ
డఘ
< 0 
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(i) Political instability and capital accumulation 
 
A number of empirical studies have shown a link between political instability and the 
accumulation of capital. Alesina and Perotti (1996) provide an empirical test to show that socio-
political instability has a negative effect on investment accumulation, using a sample of 71 
countries. Fedderke (2001, 2004) explicitly tests the relationship between uncertainty (as proxied 
by political instability) and investment using a panel of 28 manufacturing sectors’ data in South 
Africa, and finds that political instability  has a lowering effect on the investment rate. In other 
words, political instability depresses the accumulation of capital. These results seem to enhance 
the findings of Feng (2001), Fielding (2002) and Aysan et al. (2007) that political instability has 
a negative effect on investment. 
 
The work of Le (2004), using a panel of 25 developing countries, distinguishes between the 
types of political instability. According to Le, socio-political instability in the form of non-
violent protests encourages private investment, while violent uprisings hinder private investment. 
However, Campos and Nugent (2003), investigating the causal relationship between aggregate 
investment and political instability, find that there is a positive causal relation in the long run 
going from instability to investment, which is particularly strong in low-income countries. In 
contrast, an earlier study by Svensson (1998) indicates that once property rights are accounted 
for, political instability has no direct effect on private investment. 
 
(ii) Political freedom and capital accumulation 
 
In order to distinguish between political freedom and political instability, this section reviews 
studies that use the political-rights and civil-liberties indices. Several empirical works have 
shown that there exists a positive correlation between political freedom and investment. Feng 
(2001) analysed the impact of political freedom on private investment for a sample of 42 
developing countries, using a composite index of political rights and civil liberties from Gastil 
indices. The results showed a positive and significant relationship between political freedom and 
private investment. This supports earlier findings that civil liberty has a positive impact on 
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investment (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985), and that democracy has a positive impact on private 
investment (Helliwell, 1994; Pastor and Sung, 1995).  
 
An index of political and civil liberties (as a proxy of property rights) was used by Hadjimichael 
and Ghura (1995) and found to have a positive but insignificant effect on the private-investment 
performance of 32 African countries over the period 1986 to 1992. Kumar and Mlambo (1995) 
argued that civil liberties appear to exert a stronger impact on investment than political rights do. 
However, Mlambo and Oshikoya (2001) failed to detect any insignificant impact of the two 
measures individually, while they found that the interaction term between political rights and 
civil liberties did have an impact on investment. A contradiction to these findings is provided by 
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), who found that increases in political freedom reduce investment 
in physical capital. Democratic institutions tend to respond to the demands of the poor through 
expansion of access to education and attempts to lower income inequality.  
 
(iii) Property rights and capital accumulation 
 
The importance of secure property rights and their positive links to investment formation 
underscores the recent empirics in growth determinants theory. Empirically, a positive 
relationship between secure property rights and investment has been found by Knack and Keefer 
(1995), Fedderke and Luiz (2005), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).  
Knack and Keefer (1995) constructed a property-rights index from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) data sets and applied 
it to the United States data. They found that property rights have huge impact on investment and 
growth. Knack and Keefer also showed that property rights not only affect the magnitude of 
investment, but also the efficiency with which inputs are allocated.    
 
Similarly, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) using annual data covering the period from 1954 to 1992 
for South Africa found that secure property rights stimulate investment. The study also used a 
system of equation and incorporated a number of measures of institutional dimensions which 
provided insights into the webs of association between institutions and investment rates.  
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The importance of property rights in explaining investment is supported by Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005); using a multiple instrumental variables strategy, they found that property rights 
institutions have a major influence on investment, long-run economic growth and financial 
development.  
 
(iv) Independence of the judiciary and capital accumulation 
 
Empirical evidence on the impact of judicial independence on investment and growth is rare. A 
series of papers by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2004), Djankov et al. (2003) and Beck et al. 
(2006) in the law and finance literature have emphasised the importance of the economic value 
of judicial independence. This line of studies showed that there is a strong correlation between 
legal systems and financial development. Countries with common-law origins are more likely to 
provide strong protections for investors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), and better financing of 
firms (Beck et al., 2006). 
 
The work of Feld and Voigt (2003) is among the few empirical studies linking judicial 
independence directly to economic growth. Using two indicators capturing the de jure and de 
facto judicial independence in a sample of 57 countries, they found that de jure independence 
does not impact economic growth, but de facto independence does positively influence real GDP 
growth per capita. The paper indicated that one of the transmission channels of the positive 
impact might be via investment, although this not was investigated. Investment was added as an 
explanatory variable in the growth model. Based on this hypothesis, the present study explores 
the relationship between judicial independence and investment.  
5.2.4  Empirical model and data issues 
5.2.4.1 Empirical model 
 
The choice of the model is based on the new theory of investment which clearly specifies that 
uncertainty and the possibility of postponing investment will affect capital formulation. Section 
5.2.1.3 has shown that uncertainty stemming from poor-quality institutions, such as weak 
enforcement of property rights and of the legal system, influences the accumulation of capital. 
Furthermore, the importance of good institutions in promoting economic development indirectly 
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through capital accumulation has been shown. A realistic model of investment for Namibia76 and 
Tanzania therefore depends on three broad categories of variables: standard investment variables, 
uncertainty variables and institutional variables. 
 
The basis of all investment functions is an attempt to identify net rates of return to investment, 
with output (Yt) frequently serving as an indicator of expected future returns to investment, 
while the user cost of capital (UC) serves as a measure of the marginal cost of investment. This 
paper extends the standard model of irreversible investment under uncertainty by integrating 
property rights (Prop), political freedom (Polfree) and judicial independence (JI) as institutional 
indicators. This is in line with the hypothesis that capital accumulation is vulnerable from any 
form of uncertainty stemming from the quality of institutions. Also, the North (1990) hypothesis 
on the importance of secure property rights for investment is captured. Most empirical studies 
have used investment models that assume linearity; this suggests an empirical model stated as 
follows: 
 LK = f(+ LY −ܷܥ ± ܫܰܵܶ + ܮܴܱܲܲ + ܮܱܲܮܨܴܧܧ + ܮܬܫ)                                     (7) 
 
From equation (7) LK is defined as the natural log of capital stock; LY is natural log of expected 
output, UC  is user cost of capital, LProp is the natural log of property rights, LPolfree is the 
measure of political freedom in log. LJI denotes the de jure judicial independence in log. INST is 
political instability (i.e. uncertainty measure). 
 
The choice of using capital stock in the study is more appropriate in time-series analyses, given 
that fixed investment is a net addition to capital stock. The time-series behaviour is better 
captured by using models of capital stock that provide a long-term measure of the act of 
accumulation of fixed capital over time (Kumo, 2006).  
 
                                                             
76 An investment model for Namibia must allow for the impact of institutional changes particularly the political 
institutions due to the protracted colonial era.  
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The signs in equation 7 provide the prior expectations. The expectation is a positive association 
between expected output and physical capital stock. This is in line with the flexible accelerator 
theory of investment, which suggests that investment responds to changes in demand for output. 
The user cost of capital is expected to have a negative effect on capital stock. Firms invest up to 
the point where the marginal efficiency of capital equals the user cost of capital. A rise in the 
user cost reduces optimal capital stock and investment. In line with empirical literature on 
uncertainty and investment irreversibility, the sign on the political instability (Inst), which is the 
proxy of uncertainty in the study, is ambiguous. 
 
The institutional-hypothesis arguments support a positive association between strong 
institutional variables and capital stock. Secure property rights generally lead to lower expected 
expropriation and higher net returns. The increase in judiciary independence, which underscores 
checks and balances as postulated by North and Weingast (1989), is expected to have a positive 
effect on capital accumulation. If an independent judiciary is able to make the representatives of 
the state stick to their promises, additional (physical) investment could lead to higher income and 
growth (Feld and Voigt, 2003). 
  
5.2.4.2  Description of variables and data sources 
 
From the outset, it should be noted that reliable economic data (GDP, gross capital formation) on 
Tanzania prior to the 1960 are hard to come by. Peacock and Dosser (1958) made a systematic 
construction of national incomes series and they published GDP only for 1952 to 1954. Their 
work was continued by the East African Statistical Department and later by the Bureau of 
Statistics. However, data reconciled with publications of current national income is not available.  
 
In this thesis, available data on GDP was successively rebased until all data was based on 2001 
constant prices. The data span for the analysis on Tanzania is from 1946 to 2009; for Namibia 
the data span is from 1923 to 2009.  
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Dependent and control variables 
 
The log of physical capital stock is the dependent variable (LKt). The method used to calculate 
capital stock is the perpetual inventory method, using data on gross fixed capital formation from 
the SWA/Namibia Department of Economic Affairs and extended with data from CBS-Namibia 
National Accounts.77 The data on gross fixed capital formation in Tanzania are from the East 
African Statistical Department Reports and National Accounts of Tanzania. The depreciation rate 
used in this study is 6 percent as in Hall and Jones (1999).  
 
The log of real gross domestic product is used as a proxy for the expected return on capital 
(LYt). Data for the period 1920 to 1987 were obtained from SWA/Namibia Department of 
Economic Affairs and extended with data from CBS-Namibia National Accounts. In the case of 
Tanzania, data for the period 1952 to 2009 were obtained from the East African Statistical 
Department Reports and National Accounts of Tanzania. 
 
The user cost of capital (UCt) is a proxy for the marginal cost of capital. The real user cost of 
capital is computed using an analytical expression formulated as UCt = (i –π + δ) where i is the 
average commercial bank lending rates; π is the rate of inflation; and the depreciation rate δ is 
assumed to be constant at 6 percent level. 
 
The data on inflation and nominal interest rate (lending rate) were extrapolated backwards using 
the South African (SA) data growth rates on these variables, as there is a lack of data on Namibia 
between 1920 and 1950. The SA data was obtained from Union Statistics for Fifty Years (1910–
1960), Jubilee Issue. Given lack of data on Tanzania from 1946 to 1966, the data on nominal 
interest rate (lending rate) were extrapolated backwards using the growth rates on interest rate 
data from United Kingdom (UK). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1969), 
the rate charged by commercial banks before March 1967 on prime loans usually followed the 
London rate. The UK data was obtained from Abildgren (2005).  
                                                             
77 The calculation of capital stock is based on the modified Harberger approach as used by Nehru and Dhareshwar 
(1993).  
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Uncertainty is proxied by the political instability index (Inst). Fedderke (2001) argues that 
investment is adversely affected by uncertainty. The political instability index is computed using 
the principal component analysis of five sub-components of political repression and opposition. 
The data is available for the period 1884 to 2009 for both countries.78 
 
Institutional Indicators 
The variables employed by this study to represent economic and political institutions are 
constructed by the author.  Chapter two of this thesis provides the description of the respective 
sub-components used as inputs into the indices and the methodology applied. The data is 
available for the period 1884 to 2009, except for judicial independence de facto, which coverage 
starts from 1950 onwards, and therefore it is excluded from this analysis. The analysis on 
Tanzania is from 1946 to 2009, while for Namibia the data span is 1923 to 2009. This is dictated 
by the availability of reliable economic variables data. 
 
The log of property rights index (LProp): The log of the property right index is computed using 
the factor analysis of seven sub-components of full liberal ownership. 
 
The log of judicial independent de jure index (LJI):  Both de jure and de facto measures have 
been developed. The log of JI de jure covers the period 1884 to 2009; the JI de facto covers the 
period 1950 to 2009. In this thesis the JI de jure, due to its longer dated span, was used.  
 
The log of political freedom index (LPolfree): The log of the political freedom index is computed 
using the factor analysis of 12 sub-components of indicators of political rights and civil liberties 
based on theoretical dimensions of a contemporary liberal democracy advanced by Jaggers and 
Gurr (1995).  
 
The plots of the variables are presented in figure 5.3 for Namibia, while figure 5.4 plots the 
Tanzania variables.  
 
                                                             
78 See chapter two for a detailed discussion on the methodology and the data. 
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Figure 5-3Time-series plots of variables for Namibia 
       (a) Capital Stock (Kt)                                                                                (b) Log of Capital Stock (LKt)                  
                                   
  (c)   Real GDP (RGDP)                                       (d) Log of Real GDP (LRGDP)     
        
       ( e) Political Freedom Index (Polfree)                          (f) Political Instability Index (Inst)      
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Figure 5.3 Time-series plots of variables for Namibia (continued) 
(g) User Cost of Capital (UCt)                             (h) Property Rights Index (Prop)
       
(i) Independence of Judiciary Index (JI de jure)                                                                                                 
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Figure 5-4 Time-series plots of variables for Tanzania 
 (a) Capital Stock (Kt)                                                        (b) Log of Capital Stock (LKt)      
  
           (c)   Real GDP (RGDP)                (d) Log of Real GDP (LRGDP)             
         
      ( e) Political Freedom Index (Polfree)                          (f) Political Instability Index (Inst)       
         
Figure 5.4 Time-series plots of variables for Tanzania (continued) 
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(g) User Cost of Capital (UCt)                             (h) Property Rights Index (Prop)                
                        
     (i) Independence of Judiciary Index (JI de jure) 
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5.3  Econometric methodology  
 
There are two stages involved in the methodology. The first is the test for the existence of a long-
run relationship in levels among the variables by the Pesaran, Shin and Smith (PSS) F-test 
(Pesaran et al., 2001) statistics technique. Once the long-run relationship has been verified in 
step one and relying on theory, an estimation of the parameters of the long-run relationship and 
the associated short-run dynamic error correction models is conducted by applying the Johansen 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).  
5.3.1  Testing for the direction of association between variables 
 
The estimation of the empirical model in equation 7 is potentially subject to the problem of 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables because of the feedback effects from capital 
accumulation to institutions or vice versa. It seems reasonable to argue that institutions and 
economic outcomes are jointly determined which is key argument in Acemoglu et al. (2004). 
Therefore, it is necessary to determine the long-run association between the variables in the 
model.  
 
The bound-testing procedure developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) has been proposed in the 
economic literature for investigating long-run association among time-series variables. To 
explore the direction of association between the variables included in this thesis, the PSS F- test 
is employed. For a comprehensive description of this technique, see Pesaran et al. (2001). 
 
Let us consider an ECM given by 
∆ݖ௧ = ܽ଴ + ܽଵݐ + Πݖ௧ିଵ + ෍ Γ୧୮ିଵ
୧ୀଵ
Δz୲ି୧ + ε୲  , t = 1,2 … … … … ..     (8) 
The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) is a single-equation framework therefore ܼ௧  is 
portioned to ݖ௧(ݕ௧ , ݔ′௧)′  where ݕ௧ is the variable to be modelled given the k-vector ܺ௧, past 
values ൛ݖ௧ିଵ} ௧ିଵ௜ୀଵ  and ܼ௧  . 
The error term is also portioned into ߝ௧ = ൫ߝ௬௧ߝ௫௧́ ൯´ and its variance as 
     Ω = ቀఠ೤೤ఠೣ೤ ఠ೤ೣఆೣೣቁ 
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And then expressing ߝ௬௧ conditionally in terms of ߝ௫௧ as ߝ௬௧ = ߱௬௫Ωିଵߝ௫௧ + ݑ௧  
where  ݑ௧ ∼ ܫܰ(0,߱௨௨), ߱௨௨ = ߱௬௬ − ࣓௬௫࣓ and ߱ = Ω௫௫ିଵ߱௫௬ . Also portioning ܽ଴(ܽ௬଴,ܽ′௫଴)′ 
 
and ܽଵ(ܽ௬ଵ,ܽ′௫ଵ)′ and similarly partitioning the long run multipliers to conformably with 
ݖ௧(ݕ௧, ݔ′௧)′ as  
Π = ቆߨ௬௬   
ߨ௫௬
ߨ௬௫  Π௫௫ቇ 
Then assuming that ߨ௫௬ = 0 we have 
 
Δx௧ = ܽ௫଴ + ܽ௫ଵݐ + Π௫௫ݔ௧ିଵ + ෍ Γ௫௜Δz௧ି௜ + ߝ௫௧  ݐ = 1,2, … ,݊௣ିଵ
௜ୀଵ
        ܽ݊݀                          (9) 
 
Δy௧ = ܿ଴ + ܿଵݐ + π௬௬ݕ௧ିଵ + π௬௫.௫ݔ௧ିଵ + ෍ ψ′௜Δz௧ି௜ + ߱′Δݔ௧ + ݑ௧  ௣ିଵ
௜ୀଵ
                                 (10) 
 
The specification of ܿ଴ ܽ݊݀ ܿଵ,are defined in equation 2 of Pesaran et al (2001), ߱ in equation 
2.4 and ψ in equation 2.5 of the same reference. When ߨ௫௬ = 0, since there is no feedback from 
the level of  ݕ௧ to ݔ௧ , equation 9 and equation10 shows that {ݔ௧ } ∞௧ୀଵ long run forces {ݕ௧ } ∞௧ୀଵ. 
However, the possibility that {ݕ௧ } ∞௧ୀଵ Granger causes {ݔ௧ } ∞௧ୀଵ in the short run remains.79  
 
Provided that Π௫௫ has a rank r,0 ≤ r ≥k, then weak exogeneity for {ݔ௧ } ∞௧ୀଵfollows provided 
either 
(i) ߨ௫௬ = 0 and Π௫௫ = 0,݂݋ݎ π௬௬  ܽ݊݀ π௬௫.௫ = π௬௫ , or  
(ii) Where Π௫௫ ≠ 0, as π௬௬  and π௬௫.௫ = π௬௫ −߱′Π௫௫ are variation free from the 
parameters in equation 10, ݔ௧ } ∞௧ୀଵ remains weakly exogenous.  
 
The bound-testing procedure developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) tests for the absence of any level 
relationship between ݕ௧  and  ݔ௧ by testing for the exclusion of lagged variables ݕ௧ିଵ  and  ݔ௧ିଵ. 
This is based on the joint null hypothesis that  π௬௬ = 0 and π௬௫.௫=0, under the sequential 
                                                             
79 See also Granger and Lin(1995).  
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treatment of all variables in the specification as the outcome variable. Acceptance of the joint 
hypothesis thus establishes the absence of a level relationship, and hence weak exogeneity for 
the y-variable specified under the test.  
 
The empirical specification of the PPS (2001) procedure is presented as follows: 
∆ܮܭ௧ =∝଴+∝ଵ ܦ௜ + ෍ߚଵ௜∆݈݊ ௧ܻି௜௣
௜ୀ଴
+ ෍ߚଶ௜∆ܷܥ௧ି௜௣
௜ୀ଴
+ ෍ߚଷ௜∆ܲ݋݈݅݊ݏݐ௧ି௜  ௣
௜ୀ଴+ ෍ߚସ௜∆݈݊ܲݎ݋݌௧ି௜௣
௜ୀ଴
+ ෍ߚହ௜∆݈݊ܲ݋݈݂ݎ݁݁௧ି௜௣
௜ୀ଴
   + ෍ߚ଺௜∆݈݊ܬܫ௧ି௜௣
௜ୀ଴
 
+ ෍ߛଵ௜∆݈݊ܭ௧ି௜௣
௜ୀଵ
+ ߜଵ݈݊ܭ௧ିଵ + ߜଶܷܥ௧ିଵ + ߜଷܲ݋݈݅݊ݏݐ௧ିଵ + ߜସ݈݊ܲݎ݋݌௧ିଵ+ ߜହ݈݊ܲ݋݈݂ݎ݁݁௧ିଵ + ߜ଺݈݊ܬܫ௧ିଵ+ ߜ଻݈݊ ௧ܻିଵ                                                                                            (11)    
 
The order of augmentation, which is p, is determined by the need to render the error term white 
noise. This is chosen from the set of all feasible lag structure combinations by means of 
information selection criteria such as Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwartz 
Bayesian criteria (SBC).  
 
The PSS approach tests for the absence of any level relationship between yt-1 and xt-1 in Error 
Correction Model (ECM) given by equation (8). Thus, the absence of level relationship between 
yt and xt is a joint significant test of the null hypothesis (Ho: δ1= δ2= δ3....= δn+1=0), under all 
feasible alternative left hand side (LHS) variables. This can be examined by the standard Wald or 
F-statistics. The distribution of the test statistics is non-standard and it is influenced by whether 
the x୧,୲ are I (0) or I (1). Pesaran et al. (2001) tabulate two asymptotic critical values, a lower 
bound and an upper bound. When the order of integration of the variables is known and all the 
variables are I (0), the decision is made based on the lower bound, and in the case of all the 
variables being I (1), the decision is based on the upper bound. The test is analogous to a Granger 
causality test, but in the presence of non-stationary data (Fedderke and Luiz, 2008).  
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The test statistic is computed with each of  y୲, x୧,୲, … . x୬,୲ as the dependent variable. If the 
calculated F-statistics exceeds the upper critical value, then reject the null of no long-run 
relationship. If the calculated F-statistics lies below the lower bound value, infer the absence of a 
long-run relationship. The test is inconclusive if the calculated F-test falls between the two 
bounds.  
 
Narayan (2005) however argued that critical values generated by Pesaran et al.(2001) cannot be 
used in small samples since they are based on large samples ( they are generated for samples 
sizes of 500 and 1000 observations and 20 000 and 40 000 replications respectively). Narayan 
(2005) compares the critical values generated from smaller samples, 30-80 observations, using 
the same GAUSS code as (Pesaran et al.,2001) and find critical values reported in Pesaran et 
al.(2001) are smaller than those generated from a larger sample. Hence given the sample size in 
the present study (84 observations for Namibia analysis and 64 observations for the Tanzanian 
case) the analyses adopt the critical values as provided by Narayan (2005). 
 
All variables in equation (9) are defined except Di which is dummies for specific structural 
breaks. In the Namibia empirical analysis, the three dummies are included to represent events 
such as the World War II (1939–1945 =1 and zero otherwise) and intense liberation hostilities 
(1970–1988 =1 and zero otherwise), and the independence dummy (1990–2009 =1, and zero 
otherwise), which are verified and found to affect the economic and institutional variables. 
 
In the Tanzania analysis, three dummies are introduced to capture various economic and political 
structural changes during the period under review. The three periods are defined as follows: The 
pre-Arusha period runs from 1946 to 1966. This is followed by Arusha declaration period which 
started in 1967 and continued until 1985, with President Nyerere’s resignation. The third is the 
reform period, from 1986 to 2009.  
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) is applied to equation 11 in order to test for the existence of a 
long-run relationship among the variables by conducting an F-test for the joint significance of the 
coefficient of the lagged levels of the variables. 
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5.3.2  Johansen VECM Estimation Technology 
 
5.3.2.1  Methodology 
This section gives a brief description of the standard Johanssen-Juselius technique80  for 
multivariate cointegration that is applied in the empirical analysis. The basic vector 
autoregressive (VAR) is specified as follows: 
ݖ௧ = ܣଵݖ௧ିଵ + ⋯+ ܣ௠ݖ௧ି௠ + ߜ + ݒ௧                                                                  (12)  
 
Where ݖ௧ is a n x 1 matrix of endogenous variables, m is the lag length, δ is a matrix of 
deterministic terms and ݒ௧ is a Gaussian error term. Reparametrization provides the following 
VECM specification: 
 
 ∆ݖ௧ = ∑ Γ୧௞ିଵ௜ୀଵ Δz୲ିଵ + ∏z୲ି୩ାଵ + δ + v୲                                                           (13) 
 
where Π = ߙߚ′ . ߙ is referred to as the loading matrix, containing the short run dynamics, while 
ߚ is the matrix containing the long run equilibrium (cointegrating) relationships. The rank, r, of 
the matrix represents the number of cointegrating vectors and is tested for by using the standard 
Trace and Maximal Eigenvalue test statistics. Where r >1 issues of identification arise. 81 These 
can be resolved by means of restrictions on the loading matrix (ߙ), the matrix representing short-
run dynamics (Γ) and the cointegration space ߚ. 82 Various ways of imposing restrictions are 
proposed in the literature (Johansen, 1988, 1991, 1995; Phillips, 1991; Pesaran and Shin 1995b, 
2001). 
The thesis follows Johansen (1988, 1991, 1995) and applies the following technique in reducing 
the general VECM to a more parsimonious representation: 
 
1. Test the order of integration of the variables. 
2. Set the appropriate lag length of the VAR such that the error terms in each equation have 
no autocorrelation. 
3. Use Johansen’s cointegration test to estimate the cointegrating vectors. 
                                                             
80 For more detailed discussion refer to Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992).  
81 See Pesaran and Shin (1995a, 1995b), Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992). 
82 Refer to Greenslade et al.(1999) 
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4. Impose identification restriction on the cointegrating vector, β. 
5. Test the over-identifying restrictions on the cointegrating vector, β. 
 
5.3.2.2  Model specification 
 
(i) The co-integrating relationships  
The aim is to examine the impact of institutions on fixed capital accumulation over time. A 
theoretical and empirical review supports a possibility of two long-run relationships, linking 
capital stock and institutions with economic outcomes, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a 
strong feedback effect from capital stock to output (GDP). Dawson (1998) argues that the effect 
of institutions on growth is via their effect on capital stock (investment). This supports a 
separation of two cointegrating vectors in estimation, one capturing investment and the other 
explaining output. 
 
It is also worth noting that the extension of standard investment with an institutional variable 
might pose a third cointegrating vector. This is line with Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998) who 
showed that there exist a diverse and often strong web of associations among these social and 
political variables, and among these variables and measures of economic activity, such as output 
and investment. 
In restricting the cointegrating vectors, Pesaran and Shin (1995a) show that r2 restrictions are 
needed for exact identification. The common approach of imposing r2 identifying restrictions in 
Johansen’s statistical approach was criticised as being a purely mathematical convenience.  
 
The signs and zero restrictions on the long-run parameters are shown in equation 14, which 
represents an a priori just-identified model guided by theoretical and empirical work. The 
empirical specification is as follows: 
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Πݖ௧ି௞ାଵ
=
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⎥
⎥
⎤
                    (14) 
 
All variables in equation (14) are defined (see equation (7)) and their description and sources are 
discussed in section 5.2.4.2 of this thesis.  
 
(ii) Identification Strategy  
 
An emphasis was placed on using an economic theory to guide the choice of long-run 
exact/over-identifying restrictions. This is aided by the PSS F-test, whereby normalisation 
restrictions are placed on those variables found to be endogenous. With a prior of three vectors, 
nine restrictions for just-identification must be imposed on the long-run model. In each vector, 
three restrictions are imposed, i.e. one normalisation restriction and two exclusion restrictions. 
 
According to the neoclassical approach, the desired or optimal capital stock is proportional to 
output and the user cost of capital. Therefore, in the analysis both the output measure (as proxied 
by GDP) and the user cost of capital are retained in the first vector, representing the capital stock 
relation. Furthermore, the new theory of investment clearly specifies that uncertainty (as proxied 
by political instability) and the possibility of postponing investment will affect capital 
formulation.  
 
Relative to other institutional determinants, the New Institutional theory argues that property 
rights have a first-order effect on long-run investment (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).  
 
In the first vector, a normalisation restriction is imposed on LKt, while the exclusion restrictions 
are imposed on de jure judicial independence (LJIt) and political rights (LPolfree). The 
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expectation is that these variables affect capital stock indirectly via other institutional variables. 
This is applied to both the Namibian and the Tanzanian analyses in the next section.  
 
In the second vector, which represents the output relation, a normalisation is imposed on GDP 
while a zero restriction is put on user cost of capital. Under the neoclassical theory of investment, 
user cost of capital will affect capital stock, thereby exerting an effect on output indirectly. 
Another exclusion restriction was put on political rights. Again the expectation is that these 
variables will affect output indirectly via other institutional variables.  
 
The literature acknowledges that both political and economic institutions are fundamental causes 
of economic development. Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998) showed that when considering a set of 
approximately 67 indicators of social and political dimensions of society, there exists a diverse 
and often strong web of association among these variables, and among them and measures of 
economic activity such as output and investment.  
 
The third vector normalises on political instability (Inst) and imposes an exclusion restriction on 
user cost of capital (UCt) and capital stock (LKt) in the Namibia analysis. In the case of 
Tanzania, a normalisation is on judicial independence (JIt), while exclusion restrictions are 
imposed on user cost of capital (UCt) and capital stock (LKt). The choice of the normalising 
variable, i.e. political instability or judicial independence, is an empirical outcome, based on PSS 
F-test results. There is no theory or hypothesis to guide the selection, except the work of 
Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998), which draws our attention to the web of association among the 
institutional variables.  
 
In the study judicial independence is not just defined as the extent of the de jure structural 
independence of the judiciary within the government system, but also in terms of the behavioral 
independence of individual judges. The latter consideration includes the method of appointments 
of the judiciary and their tenure security, among other aspects. A sound judiciary is key to 
enforcement.  
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The political instability index, on the other hand, captures the number and magnitude of 
identifiable events reflecting de facto constraints of political, social and economic rights. These 
events include: political fatalities, civil protest, politically motivated arrest, declarations of state 
of emergencies, and the banning of political parties and publications.  
 
Over-identification of the system is done by further restrictions on the just-identified model.  
 
5.3.3 Dealing with Structural breaks within the data series 
 
The periods under review for both countries, 1923 to 2009 and 1946 to 2009, are long, and 
potential structural breaks are anticipated in the data. Perron (1989) addressed the problem of 
unit root testing in the presence of structural breaks in the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests. 
Dating of the potential break was assumed known a priori in Perron’s (1989) unit root test. 
Christiano (1992), among others, however criticised the proposed standard approach by Perron. 
Christiano argued that the standard approach invalidates the distribution theory underlying 
conventional testing. 
 
As a consequence, Perron (1997) and many others, including Zivot and Andrews (1992), 
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) and Bai and Perron (2003), developed different methodologies for 
endogenising dates. This study applies the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test and the sequential 
procedure of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to verify the timing of structural breaks. 
 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) suggested a variation of Perron’s (1989) test that allows 
endogenously determined breakpoints in the intercept, the trend function, or both. In its general 
from (breaks in both the intercept and trend function), the test entails running the following 
regression for all potential breakpoints, TB, (1<TB<T): 
∆ݕ௧ = ߤ + ߚݐ + ߠଵܦ ௧ܷ + ߛଵܦ ௧ܶ + ߙݕ௧ିଵ + ෍ܿ௜∆ݕ௧ିଵ + ߝ௧                                    (15) ௞
௜ୀଵ
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where DUt and DTt are break dummy-variables that are defined as follows: 
DUt = 1 if t>TB; 0 otherwise    and DTt = t-TB if t >TB; 0 otherwise 
and k is the number of lags determined for each possible breakpoint by one of the information 
criteria.  
 
Since it is possible for an economic series to exhibit multiple breakpoints, the Bai and Perron 
(2003) endogenous structural breaks test is considered. The regression considered here is the 
multiple regressions with m breaks (or equivalently, m+1 regime). 
       ݕ௧ = ݔ௧′ߚ௝ + ߝ௧                     (t =Tj-1+1,....,Tj;   j=1,....,m+1)                          (16) 
 
where y is the dependent variable, x is a vector of covariates, β is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients that may vary over time, ε is the disturbance term, T is the number of observations, 
T0 =0 and Tm+1 =T by convention.  
 
Equations 15 and 16 are estimated to determine endogenously the timing of the structural break 
with no ex ante preference for any particular year or event.  
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Chapter 6  
 
6.  The impact of institutions on capital formation: Empirical analysis and econometric 
model estimation 
 
6.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the analysis of empirical results using the time-series data from Namibia. 
Country parameters are estimated separately using time-series regression for each country. This 
section applies the conceptual framework and methodology as developed in the chapter five of 
this thesis. The analysis of empirical results starts with the unit root test. Secondly, the Pesaran, 
Shin & Smith (PSS)-F-test (Pesaran et al., 2001) is then examined to explore the direction of 
relationship between the variables within models. This is followed by cointegration tests using 
the maximum likelihood procedure of Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).  
 
6.1 Empirical analysis: Namibia 
 
6.1.1 The univariate characteristics of the data 
 
Variables whose means and variances change over time are known as non-stationary or unit root 
variables. Economic theory often suggests the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships 
among non-stationary time-series variables. If variables are non-stationary, the estimation of the 
long-run relationship between those variables has been shown to be based on the cointegration 
method. Hence, pretesting for unit roots is the first step in vector-error -correction modelling.  
 
The standard ADF and Phillips and Perron (1988) (PP) tests for the null of a unit root are 
applied. Table 6.1 reports the unit roots results, where c denotes the inclusion of a constant. 
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Table 6:1ADF and PP unit root test 
Variable Levels First Differences Order of 
Integration 
 c c I(d) 
LKt -0.60 -13.18*** I(1) 
LYt -0.33 -7.41*** I(1) 
Uct -1.31 -7.54*** I(1) 
Inst -2.27 -14.13*** I(1) 
LProp -2.53 -9.37*** I(1) 
LJI  -0.02 -8.41*** I(1) 
LPolfree -0.73 -6.88*** I(1) 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test  
LKt -2.56 -10.06*** I(1) 
LYt -0.64 -7.38*** I(1) 
Uct -3.45**  I(0) 
Notes: All variables are significant at 1% critical values denoted by ***, except UCt which is significant at 5 % 
critical value denoted by **.  
 
The results indicate that the computed t-statistics are greater than the critical values, thus 
implying that all variables are non-stationary at levels except for the user cost of capital (UCt), as 
shown in table 6.1 under the PP unit root test.  
 
The user cost of capital is stationary at 5% significance level. All the other variables have to be 
differenced once to transform them to stationary at 1% critical values. This is an indication that 
the variables are I (1). As pointed out in the literature, the ADF test is unable to discriminate well 
between non-stationary and stationary series with high degrees of autoregression.  
 
As a consequence, the PP test is applied. The PP test has an advantage over the ADF in that it 
gives robust estimates when the series has serial correlation and time-dependent 
heteroskedasticity. Under the PP test, all variables are confirmed to be I (1) at 1% critical level, 
with an exception of UCt which is I (0) at 5% critical level. However, a closer visual plot 
inspection of the UCt reveals that the variable might be non-stationary at levels (see figure 5-
3(g)).  
 
Next the variable unit root characteristics is further explored using the Zivot-Andrews unit root 
test, given that neither the ADF nor the PP test account for presence of structural change in the 
economic variables.  
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6.1.2 Dealing with structural breaks in the data series 
 
The period under review, from 1923 to 2009, is long, and potential structural breaks are 
anticipated in the data. Equations 15 and 16 are estimated to determine endogenously the timing 
of the structural break with no ex ante preference for any particular year or event. Table 6:2 
reports the results. 
Table 6:2 Zivot-Andrews unit root test and Bai-Perron breakpoint test 
Variable Levels First Differences Order of 
Integration 
Chosen break 
 Intercept Intercept I(d)  
LKt -3.95 -4.58*** I(1) 1945 
LYt -4.56 -6.70*** I(1) 1946 
Uct -4.22 -7.96*** I(1) 1984 
LProp -4.7 -10.1*** I(1) 1990 
LPolfree -4.13 -7.15*** I(1) 1990 
LJI -2.80 -6.41*** I(1) 1990 
Inst  -3.75 -10.0*** I(1) 1989 
Bai-Perron breakpoint test    
 No of breaks Year Year Year Link 
LKt 2 1935 1971  WW2 and the 1970s-1980s War 
LYt 3 1935 1948 1970 WW2 and the 1970s-1980s War 
Uct 2 1941 1981  WW2 and the 1970s-1980s War 
LProp 3 1939 1967 1989 WW2 &1970s-1980s & Independence 
LPolfree 3 1948 1974 1988 WW2 &1970s-1980s & Independence 
LJI 3 1945 1976 1989 WW2 &1970s-1980s & Independence 
Inst  3 1939 1969 1989 WW2 &1970s-1980s & Independence 
Note: For the Zivot-Andrews unit root test ***denotes a 1% level of significance. 
 
The Zivot-Andrews unit root confirmed that LKt and LYt are I (1) subject to the presence of a 
structural break in 1945 and 1946 respectively. The chosen breakpoint is not surprising, given 
World War II and its aftermath. In the case of variable UC, the breakpoint is in 1984. When 
Zivot-Andrews unit root test was applied in levels, it showed that UCt is not an I (0) subject to 
the presence of a structural break in 1984. However, differencing it once, UCt does become 
stationary at 1% critical level. Therefore, we proceed with UCt as I (1) in the study.  
 
All institutional variables are confirmed to I(1) subject to the presence of a structural break in 
1990, which could be ascribed to the attainment of Namibian independence, except political 
instability (Inst), which showed a breakpoint in 1989. Here we conclude that all unit roots are 
present in all the variables even when structural breaks are accounted for.  
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The use of the Bai-Perron breakpoint test is intuitive in timing multiple breaks, which is crucial 
for the inclusion of dummies in the study. In line with the Zivot-Andrews unit root, we confirm 
the importance of World War II, which started in the late 1930s and lasted through 1945. 
Another crucial timing for Namibia is the period between the 1970s and late 1980s. The year 
1989 is confirmed as important as it signifies the onset of Namibia’s independence.  
 
6.1.3 ARDL PSS F-test estimation results 
 
We apply the PSS F-test to determine the direction of association between capital stock and its 
economic and institutional determinants in the specified model (see equation 11). Table 6:3 
presents the PSS F-statistics when each variable is considered as a dependent variable in the 
ARDL-OLS regressions. The conclusions are based on the critical values provided in Narayan 
(2005) for a sample size 80, for the case of unrestricted intercept and no trend with seven 
variables (i.e. k=7). 
 
Table 6:3 ARDL estimation of long-run relationship 
Dependent Variable Lag 
Order 
F-statistics Probability Interpretation 
FKt  (Kt|Prop,Polfree, JI, UC, Inst,Yt) 2 4.753 0.0003 Possible Outcome 
variable 
Fprop  (Prop|Kt,Polfree, JI, UC, 
Inst,Yt) 
2 0.710 0.663 Forcing variable 
Fpolfree (Polfree |Prop,Kt, JI, UC, 
Inst,Yt) 
2 1.844 0.0975 Forcing variable 
FYt  (Yt |Prop,Polfree, JI, Kt ,UC, 
Inst) 
2 4.488 0.0005 Possible Outcome 
variable 
FUC (UC|Prop,Polfree, JI, Kt , Inst,Yt) 2 2.0968 0.0895 
 
Forcing variable 
FJI  (JI|Prop,Polfree, Kt, UC, Inst,Yt) 2 1.4944 0.1890 Forcing variable 
 
FInst  (Inst|Prop,Polfree, Kt ,JI, UC, 
Yt) 
2 5.1550 0.0002 Possible Outcome 
variable 
  
Narayan (2005) Table CI(iii) Unrestricted intercept and no trend     K=7 
Critical Values Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds  I(1) 
At   5% 2.476 3.746 
The calculated F-statistics FKt (Kt|Prop, Polfree, JI, UC, Inst, Yt) = 4.75 and FYt (Yt |Prop, 
Polfree, JI, Kt, UC, Inst) = 4.48 are higher than the upper-bound critical value 3.74 at the 5% 
level. Thus the null hypotheses of the absence of relationship are rejected, implying a long-run 
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relationship among the variables when the regressions are normalised on both Kt and Yt 
variables. In terms of institutional variables, political instability, which is our proxy for 
uncertainty, appears to be an outcome variable relative to a number of institutional variables 
(property rights, political rights and judicial independence).  
 
The use of a single-equation cointegration approach such as the ARDL is valid only where there 
is a unique cointegration vector (Pesaran et al., 2001). Our results have shown the existence of 
more than one possible equilibrium relationship in the model. For us to proceed with estimating 
the model in equation 7, we adopt the Johansen VECM technique as specified in equation 14.  
 
6.1.4  Johansen cointegration results 
 
The present study uses the Johansen test for cointegration. There are two important issues in 
specifying a VAR model: the choice of appropriate lag length and the number of variables to be 
included in the model. Based on statistical tests, a VAR with the lag order of two is estimated. 
Table 6:4 reports the results for the cointegration test under the assumption of unrestricted 
intercepts and restricted trend, which is chosen following the summary of all possible models.  
 
Both the trace and eigenvalue tests indicate that there are at least three cointegration equations at 
the 5% level of significance. This is in line with the PSS F-tests results, which suggested that 
LKt, LYt and Inst are potential outcome variables in this study.  
 
Table 6:4 Johansen test for multiple-co-integrating vectors 
Test statistics 
Ho Alternative Trace 5% Critical 
Value 
Prob.** Max.Eigen 5% Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r = 0* r=1 195.943 125.615 0.0000 62.566 46.231 0.0005 
r<=1* r= 2 133.378 95.754 0.0000 48.800 40.078 0.0041 
r<=2* r=3 84.577 69.819 0.0021 44.193 33.877 0.0021 
r<=3 r=4 40.384 47.856 0.2090 24.078 27.584 0.1320 
r<=4 r=5 16.306 29.797 0.6906 10.817 21.132 0.6655 
The results of the unidentified cointegrated VAR for the three cointegrating vectors are hard to 
interpret economically. Therefore, one needs to impose appropriate restrictions and 
normalisation on the long-run betas (see section 5.3.2.2 of this thesis for discussion). Three 
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normalisation and six parameter restrictions are imposed to obtain a just-identified model, the 
results of which are given in the next subsection.  
 
6.1.4.1  Long-run and short-run estimate analysis 
In the just-identified model,83 the first cointegrating vector was taken to represent the capital-
stock relation. Relative to other institutional determinants, theory argues that property rights have 
a first-order effect on long-run investment (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). We normalise on 
capital stock and put zero restrictions on judicial independence and political rights.  
 
In the second vector, which represents the output relation, we normalise on GDP and put zero 
restrictions on user cost of capital. Under the neoclassical theory of investment, user cost of 
capital will affect capital stock, thereby exerting an effect on output indirectly. Another 
restriction was put on political rights. We expect these variables to affect output indirectly via 
other institutional variables.  
 
The third vector, which represents uncertainty, we normalise on political instability, and put a 
zero restriction on capital stock and user capital stock. Here, we are also exploring the systematic 
relationship between institutional variables themselves and macroeconomic variables (see 
Fedderke and Luiz, 2005). 
 
Once the model was just-identified through these restrictions, the next step was to impose and 
test further over-identifying restrictions. A likelihood ratio test compares the less restricted with 
the more restricted model (Johansen, 1988). If the likelihood test is statistically significant, then 
the less restricted model is said to fit the data better than the more restrictive, and vice versa.  
  
                                                             
83 See section 5.3.2.2 for discussion of identification restrictions of the model.  
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Table 6:5 Normalised cointegration coefficients 
 (a) Just identified (b) Over-identified 
(i) Long-run Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Cointegrating Eq Lkt LYt Pol Inst Lkt LYt Pol Inst 
LKt 1.000 -8.569 
(-12.95) 
0.000 1.000 -4.62 
(-13.7) 
0.000 
LYt -0.667 
(-6.14) 
1.000 -2.604 
(-4.97) 
-0.652 
(5.79) 
1.000 -1.70 
(-3.57) 
Inst 0.071 
(1.652) 
0.953 
(5.857) 
1.000 0.07 
(1.66) 
0.48 
(6.13) 
1.000 
LProp 4.82 
(7.95) 
-2.454 
(0.828) 
3.479 
(1.37) 
5.02 
(8.01) 
0.000 6.58 
(4.23) 
LPolfree 0.000 0.000 2.765 
(3.84) 
0.000 0.000 3.02 
(4.6) 
UCt 0.111 
(7.47) 
0.000 0.000 0.114 
(7.45) 
0.000 0.000 
LJI 0.000 -26.72 
(-12.62) 
-12.46 
(-6.37) 
0.000 -13.06 -10.3 
(-6.3) 
Trend -0.05 
(-7.485) 
0.44 
(8.92) 
0.10 
(3.16) 
-0.06 
(-7.53) 
0.20 
(8.8) 
0.03 
(1.32) 
LR Test of restrictions    X2 (1) = 0.263[0.608]  
Accepts restriction 
(ii) Short-run Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Dummies 
WW2DU -0.03 
(-2.42) 
0.09 
(1.17) 
-0.141 
(-0.29) 
-0.03 
(-2.3) 
0.07 
(0.91) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
DU1970 0.00 
(0.171) 
-0.11 
(-1.67) 
1.53 
(3.66) 
-0.00 
(-0.101) 
-0.01 
(-1.298) 
1.46 
(3.74) 
DU1990 0.06 
(2.09) 
-0.05 
(-0.31) 
-2.22 
(-2.05) 
0.06 
(2.14) 
-0.06 
(-0.35) 
-2.17 
(-2.06) 
 Notes: figures in round brackets are t-statistics 
 
All the variables in the just-identified model (a) are significant based on their t-statistics values 
as shown in table 6:5(i), with the exception of property rights in both the LYt vector and political 
instability (Inst) vector. Zero restriction is imposed on the coefficient of property rights in the Yt 
vector in the over-identified model. In the over-identified model (b), the restriction is accepted 
with the likelihood ratio given by Chi-square = 0.263 and a p-value 0.608. The normalised 
equations are presented below: 
Lkt =   0.06t + 0.65 LYt - 0.07Inst – 5.02 LProp – 0.114 UCt                         (17) 
LYt = - 0.20 t +4.62 LKt - 0.485 Inst +13.1 LJI                                               (18) 
Inst = - 0.03t + 1.7 LYt - 6.58 LProp -.02 LPolfree + 10.3 LJI                     (19) 
 
From economic point of view, the results from equations 17 to 19 are mixed. In the LKt vector, 
all variables are significant and carry the expected coefficients’ signs, apart from property rights.  
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According to equation 17, capital stock (Lkt) showed a significantly negative relation with the 
property right index (LProp) in long-run with an elasticity coefficient of -5.02. This result is 
counterintuitive, since property rights are expected to have a higher positive impact on capital 
accumulation, especially to the extent that secure property rights increase investors’ confidence, 
thereby increasing the level of investment. Plausible explanations might be the use of our proxy 
for property rights, which is based on land rights.  
 
Firstly, given the historical dual land ownership in Namibia, an anticipated land reform84, i.e. the 
process to achieve a more equal distribution of land since mid-1980s and the onset of 
independence in 1990, might induce some level of uncertainty among some economic 
actors.85High uncertainty is detrimental to formation of capital stock due to irreversibility of 
investment. Although property rights in Namibia are generally secured, they are not broad-based.  
Therefore, it appears that perceived fear of land lost during a reform might hinder more 
fundamental long term investment in Namibia. This is shown by a declining share of capital 
formation in the agriculture sector especially since the 1980s onwards. Similar results were 
obtained in the work of Ayalew et al. (2005), which have shown that perceived land tenure 
insecurity due to land reform negatively affect investment in the case of Ethiopia. According to 
Beasley (1995), reducing the risk of expropriation, secure property rights encourage land users to 
make long-term land –related investments.  
 
Secondly, the negative correlation between property rights and investment could be due to 
omitted factors which influence both the measure of property rights and investment. The factor 
that land rights under the colonial regime were poor for blacks, while at the same time leading to 
investment by the whites is a possible explanation. It should be noted that whites enjoyed a 
number of incentives such as financial assistance via a number of land settlement legislations. 
 
                                                             
84 Since 1995, The Namibian government has pursued policies of land reform through tenure reform and 
redistributive land reform through buying of farmland and few cases of land expropriations.  
85 This mainly refers to land owners under the freehold tenure system where major capital investment undertakings 
are taking place.  
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Thirdly, it can view that there are alternate ways in which the role of property rights affect 
capital accumulation in the Namibian context. First property rights acts via political instability 
variables. This is strongly supported by the results reported in table 6.5, which indicates that 
improvement in property rights dampens political instability. A statistically significant negative 
association between property rights and political instability was also detected (see table 3.1). 
This support the hypothesis extended by Fedderke and Luiz (2005) that uncertainty would have 
to be understood as being related to a broader institutional nexus. The results might also show 
that investors are more sensitive to the signal coming from the political environment as 
represented by political instability index rather than the constitutional one (i.e. de jure 
indicators). This might be due to the long history of brutal colonization, independence war and 
struggle for the control of the land.  
 
Uncertainty, as proxied by political instability (Inst), has a negative and statistically significant 
influence on capital-stock accumulation. Empirical support for a negative link between capital 
stock and measures of political instability is found in the work of Fielding (2002) and Fedderke 
and Luiz (2005) for South Africa. Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that socio-political instability 
generates an uncertain political-economic environment, raising risks and reducing investment. 
This result is also consistent with historical episodes of high political instability and the rapid 
decline in gross capital formation in Namibia, particularly between the 1970s and late 1980s. 
 
Normalised equation 17 shows that there is a significant positive relationship between GDP and 
the accumulation of capital. The result is consistent with the findings of many researchers (inter 
alia Fielding, 1997, 1993; Ndikumana, 2000; Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001). This is supported by 
the flexible accelerator theory, which shows that high output is associated with a high rate of 
capital-stock accumulation. 
 
The impact of user cost of capital is seen to be negative and relatively statistically significant. 
This finding is corroborated by empirical studies (Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Oshikoya, 1994; 
Ndikumana, 2000; Ghura and Goodwin, 2000) in which increased user cost of capital 
discourages investment formation. The significant negative influence of user cost of capital on 
capital stock is also consistent with the investment theory.  
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Turning to the GDP vector (Yt),86 as shown by equation 18, all variables are significant and carry 
the expected coefficients’ signs. LKt has a positive and significant effect of 4.62 on GDP, thus 
confirming that capital stock is a key factor contributing to real GDP growth. Another important 
result is the positive relation of judicial independence to GDP, with a significant elasticity of 
13.1. Theory suggests that effective independent courts promote investment and economic 
growth. As expected, political instability negatively influences GDP.  
 
The last vector represents political instability (Inst), shown in equation 19. The results are quite 
mixed: while property rights appear to have a negative relation to political instability, judicial 
independence shows a positive association with political instability. Improvements in property 
rights significantly dampen political instability (elasticity of -6.58). The positive significant 
relation between increases in output and instability, with an elasticity of (1.7), is in line with the 
findings of Fedderke and Luiz (2005). Political rights report a significant negative sign, implying 
a rise in freedom rights being associated with decreasing levels of political instability, with an 
elasticity of -3.02.  
 
We now turn to the impact of the dummy variables representing World War II, the hostilities 
from the 1970s to 1980s, and the independence and post-independence period in Namibia. The 
World War II dummy (WW2DU) has a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -0.03, 
in the LKt cointegration vector only, while the DU1970 is statistically significant in the Yt and 
Inst cointegration vectors respectively. In the instability vector the sign is positive, reaffirming 
their association. The independence and post-independence period dummy (DU1990) shows a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient of 0.06 in the vector representing capital stock. In 
the political instability vector the sign is negative and statistically significant. This indicates the 
onset of the stable political and macroeconomic environment period in Namibia, which is still 
lingering.  
 
6.1.4.2  Robustness analysis 
 
                                                             
86 This vector is likely to be underspecified in this regression.  
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The last step in evaluating the cointegration model is an impulse-response analysis. Building on 
Sims’s (1980) seminal paper, Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992) argued that an impulse-response 
analysis of vector autoregressive systems with cointegrated variables can be considered. 
Although the individual variables are non-stationary, there are linear combinations of them 
which are stationary. These are interpreted as the long-run equilibrium relations. Assuming that 
variables are in equilibrium at some time t, say t=0, any shock to one of the variables results in 
time paths of the system that eventually settle down in a new equilibrium, provided no further 
shocks occur. If a relationship is cointegrated, the shock will have impact, but will tend to zero 
even though the shock will have a permanent effect on the individual variables.  
 
After estimating the vector-error-correction model using the Johansen technique with the 
Namibian data, the estimation of the persistence profile of the effect of a system-wide shock to 
the cointegrated vectors (CV) in the just- and over-identified models was carried-out. In addition, 
impulse-response functions with respect to one standard error shock to the capital stock, output 
and political instability equations are also estimated. The results of the plots are based on the 
over-identified model, as shown in figures 6-1 to 6-4 below for Namibia. The just-identified 
model impulse-response plots are presented in the appendices. It should be noted that the same 
impulse responses are obtained from a system with just identified restrictions on the cointegrated 
vectors (see figure C1 in the appendices). 
 
Figure 6.1 show a rapid convergence to equilibrium of all vectors in the long run due to a 
system-wide shock. According to the plots, all the three cointegrated vectors shocks rapidly die 
out, indicating stability of the equilibrium relation.  
 
A symmetrical result emerges for the shocks to individual equations. Figure 6.2 shows that the 
shocks to the capital stock equation have minimal and less persistent effect on all three 
cointegrated vectors in the short run. The shocks tend to die out rapidly restoring the equilibrium 
relation among the vectors.  
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Figure 6-1 Persistence profiles of CV’s to system-wide shock: over-id model for Namibia 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Impulse responses of CV’s to shock in the equation of LKt: over-id model 
 
 
From figure 6.3 an output equation shocks has minimal initial impact on three cointegrated 
vectors in the short run. This however tend to converge very quickly to the equilibrium.  
The political instability equation shocks are shown by figure 6.4. The shocks tend to smooth out 
in the long run, confirming the stability of the model. In summary, this exercise demonstrates 
that the system might be adequate for studying the impact of institutions on capital stock 
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Figure 6-3 Impulse responses of CV’s to shock in the equation for LRGD: over-id model 
 
 
Figure 6-4 Impulse Responses of CV’s to shock in the equation for Inst: over-id model  
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6.2 Empirical analysis and model estimation: Tanzania 
 
This section extends the empirical research by testing the impact of institutional indicators on 
irreversible investment behaviour under uncertainty using aggregate data from Tanzania. 
 
6.2.1  The univariate characteristics of the data 
 
It is crucial to detect whether the series are stationary or not. Three different tests are used: the 
standard ADF and PP tests for the null of a unit root, and, to account for structural breaks in the 
dataset, the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test. Table 6:6 reports the two unit roots results. The 
result for the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test is presented in table 6:7. 
 
Table 6:6 ADF and PP unit root test 
Variable ADF Statistics PP Statistics I(d) 
 Levels 1st Differences Levels 1st Differences  
LKt -0.66 -16.86*** -2.89 -5.07*** I(1) 
LYt 0.46 -2.02 1.98 -9.91*** I(1) 
Uct -2.09 -9.68*** -2.64 -10.73*** I(1) 
Inst -0.98 -6.86*** -1.02 -7.12 I(1) & I(1) 
LProp -1.13 -7.75*** -1.13 -7.75*** I(1) 
LJI  -1.84 -9.06*** 1.73 -9.06*** I(1) 
LPolfree -1.55 -7.53*** -1.65 -7.53*** I(1) 
 
                Notes: All variables are significant at 1% critical values denoted by ***  
 
The purpose of using three unit root tests is to get insight into the order of the variables, when 
one or more tests are not in conformity. This is important particularly in a long-dated time-series 
study, due to the fact the standard unit root tests used to behave poorly in the presence of 
structural breaks in the data. The ADF and PP tests confirm that all variables contain a unit root. 
 
6.2.2 Dealing with structural breaks in the data series 
 
There are anticipated structural breaks in the data due to the period under review, from 1946 to 
2009. The Zivot and Andrews (1992) test as specified in equation 15 and the sequential 
procedure of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) presented in equation 16 are applied to verify the 
timing of structural breaks. Table 6:7 reports the results. 
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Table 6:7 Zivot-Andrews unit root tests and Bai-Perron breakpoint test 
Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Tests 
Variable Levels First Differences Order of 
Integration 
Chosen break 
 Intercept Intercept I(d)  
LKt -3.97 -9.12 I(1) 1972 
LYt -0.89 -9.96 I(1) 1977 
Uct -5.07 -10.04 I(1) 1985 
Inst -4.09 -7.93 I(1) 1970 
LProp -4.54 -8.29 I(1) 1973 
LJI  -5.27 -9.65 I(1) 1965 
LPolfree -3.47 -8.17 I(1) 1965 
Bai-Perron breakpoint test  
 No of breaks Year Year Year Year 
LKt 2 1954 1975   
LYt 3 1954 1979 1999  
Uct 3 1965 1979 2000  
Inst 1  1972   
LProp 3 1962 1972 1983  
LJI  4 1960 1974 1985 1999 
LPolfree 4 1954 1964 1978 1991 
Zivot-Andrews unit root test ***denotes a 1% level of significance. 
 
The Zivot-Andrews unit root confirmed that all variables are I (1) in the presence of structural 
breaks. The chosen breakpoints for the political freedom and judicial independence indices is the 
year 1965, while for the property rights and political instability indices they are the years 1973 
and 1970 respectively. These breakpoints capture the one-party regime and the Arusha 
declaration period.  
 
The economic-variables breakpoints are identified in the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, we 
proceed with the fact that all variables are I (1). These breakpoints are linked to structural 
changes under the Arusha declaration periods, while the mid-1980s signify the onset of the 
structural reform period with the resignation of President Nyerere.  
 
The use of the Bai-Perron breakpoint test is intuitive in timing multiple breaks, which is crucial 
for the inclusion of dummies in the study. Tanzania has undergone major political and economic 
structural changes, and multiple breakpoints are identified. Three dummies are introduced to 
capture this period of changes in the study. The three periods are aided by the work of Bigsten 
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and Danielson (2001) and defined as follows: The pre-Arusha period runs from 1946 to 1966. 
This is followed by the Arusha declaration period from 1967 to 1985, ending with President 
Nyerere’s resignation. The third is the reform period, from 1986 to 2009.  
 
6.2.3 ARDL PSS F-test estimation results 
 
Table 6.8 presents the PSS F-statistics when each variable is considered as a dependent variable 
in the ARDL-OLS regressions in equation 11. The results are derived from case III – an 
unrestricted intercept without trend in Narayan (2005). The sample size is 65 (i.e. n=65) with 
seven variables (i.e. k=7).  
 
Table 6:8 ARDL estimation of long-run relationship 
Dependent Variable Lag Order F-statistics Probability Interpretation 
FKt  (Kt|Prop,Polfree, JI, UC, Inst,Yt) 2 3.85 0.004 Possible Outcome 
variable 
Fprop  (Prop|Kt,Polfree, JI, UC, 
Inst,Yt) 
2 0.48 0.837 Forcing variable 
Fpolfree (Polfree |Prop,Kt, JI, UC, 
Inst,Yt) 
2 2.70 0.02 Forcing variable 
FYt  (Yt |Prop,Polfree, JI, Kt ,UC, 
Inst) 
2 4.45  Possible Outcome 
variable 
FUC (UC|Prop,Polfree, JI, Kt , Inst,Yt) 2 1.99 0.008 Forcing variable 
FJI  (JI|Prop,Polfree, Kt, UC, Inst,Yt) 2 6.57 0.000 Possible Outcome 
variable  
FInst  (Inst|Prop,Polfree, Kt ,JI, UC, 
Yt) 
2 2.00 0.087 Forcing variable 
  
Narayan(2005) Table CI(iii) Unrestricted intercept and no trend  k =7 
Critical Values Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds  I(1) 
At   5% 2.513 3.823 
 
The calculated F-statistics FKt (Kt|Prop, Polfree, JI, UC, Inst, Yt) = 3.85 and FYt (Yt |Prop, 
Polfree, JI, Kt, UC, Inst) =4.45 are both higher than the upper- bound critical value 3.82 at the 
5% level. Thus the null hypothesis of the absence of relationship is rejected, implying a long-run 
relationship among the variables when the regressions are normalised on both Kt and Yt 
variables.   
In terms of institutional variables, judicial independence appears to be a possible outcome 
variable relative to a number of institutional variables (property rights, political rights and 
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political instability) in the case of Tanzania. This result is different from the Namibian case, 
where political instability is shown to be a possible outcome variable. There is growing evidence 
that institutional arrangements have an element of context specificity arising from differences in 
historical trajectories. In terms of political instability, Tanzania, as opposed to Namibia, enjoyed 
a period of peace.  
 
Furthermore, for the most part of the review period Tanzania witnessed the repression of the 
judicial system under the one-party state. In the period between independence from Great Britain 
in 1961 and the late 1980s, there was a subordination of the law and the legal system to the 
executive, effectively weakening the courts and rendering the law a relatively unimportant facet 
of economic and social life in Tanzania.  
 
These results have significant implications for the analysis. The ARDL cointegration test 
assumed that only one long-run relationship exists between the variables (Pesaran et al., 2001). 
The PSS F-test results indicate the presence of more than one cointegration vector. We adopt the 
Johansen VECM technique and proceed with estimating the model in equation 7 in section 
5.2.4.1 using the Tanzanian dataset. We estimate the VAR equation specified in equation 14 with 
minor changes to the third vector. The log of judicial independence (LJI) becomes the 
normalising variable rather than political instability, (Inst) as shown in equation 14.  
 
6.2.4  Johansen cointegration results 
 
Based on statistical tests, a VAR with the lag order of 2 is estimated. Table 6.9 presents the 
Johansen co-integration test results. The trace test results indicate three cointegrating equations 
at the 5% level of significance. Taking the maximum eigenvalue test results indicates one 
cointegrating equation. This is not in line with the postulated theory. Therefore, we decided to 
opt for the results of the trace test which show that there are at least three cointegrating vectors. 
The decision is also aided by the PSS F-tests, which suggested that LKt, LYt and LJI are 
possible outcome variables in the Tanzanian analysis.  
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Table 6:9 Johansen test for multiple co-integrating vectors 
Test statistics 
Ho Alternative Trace 5% Critical 
Value 
Prob. Max.Eigen 5% Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
r = 0* r=1 173.52 125.61 0.000 65.43 46.23 0.000 
r<=1* r= 2 107.09 95.75 0.005 36.28 40.07 0.126 
r<=2* r=3 71.81 69.81 0.034 24.88 33.87 0.392 
r<=3 r=4 46.92 47.85 0.061 21.55 27.58 0.244 
r<=4 r=5 25.37 29.79 0.148 17.12 21.13 0.166 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
The cointegration vectors describing the economic long equilibrium can be estimated only if 
meaningful economic restrictions are imposed. With three cointegrating vectors, I imposed three 
normalisation and six parameter restrictions for exact identification.  
 
6.2.4.1  Long run and Short run estimates analysis 
  
The first cointegrating vector represents the capital-stock relation; we normalise on capital stock 
and put zero restrictions on judicial independence and political rights. Relative to other 
institutional determinants, secure property rights have been emphasised in the literature as a 
crucial factor for encouraging investment.  
 
In the second vector, which represents the output relation, we normalise on GDP, and we put 
zero restrictions on user cost of capital and on political rights. We expect these variables to affect 
output indirectly through other variables, such as capital stock and political instability.  
 
The third vector represents normalise on judicial independence and zero restrictions are put on 
capital stock and user capital stock. Unlike in the analysis on Namibia, judicial independence 
was shown to be a possible outcome variable under the PSS F-test (see table 6:8). The North and 
Weingast (1989) hypothesis argues that institutions characterised by checks and balances can 
have beneficial effect on investment. We seek also to understand inter-relationship among 
institutional variables. 
 
Once the model was just-identified through these restrictions, the next step was to impose and 
test further over-identifying restrictions.  
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Table 6:10 Normalised cointegration coefficients 
 (c) Just identified (d) Over-identified 
(i) Long-run Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Cointegrating Eq LKt LYt LJI  LKt LYt LJI 
LKt 1.000 -0.562 
(-25.8) 
0.000 1.000 -0.573 
(-10.1) 
0.000 
LYt -1.771 
(-18.5) 
1.000 -0.01 
(-0.132) 
-1.021 
(-7.62) 
1.000 -0.029 
(-1.15) 
Inst -0.55 
(-5.85) 
0.28 
(5.81) 
0.01 
(0.65) 
0.000 0.290 
(5.15) 
0.000 
LProp 0.38 
(3.71) 
0.23 
(4.14) 
-0.251 
(-9.32) 
-0.25 
(-1.87) 
0.000 -0.208 
(-7.11) 
LPolfree 0.000 0.000 -0.08 
(-5.18) 
0.000 0.000 -0.136 
(-2.283) 
UCt 0.01 
(3.22) 
0.000 0.000 0.01 
(1.786) 
0.000 0.000 
LJI 0.000 -1.569 
(-34.0) 
1.000 0.000 -0.712 
(-3.83) 
1.000 
C 4.58 1.68 -2.48 0.95 -0.62 -2.26 
LR Test of restrictions    X2 (1) = 0.567[0.143]  
Accepts restriction 
(ii) Short-run Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Dummies 
DU1961 0.001 
(1.12) 
0.02 
(0.36) 
0.186 
(5.89) 
0.01 
(1.33) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
0.174 
(5.46) 
DU1967 -.001 
(-0.08) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.23 
(6.42) 
0.03 
(1.45) 
0.08 
(0.95) 
0.22 
(4.48) 
DU1986 0.01 
(0.77) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
0.19 
(5.65) 
0.05 
(2.45) 
0.14 
(1.51) 
0.183 
(3.59) 
 Notes: figures in round brackets are t-statistics 
All the variables in the just-identified model (c) carry the expected sign as shown in table 6:10, 
with the exception of political instability and property rights in the LKt and Yt vectors 
respectively. Equation 20 to 22 allow us to over-identify the vectors that comprise three long-run 
relations and these (over-identifying) restrictions are not rejected (table 6:10). The results from 
equation 20 to 22 carry expected signs and are significant.  
 
The normalised equations are presented below: 
 
LKt =   0.95 C + 1.02 LYt + 0.25 LProp – 0.01 UCt       (20) 
LYt = -0.62C + 0.57 LKt - 0.29 Inst +0.71 LJI       (21) 
LJI = -2.3 C + 0.03 LYt + 0.21 LProp + 0.14 LPolfree      (22) 
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In the LKt vector, all variables are significant and carry the expected coefficients’ signs. 
According to equation 20, capital stock (LKt) showed a significantly positive relation with 
property rights index (LProp) in the long run with an elasticity coefficient of 0.25. Secure 
property rights have been emphasised in the empirical literature as crucial factors for 
encouraging investment (Glaeser et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Fielding, 2002; Hall and 
Jones, 1999; La Porta et al., 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995).  
 
Normalised equation 20 showed that there is a significant positive relationship between 
accumulation of capital and GDP. According to the neoclassical theory of investment, this 
implies that anticipations of economic growth induce more investment. The significant negative 
influence of user cost of capital on capital stock is consistent with the user-cost-of-capital theory 
and other empirical results.  
 
Turning to the GDP vector (Yt),87 as shown by equation 21, all variables are significant and carry 
the expected coefficients’ signs. LKt has a positive and significant effect of 0.57 on GDP, thus 
confirming that capital stock is a key factor contributing to real GDP growth. Another important 
result is the positive relation of judicial independence to GDP with a significant elasticity of 
13.1. This is in line with the findings of Feld and Voigt (2003). Theory suggests that effective 
independent courts promote investment and economic growth. The other important institutional 
variable that came out very strongly with a negative and significant impact on GDP is political 
instability, representing uncertainty in the political macroeconomic environment.  
 
The last vector is judicial independence (JI), represented in equation 22. The most interesting 
results are that the two institutional variables, property rights and political freedom, are 
significant in the JI vector. According to La Porta et al. (2004), countries with independent 
judiciaries are more likely to have strong protections of property, political, and human rights. It 
should be noted that causation is unclear (not implied). Property rights appear to have a positive 
relation to judicial independence. Improvements in property rights are associated with increased 
                                                             
87 This vector is likely to be underspecified in this regression.  
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judicial independence. Political rights report a significant positive sign, implying a rise in rights 
being associated with increasing levels of judicial independence, with an elasticity of 0.14.  
 
We now turn to the interpretations of dummies in the three cointegration vectors. All dummies 
except the DU1986, which captures the onset of the economic reforms in Tanzania, are 
insignificant. The reform dummy (DU1986) has positive and statistically significant coefficients 
of 0.05 and 0.18, in the LKt and LJI cointegration vectors, respectively. This is consistent with 
the work of Moshi and Kilindo (1999), which showed that only the dummy capturing the reform 
period had a positive influence on private-sector investment in Tanzania.  
 
6.2.4.2  Robustness analysis 
 
The study focused on the impulse-response analysis of the cointegrated vectors. Figure 6.5 plots 
impulse response of the cointegrated vectors to a system-wide shock. The response in the three 
cointegrated vectors is transitory. The initial response of the three cointegrated vectors is 
negative, but dies out very fast. The overall relationship between vectors is stable.  
 
Figure 6.6 shows the response of the three cointegration vectors to a one standard deviation 
shock in the equation for capital stock. The initial reaction of the three cointegrated vectors is 
insignificant and dies out rapidly. In figure 6.7 the initial response of capital stock vector (cv1) 
and output (cv2) to an output shock is muted and dies out immediately. However the response of 
the judicial independence (cv3) to a shock in output is positive and significant in the initial 
period, then it becomes negative and dies out.  
 
Figure 6.8 shows the responses of three vectors to a positive shock in the judicial independence 
equation is initially positive before tending to zero. Overall, there is convergence in the long run. 
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Figure 6-5 Persistence profiles of CVs to system –wide shock: over-id model for Tanzania 
 
 
Figure 6-6 Impulse responses of CVs to shock in the equation for LKt: over- id model 
 
 
Figure 6-7 Impulse Responses of CVs to shock in the equation for output: over- id model 
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Figure 6-8 Impulse Responses of CV’s to shock in the equation for LJI: over-id model  
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6.3 Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact of institutions on capital accumulation 
in Namibia and Tanzania. The institutional hypothesis argued that a solid institutional framework 
is a key determinant of capital accumulation. When property rights are weak and poorly 
protected, investors will be reluctant to risk their capital for fear of expropriation. Also, the 
irreversible investment under uncertainty theory tells us that greater uncertainty is likely to affect 
the investment level due to the option value of waiting. This has been used to justify the 
estimation of the impact of institutional indicators on capital-stock accumulation in Namibia and 
Tanzania, applying the Johansen VECM technique. Given that the relationship between 
institutions and economic development is almost certain to differ across countries; time-series 
evidence may offer better insights than cross-section studies. The data span for Namibia is from 
1923 to 2009 that for Tanzania is from 1946 to 2009. 
 
Econometrically, the dynamic structure of our empirical model suggests that a multi-
cointegration framework exists, in which separate long-run relationships are identifiable. Relying 
on theoretical and empirical literature and aided by the PSS F-test, a distinction was made 
between outcome and forcing variables in the model. This in turn informed the a priori 
specification of the long-run relationship estimated in the study. A Johansen VECM technique 
was used, exploiting the long-series measures of institutions constructed by the author, and other 
economic variables. Over-identifying restrictions on the long-run relationship are all accepted.  
 
The empirical results of this chapter confirmed that political instability does impact on capital-
stock accumulation in Namibia. The evidence also suggested that capital stock is positively 
related to GDP, while user cost of capital relates to it negatively.  
 
Another important aspect of the study is its examination of the institutional underpinnings of the 
accumulation of capital stock. The long-run relationship representing political instability 
equilibrium provided an insight into the webs of association among diverse institutional 
variables. Property rights and political rights prove to be important in dampening political 
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instability. However, the impact of property rights on capital stock remained negative in 
Namibia. 
 
In the case of Tanzania, the chapter revealed that property rights and investment are cointegrated 
and thus exhibit a reliable long-run relationship. The standard investment variables carried the 
signs expected according to theory.  
  
The most interesting result is the importance given to judicial independence, which showed a 
positive relation to GDP. It is also shown that uncertainty in the political macroeconomic 
environment (political instability) has had a negative impact on economic development over time 
in Tanzania.  
 
Lastly, the chapter shows that other institutional variables (property and political rights) have a 
positive relation with judicial independence. Unlike in the case of Namibia, judicial 
independence is found to be a possible outcome variable as opposed to political instability. This 
is not surprising, as Tanzania on average was quite peaceful during the period under review, 
while other institutional oppressions were experienced under the one-party system. 
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Chapter 7  
 
7.0  Conclusions and Implications 
 
This chapter is in two parts. The first, 7.1, presents conclusions from the findings of this thesis, 
and the second, 7.2, discusses implications and offers recommendations based on the 
conclusions. 
 
7.1  Conclusions 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is twofold: firstly, the thesis addresses the measurement 
challenges of institutional variables in empirical work through the construction of new set of 
institutional indicators on Namibia and Tanzania that are usable in country-specific time-series. 
Secondly, it examines the impact of institutions on capital accumulation over time in two 
developing countries (namely, Namibia and Tanzania).  
 
The key argument of this thesis is that institutional measures are time-truncated in the existing 
“deeper determinants” literature. This renders it difficult to explain the persistent differences in 
income levels across countries. The thesis argues that longer-dated series of institutional 
measures are vital, and it therefore presents the formal measures on Namibia and Tanzania. The 
measuring of institutions using written rules are in line with accepted definitions of formal 
institutions postulated in the “deeper determinants” literature. The new indicators, while 
covering a long time period, from 1884 to 2009, correlate fairly well with some of the widely 
used institutional indices produced by the Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation.  
 
The cross-country comparisons between Tanzania and Namibia reveal a comparable pattern in 
the indices of political freedom and judicial independence, both under the German colonial 
administration and, subsequently, with the British colonial administration over Tanzania and the 
South African colonial administration over Namibia. The property-rights patterns, however, 
remain divergent between the two countries under German colonial rule. The comparison 
between the British former colonies Tanzania and Zimbabwe shows a similar close pattern in 
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terms of political freedom, while property rights appear to be better in Tanzania than Zimbabwe 
between 1945 and 1960.  
 
Another feature of the thesis is that the examination of institution formation over this longer 
period underscores the notion of persistence in institutions. The thesis argues that despite 
changes in colonial regimes, the broader framework of institutions remained partly the same. 
This is reflected in aspects of the institutional framework such as the contract-labour system and 
pass laws, which were applicable during the German era and upheld by the next regime. In 
Namibia, the expropriation of land led to the creation of smaller land units known as reserves for 
the African blacks. The smaller sizes of these parcels of unproductive land could partly explain 
the problem of income inequality in Namibia today.  
 
Another observation is that in respect of some of the laws, changes were made in their names, 
and in the enforcement authorities, but the scope of the laws remained the same. This is reflected 
in the post-independence period in Tanzania, where the title ‘president’ was substituted for the 
title ‘governor’ in some land laws. Similarly, draconian laws similar to the colonial laws were 
enacted to curtail political freedom.  
 
The institutional hypothesis argued that a solid institutional framework is a key determinant of 
capital accumulation. When property rights are weak and poorly protected, investors will be 
reluctant to risk their capital for fear of expropriation. Also, the theory of irreversible investment 
under uncertainty tells us that greater uncertainty is likely to affect investment levels due to the 
option value of waiting. This has been used to justify the estimation of the impact of institutional 
indicators on capital-stock accumulation in Namibia and Tanzania, applying the Johansen 
VECM technique.  
 
Given that the relationship between institutions and economic development is almost certain to 
differ across countries; time-series evidence may offer better insights than cross-section studies. 
The data span for Namibia is from 1923 to 2009, while for Tanzania is from 1946 to 2009. Given 
the length of the time span, one expects that structural changes could have taken place, therefore 
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several tests such as the Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Bai and Perron (2003) tests are applied to 
take into account structural breaks in testing for unit roots.  
 
Econometrically, the dynamic structure of our empirical model suggests that a multi-
cointegration framework exists, in which separate long-run relationships are identifiable. Relying 
on theoretical and empirical literature and aided by the PSS F-test, a distinction was made 
between outcome and forcing variables in the model. This in turn informed the a priori 
specification of the long-run relationship estimated in the study. A Johansen VECM technique 
was used, exploiting the long-series measures of institutions constructed by the author, and other 
economic variables. Dummy variables were introduced to capture the detected structural breaks. 
Over-identifying restrictions on the long-run relationship are all accepted.  
 
The empirical results of this thesis confirmed that political instability have an effect on capital-
stock accumulation in Namibia. The evidence also suggested that capital stock is positively 
related to GDP, while user cost of capital relates to it negatively.  
 
Another important aspect of the thesis is the institutional underpinnings of the accumulation of 
capital stock. The long-run relationship representing political instability equilibrium provided an 
insight into the webs of association between different institutional variables. Property rights and 
political rights prove to be important in dampening political instability. However, the impact of 
property rights on capital stock remained negative in Namibia. 
 
In the case of Tanzania, the findings highlight the importance of property rights in explaining 
capital accumulation over time. The standard investment variables carried the signs expected 
according to theory.  
 
The most interesting result is the importance given to judicial independence, which showed a 
positive relation to GDP. It is also shown that uncertainty in the political macroeconomic 
environment (political instability) has had a negative impact on economic development over time 
in Tanzania.  
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Lastly, the thesis shows that other institutional variables (property and political rights) have a 
positive relation with judicial independence. Unlike in the case of Namibia, judicial 
independence is found to be a possible outcome variable, as opposed to political instability. This 
is not surprising, as Tanzania on average was quite peaceful during the period under review, 
while other institutional oppressions were experienced under the one-party system. 
 
7.2  Implications 
The findings of the thesis suggest that institutional factors are important determinants of long-
term capital formation, and hence economic development.  
 
In case of Namibia, the main policy implications are: 
 The government should promote an institutional framework that ensures political stability 
to attract investors. 
 The property-rights structure in Namibia appears to affect capital formation negatively. 
Therefore, the government should address a framework that ensures secure property 
rights, not just for a minority but for the broad cross-section of the society. This is not 
only because secure property rights attract investment, but also because it would dampen 
political instability within the country.  
 
 In case of Tanzania, the main policy implications are: 
 The government should promote an institutional framework that guarantees the 
independence of the judiciary. This would constitute a check-and-balance mechanism and 
promote rule of law, thereby promoting economic development. 
  The government should ensure secure property rights because they attract capital 
formation, which is vital for Tanzania’s sustainable economic development. 
 
Finally, in order to achieve broad-based economic development, future institutional and 
policy reform in developing countries should take into account the historical specificities of 
each country, and even of smaller political units, as institutional frameworks tend to persist 
over time.  
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Appendices A: Namibia: List of laws  
 
A. 1. Property right Indicator: Namibia 
This covers all legislations passed that affect the issue of immovable property with special reference to 
land rights in Namibia. Full liberal ownership comprises of  the right to possess, the right to use, the right 
to manage, the right to capital, the rights to security, the incident of transmissibility and liability to 
execution. 
YEAR Ordinance/Act/Amendments/Proclamations and Regulations  
1884 GERMAN EMPIRE – GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
1884-1885  
1886 Law for the protection areas (Schutzgebietsgesetz) dated 17.04.1886 
It creates a "dual" legal system for Germans and indigenes. The legal system in SWA is henceforth 
determined by racial differentiation. 
1887-1889  
1890 Imperial Germany declares its protectorate a "Crown Colony". 
 
1891 Land acquisition of real estates Imperial Ordinance of 1 September 1891 
According to section 1 of decree only the colonial government had the right to occupy unowned 
(herrenlos) land within the German sphere of interest in South West Africa.  
1892-1893  
1894 Imperial Ordinance of 24 July 1894 
Provision for the legal affairs of immovable properties – It required that all contracts by which 
property in real estate was acquired or leased for longer than 15 years had to be consented to by the 
Governor in charge.  
1895 German imperial decree 
1896-1897  
1898 Imperial Order 1898 
This calls for the creation of “Landreserve” ( reserve of land) for the natives.  
1899  
1900 Protectorate Laws Ordinance of the Emperor of 1900 (Neu gefasstes Schutzgebietsgesetz), 
(10.09.1900) 
This amended law continues the dual legal system in SWA but does not make provision for the 
legal status of marriages between "natives" and "non-natives". 
1901  
1902 Land Rights Ordinance of the Emperor –of 1902 
 Expropriation of Lands and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation of  1902 
1903 Land Rights Ordinance of the Governor –of 1902 
Land Expropriation Ordinance of the Emperor –of 1903 
1904  
1905 The Expropriation of land of dissident tribes, Imperial Ordinance of 1905 (26.12.1905) 
The German Emperor orders the confiscation without compensation of the properties of SWA 
indigenes 
1906 Law (Ordinance) for expropriation of land/cattle of dissident tribes, of 1906 (08.08.1906) 
A law is enacted providing for the expropriation of the land and cattle of "dissident tribes" 
(Ovaherero, Swartbooi, Topnaar, Witbooi Nama, Kai||khaun (Red Nation), Bethany Nama, 
Fransman Nama, Veldschoendragers and Bondelswarts).  
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**This means that south of the Red Line only the Rehoboth Baster and the Berseba (*Hai-
*khauan) community keep their land, while the Dama - whom the Germans consider as having no 
land rights - are given some land as a grant, but not as their property. 
1907 Law (Ordinance) for expropriation of land/cattle of dissident tribes of 1907 (08.05.1907) 
A law is enacted providing for further expropriation of the land and cattle of "dissident tribes" 
(Ovaherero, Swartbooi, Topnaar, Witbooi Nama, Kai||khaun (Red Nation), Bethany Nama, 
Fransman Nama, Veldschoendragers and Bondelswarts).  
Crown Land Disposal Ordinance of the Imperial Chancellor - of 1907 
1908  
1909 Land Tax and Transfer duty Ordinance of Governor of 1909 
1910 Land Rights Ordinance of the Governor of 1910 
1911  
1912 Land valuation Commission Ordinance of the Governor of 1912 
Land valuation Commission Fees Ordinance of the Governor of 1912 
1913 Land Rights Ordinance of the Governor of 1913 
1914 First World War – South Africa under British Empire invaded German South West Africa 
1914  
1915 South Africa defeated German forces* 
Property of German Government Proclamation No.4 of 1915 
This made provision for the possession of property of the German Government by private persons 
Concessions from Natives Proclamation No.8 of 1915 
Provides that concessions for mineral, trading and other rights obtained (or to be obtained) by 
private individuals from coloured and native inhabitants shall be invalid.  
Derelict Property Proclamation  No.22 of 1915 
This made provision for the protection of livestock and other property that became derelict as a 
result of the hostilities between the Union forces and the German forces.  
1916 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
Under the German Law no native was allowed to possess any riding animals or large stock. 
Contrary to the provisions of this law the acquisition of Livestock, The SA regime sanctioned as it 
will tend to make the Native more contented and law abiding". 
1917  
1918 Deeds Registries Act No.13  of 1918 
Provided that in the case of land registered in the German land registers no transfer shall be issued 
or registered until substituted titles are prepared by a conveyancer duly admitted to practice.  
1919 Crown Lands  (Trespass)  Proclamation  No.7 of 1919  
This proclamation makes provision for the prevention of trespass on crown land in the Protectorate. 
Act No. 49 of 1919 (to administer SWA as mandatory territory) 
This gave effect to the Mandate of South West Africa – delegated administration of the territory to 
the Governor General of South Africa who was given both legislative and executive powers. 
Versailles Treaty 1919 
Renounce German Rights 
1920 Crown Land Disposal Proclamation No. 13 of 1920 
This proclamation made the Crown Land Disposal Ordinance,1903, of the Transvaal applicable to 
south west Africa and thus authorised the Administrator of South west Africa to set aside crown 
lands as reserves “for the use and benefit of aboriginal natives, coloured persons and Asiatic” as 
well as for public purpose . The land which was confiscated by the Germans and made available 
for "white" settlement as a result of the 1903 - 1909 wars was not returned by the South African 
administration. 
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Crown Land Disposal Proclamation No. 54 of 1920 
An act to amend the Land disposal proclamation of 13 of 1920, by extending the powers to the 
Administrator of the Protectorate away from the Minister of Lands and Governor General 
respectively.  
Deeds Registry Proclamation No.8 of 1920 
It makes provision for the authorization of the Registrar of Deeds to issue and register bonds 
Land Settlement Proclamation No.14 of 1920 
Amends the Union Land Settlement Act No.12 of 1912. It makes provision for a retiring member 
of a Land Board to be eligible for reappointment. It defines “private Land’ as any land which is not 
Crown land and the “Parliament” as the Parliament of the Union of South Africa. 
Enemy Property Proclamation No. 148 of 1920 
Provides for the liquidation and dispose of the assets of German nationals 
Townships Proclamation No. 68 of 1920 
It makes provision for the enacting of a law regulating the establishment of townships  
1921 Land Titles Proclamation No. 2 of 1921  
This proclamation makes provision for the issues of registered  titles to certain lands in the territory  
Fencing Proclamation  No.57 of 1921 
This proclamation relates to the erection and maintenance of dividing fence between adjoining 
properties. 
1922 SOUTH AFRICAN MANDATE UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES 
SYSTEMS – SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
1922 Land Expropriation Proclamation  No.37 of 1922 
Provides for the acquisition of land and other rights by expropriating for and in connection with the 
construction of railways.  
Land Titles Amendment Proclamation No. 14 of  1922  
An act to amend the Land Titles Proclamation No.2 of 1921 
1923 Fencing Amendment Proclamation  No.13 of 1923 
An act to amend the fencing proclamation 57 of 1921.It enables the Land Bank to make advances 
to land owners who are obliged to contribute towards the cost of fencing, provided such 
contribution exceeds ₤10. 
Deeds Registry Amendment Proclamation No. 10 of 1923 
An amendment of the Deeds registry Proclamation of 1920 in various respects 
1924 Natives Reserve Trust Funds Proclamation No.9 of  1924 
Makes provision for the establishment of funds to be expended in promoting the interests and 
welfare of the inhabitants’ resident in such reserves.  
Natives (Urban Areas) No.34 of 1924 Amendment 
The Natives (Urban Areas) Act legislated on a broad front to regulate the presence of Africans in 
the urban areas. It gave local authorities the power to demarcate and establish African locations on 
the outskirts of white urban and industrial areas, and to determine access to, and the funding of, 
these areas. 
Deeds Registry Amendment Proclamation No.4 of 1924 
Stated that the owner of land hypothecated under such bond shall be deemed to have accorded his 
consent to the transfer of the land ( with reference to the German expropriated land) 
Registration of Land in favour of Government Proclamation No.29 of 1924 
Makes special provision for the transfer to the Government of the Territory of land on which 
German owners have renounced their ownership in favour of the Government.  
1925 South West Africa Constitution Act 42 of 1925 
Provided for the Appointment of an Administrator and the election of an all white Legislative 
Assembly and Executive Committee. Had powers to make laws and ordinances except on certain 
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matters which were reserved and remained under the legislative power of the South Africa 
government88.  
Fencing Amendment Proclamation No. 18 of 1925 
It amends the fencing proclamation 13 of 1923 by empowering the administrator to divide any 
district into wards for fencing purposes. 
Fencing Amendment Proclamation No. 28 of 1925 
Slightly amends the description of a dividing fence in Proclamation No.18 of the same year 
1926 Small  settlements commonages subdivision Proclamation No.13 of 1926  
This proclamation provides for the subdivision of commonages assigned to “small settlements” 
established by the German administration.  
Native Reserve Fencing Proclamation No.12 of 1926 
Provision for administrator to fence off native land and one half of the cost incurred by the 
Administration to be recovered from the reserves’ inhabitants. 
1927 Expropriation of Lands Ordinance No.13 of 1927 
Makes provision for the Administrator and municipalities to expropriate land for public purposes.  
Land Settlement Consolidation and Amendment Proclamation No.310 of 1927 
Repeals the Land  Settlement  Proclamations: No.14,29,47 and 53 of 1920 and Proclamation No.26 
of 1923 
It provides for the establishment of Land Boards who should acquire land on behalf of the 
Government. Provision was made for the Administrator to offer holdings for allotment to 
applicants from oversea through newspapers. 
Land Survey Act No. 9 of 1927 
An act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the land survey. It makes provision for the 
establishment and the appointment of Surveyor-Generals and their regulations board. 
1928 Fencing Amendment Ordinance No.4 of 1928 
Introduction of grazing fees in all native reserves 
An act to amend the fencing proclamation 28 of 1925, by reinforcing the obligations to pay and 
rights to claim contributions towards cost of dividing fences.  
1929 Rehoboth Gebiet (Acquisition of Land) Proclamation No.29 of 1929 
Made provision for the protection of European Leasehold or freehold in immovable properties 
situated in the Gebiet.  
1930 Registration of deeds in Rehoboth Gebiet Proclamation No. 12 of 1930 
An act that treated the Rehoboth Area differently from the rest of the rest of Protectorate. It 
proclaimed Rehoboth area to be a legitimate homeland of the Basters Community.  
1931 Land Settlement Fund  Ordinance No. 2 of 1931 
Provided for the establishment of the fund in the territory under the Administrator and any excess 
surplus money to be temporary invested with the Public Debt Commissioners of the Union of 
South Africa.  
Land Settlement Law(SWA) Further amendment Proclamation No. 186 of 1931 
Makes provision for the cost of boring by Government with government drills on Government land 
to be incurred by Government as part of the improvements on land expenditure.  
1932-1935  
1936 Land Titles Amendment Proclamation  No. 1 of  1936 
An act to amend the Land titles proclamation 14 of 1922 by providing for the survey and 
registration of immovable property. Situate in Gebiet 
Land Settlement Law(SWA) Further amendment Proclamation No. 77 of 1936 
This outlines the Administrator’s mandate regarding every lease entered into under the Land 
Settlement Laws 
Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 
This makes provision for the establishment of a Native Trust and for defining of  its purpose 
                                                             
88 The reserved matters included defence; railways and harbours, posts and telegraphs, matters pertaining to the 
courts, immigration; customs and excise; banking and currency; and native affairs.  
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1937 Crown Lands  (Trespass) Amendment Proclamation  No. 4 of 1937 
An amendment of the Crown Lands (trespass) Proclamation No.7 of 1919. It amends the law 
relating to the prevention of trespassing on Crown Land in South West Africa. 
Village management Board Ordinance No. 16 of 1936 
This makes provision for the management of villages and other communities not being 
municipalities 
Deeds Registries Act No.47 of 1937 
An act to consolidate and amend the laws in force in the Union relating to the registration of deeds. 
1938 Crown Lands  (Trespass)  Amendment Proclamation  No. 31 of 1938 
An act to amend the law relating to the prevention of trespassing on Crown Land in South West 
Africa. 
1939 WORLD WAR II STARTED 
1939 Natives Trust Fund Proclamation, No. 23 of 1939 
17 "native reserves" spanning 23 000 square miles in total have been created 
These reserves are beset with similar basic problems as were the reserves created under the 
German colonial authorities: they are small and widely scattered patches of land, with limited 
economic and political viability 
Deeds Registry Amendment Proclamation No. 37of 1939 
Repeal Proc no.10 of 1923 – Makes provision for consolidations all laws related to the Deeds 
Registry in Territory to be in line with Union of SA. Deeds Registries Act No.47 of 1937 
1940 Land Settlement Act No. of 1940 
Provides for the grant of right of temporary occupation of government land to probationary lessees 
and grazing licensees based on the recommendation of the Administration to the Land Board – if 
deemed to be a bona fide farmer 
1941-1943  
1944 Territorial Development and Reserve Fund Ordinance No.13 of 1944 
This act provides for the establishment of a Territorial Development and Reserve Fund. The Fund 
shall comprise of Land Settlement and Development account among others. 
1945 Black Reserves SWA Act No.44 of 1945  
This Act authorizes the dis-establishment of one area reserved for Black occupation, in exchange 
for the establishment of another. 
Territorial Development Reserve Fund Amendment Proclamation 16 of 1945 
This an amendment of Ordinance No.13 of 1944 
1946 REFUSAL OF TRUST TERRIRTORY 
1946 Territorial Development Reserve Fund Ordinance No. 5 of 1946 
This is an amendment to the Territorial Development Reserve Fund Ordinance No.13 of 1944 
Immovable Property Taxation Amendment Ordinance No. 10 of 1946 
Amendment of Ordinance No.5 of 1935. It was repealed by Ordinance No.15 of 1949. 
Village management Board Amendment Ordinance 13 of 1946 
This act amends  Ordinance No.16 of 1937 
1947 Territorial Development Reserve Fund Ordinance No. 8 of 1947 
Amendment of Ordinance No.13 of 1944 
Land Settlement Law (SWA) Proc. No. 39 of  1947 
This is an amendment to the Union Proclamation No. 310 of 1927 
Mining Consolidation and Amendment Proc. No. 15 of 1947 
Amendment to the Proclamation No.4 of 1940. 
1948 Crown Lands  (Trespass)  Amendment Proclamation  No.18 of 1948  
An act to amend the crown lands (trespass) proclamation No.31 of 1938 
Land Settlement Law (South West Africa) Amendment Proclamation No.339 of 1948 
Makes provision for grant of right of temporary occupation of government land to probationary 
lessees in order to determine their suitability as settlers and grazing licensees. 
Grazing licensees for White were converted into ownership rights to encourage white settlement in 
SWA. 
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Removal or modification of Restrictions on Immovable Property Proclamation No. 42 of 1948 
 Application to court for the removal of restrictions by the beneficiary 
1949 South West Africa Affairs Constitution Amendment Act No. 23 of 1949 
This act gave South West Africa direct representation in the South African Parliament. The 
Governor General no longer had law-making power on reserved matters – this was done through 
South Africa Parliament.  
Land Titles  Amendment Proclamation No. 3 of  1949 
An act to amend the Land titles Proclamation No. 6 of 1942 
It repeals the Municipal Ordinance No.24 of 1935 
Rural Immovable Property Taxation Ordinance No. 15 of 1949 
This act makes provision for the introduction of an annual land tax in respect of all rural 
immovable property in the Territory. It repeals The Taxation of Landed Property Amendment 
Ordinance No.10 of 1946. 
Immovable Property Taxation Amendment Proclamation No. 57 of 1949 
Amendment of Ordinance No. 15 of the same year 
1950 Crown land disposal Amendment Proclamation No. 200 of 1950 
An act to amend the Land Disposal Proclamation No.13 of 1920 
Group Areas Act No.41 of  1950 
 occupancy and ownership of land is prescribed on racial grounds, confining blacks to the 
reserve land  
 segregation and the introduction of Apartheid system 
1951 South West Africa Affairs Constitution Amendment Act  No.55 of 1951 
Returned legislative power to the Governor General who was empowered to make laws in respect 
of reserved matters by Proclamation in the Government Gazette, subject to the approval of the 
South African Parliament.  
Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation No.56 of 1951 
Makes provision for a much stronger control on the natives in acquiring land. Restrictions on rights 
of natives to acquire land in urban areas or rural townships. Repeal Natives (Urban Areas) no.34 of 
1924 amendment: 
Expropriation Act  No.39 of 1951 
It provides for the expropriation of land for the purpose of constructing, operating or maintaining 
pipe lines, private railway branch lines or railway sidings in connection with undertakings of 
national importance. 
1952-1953  
1954 South West Africa Native Affairs Administration Act No.56 of 1954 
Transfer of the administration of native affairs from the administration of the territory of South 
West Africa acting under direction and control of the Governor-General to the Minister of Native 
Affairs of the Union for the reservation or setting apart of land for use and occupation of natives in 
that territory.  
Black Trust and Land Amendment Act No.18 of 1954 
No one may subdivide or partition land in a scheduled native or released area without the 
Minister’s consent.  
1955 Land Settlement Amendment Ordinances No. 2 & 16 of 1955 
Amendment of Union Proclamation No.310 of 1927 
Fencing Amendment Ordinance  No.21 of 1955 
An act to amend the fencing ordinance 44 of 1952 
Municipal Amendment Ordinance No. 34 of 1955 
Amendment of Ordinance No.3 of 1949 
1956 South West Africa Native Affairs Administration Act 73 of 1956 
An act to amend the Native Trust and Land Act No.  18 of 1936 
Powers to acquire certain land limited to power to acquire the right to use and occupy only, and 
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vesting dominion of certain land in the Trust. 
Native Reserves Ordinance No. 4 of 1956 
This act makes provision for the addition of certain land to the Waterberg East Native Reserve 
Land Settlement Amendment Ordinance No.13  of 1956 
Amendment of section 31 of Union Proclamation of 1927 
Termination of Grazing (Pastures) Rights Ordinance No.23 of 1956 
This act provides for the termination of the grazing lands of certain small holders on the 
commonage or townlands of the Okahandja Municipality 
Excision of Certain Lands Proclamation No. 287 of 1956 
This makes provision for the excision of certain land from the Native Areas of South West Africa 
1957 Fencing Proclamation Amendment Ordinance No.6 of 1957 
Amendment of the fencing law through extending certain provisions of the Fencing Proclamation 
No.57 of 1921. 
1958 Crown Land Disposal Ordinance No. 36 of 1958 
An act to amend the Land disposal Ordinance 7 of 1951.It makes provision for 50% of all monies 
received from the sale of Crown Lands in a township for which no Village Management Board has 
been constituted to be held in trust by the Administration for a Village Management Board which 
may be established. 
Land Settlement Amendment Ordinances No.4 & 21  of 1958 
Amendment of Union Proclamation 310 of 1927 and Ordinance 4 of 1957.It provides that lessee 
shall not at anytime grant any person an option or enter into an obligation with regard to purchase, 
lease or transfer the holding unless there is the Administrator’s approval in writing. 
Native Trust and Land Amendment Act No. 41 of 1958 
An act to amend section 20of Act 46 of 1945. It makes provision for the Trustee to appoint any 
person at any time to perform special functions on a temporary basis. The remuneration for such 
persons will come from the fund. 
Native Reserves Ordinance No. 26 of 1958 
This act makes  provision for the addition of farm Sorris to  Okombahe Reserve 
1959 Territorial Development Reserve Fund Ordinance No. 3 of 1959 
Amendment of section 6 of Ordinance No 13 of 1944  by making provision for the Administrator 
to allow an issue of money from the General Security Account if he/she sees it to be necessary in 
the public interest. 
Rural Immovable Property Tax Amendment Ordinance No.5 of 1959 
Amendment of Ordinance No.15 of 1949 by disallowing any apportionment to be made by the 
Secretary for West Africa if the rural immovable property registered in the name of a private 
company does not exceed two hundred and fifty hectors. 
Land Settlement and Relief Ordinance No. 15 of 1959 
This ordinance makes provision for the inclusion of advances, rent and interest in the purchase 
price of allotment 
Native Reserves Amendments Ordinance No. 27 of 1959 
Amendment of the law pertaining the addition of certain land to the Okombahe Native Reserve 
1960 Native Reserves Ordinance No.23 of 1960 
This ordinance makes provision for the addition of certain land to the Ovitoto Native Reserve. 
1961 Land Settlement Relief Amendment Ordinance No.9 of 1961 
1962 Trespass Ordinance No. 3 of 1962 
This prohibits entry or presence upon land or in building without permission of the owner or lawful 
occupiers. 
Land Settlement Relief Amendment Ordinances No16& 22 of 1962 
These ordinances amend Ordinance 15 of 1959 and ordinance 9 of 1961.They extend the time 
period for the temporary remission of rent and interest rate and suspension of capital payments by 
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two years 
1963 The Ondendal Report of 1963** 
Made provisions for the creation of homeland – confining the natives to the reserve according to 
ethnic groupings. 
1964  
1965  Immovable property (removal or modification of restrictions) Act No.  94 of 1965(M8) 
This Act concerns restrictions imposed on land by wills and similar instruments. 
Deeds Registries Act No. 87 of 1965 
An act to amend the Deeds Registries Act No.47 of 1937. Undivided shares in more than one piece 
of land may not be transferred to more than one transferee in the same deed. 
Land Settlement Amendment Ordinances No.14 &16,28  of 1965 
Amendments of the law relating to land settlement. They make provision for the grazing licence 
holders, delegation of power by Administrators and defining the term “Land Board” respectively. 
1966 Land Tenure Act No.32 of 1966 
This makes provision for the establishment of a Land Tenure Board the defining of its functions. 
Reservation of Land for Blacks Proclamation. No. 76 of 1966 
1967 Reservation of State Land for Natives Ordinance No.35 of 1967. 
This Ordinance authorises the Administrator-General of South West Africa to set aside and reserve 
state land “for the sole use and occupation of natives”. 
Expropriation Ordinance No. 32 of 1967 
This ordinance deals with the expropriation of land for public purposes 
Mining Titles Act No.16 of 1967 
An act to regulate the registration of mining titles, other rights connected with prospecting and 
mining, stand titles and certain other deeds and documents. 
1968 South West Africa Constitution Act  No.39 of 1968 
Replaced the SWA Constitution Act 42 of 1925 – gave powers to South Africa to make laws in 
respect of an expanded list of reserved matters. SWA Administrator powers were subject to the 
State President of South Africa – who had power to administer the territory as an integral part of 
the Republic. 
Black Homelands, Promotion/Development Act No.46 of 1968 
This makes provision for the promotion of  development of the Bantu homelands 
1969 South West Africa Affairs Act No.25 of 1969 
Gave South Africa even tighter legal and administrative over South West Africa – the list of 
reserved matters grew further and further 
Deeds Registries Amendment Act. No. 61 of 1969 
Amendment of section 1 of Act 47 of 1937 by providing for the altered procedures regarding the 
registration of transfer of land expropriated by the State. 
Formalities in respect of Contracts of Sale of Land Act No.81 of 1969 
This act makes provision for formalities in respect of a contract of sale of land and certain interest 
in land.  
Formalities in respect of Leases of Land Act No.18 of 1969 
To provide for the formalities in respect of leases of land. It repeals section 2 of the General Law 
Amendment Act No of 1756 
1970 Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act No.70 of 1970 
This Act controls the subdivision of agricultural land. Generally, subdivision is prohibited unless 
the minister of agriculture has given his consent. 
Land Tenure Amendment Act. No. 67 of 1970 
This act extends the Land Tenure Act 32 of 1966 – which establishes a Land Tenure Board and the 
acquisition and development of land in connection with farming purposes to the territory of South 
West Africa. 
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1971 Sale of Land on Installments Act No.72 of 1971 
This act makes provision for the regulation of contracts of purchase and sale of certain kinds of 
land under which the purchase price is payable in installments over a period of one year or longer 
 
1972 Subdivision of Agricultural Land Amendment Act No. 55  of 1972 
An act to amend the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. It further defines 
agricultural land so as to prohibit registration of certain leases. 
Land Tenure Amendment Act No.16 of 1972 
This amends the provisions of the Land Tenure Act No. of 1966, relating to the establishment of 
the Land Tenure Board and the delegation of powers. 
1973 Territorial Development Reserve Fund Amendment Ordinance No.2 of 1973 
This act defines the phrase “Executive Committee’, it outlines the purpose for which moneys may 
be paid out of the Roads Construction Account and provides for incidental matters. 
1974 Subdivision of Agricultural Land Amendment Act No.19 of 1974 
An amendment of  the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 55 of 1972 in order to prohibit the 
concluding of long leases and the  registration of only such leases in respect of portions of 
agricultural land in certain circumstances. 
Reservation of State Land for Natives Ordinance 16 of 1974. 
An act to amend the Schedule to Ordinance 35 of 1965.It make provision for the setting apart and 
reservation of state land for the use and occupation by Natives. 
1975 Expropriation Act No.63 of 1975 
It makes provision for the expropriation of land and other property for public and certain other 
purposes. 
Sale of Land on Installments Amendment Act No. 49 of 1975 
This act amends the Sale of Land on Installments Act No.72 of 1971. It prescribes further 
requirements for cession and assignment by the seller of rights and obligations under a contract 
1976 Registration of Deeds in Rehoboth Amendment Act No. 93 of 1976  
It provides for the registration of deeds in the Rehoboth Gebiet . 
Registration of Deeds in Rehoboth Proclamation No. 256 of 1976 
Deals with the Registration of Deeds in Rehoboth Gebiet  
Development Trust and Land Amendment Act No.110 of 1976 
1977  
1978 Expropriation Ordinance No.13 of 1978 
This ordinance deals with the expropriation of land for public purposes and it amends the 
Expropriation Ordinance 32 of 1967 – without referring to Act 63 of 1975 
1979  
1980 Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act no.12 of 1980 
Provision for the levying of rates on immovable properties within urban areas in which erven are 
sold or alienated.  
Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act no.24 of 1980 
 To regulate the acquisition of land or any interest in land.  Prevent any person from acquiring land 
or any interest in land for public, mission, education, recreation, trading or industrial purpose.  See 
Proc.56 of 1951 section 35. 
1981 Agricultural Credit Amendment Ordinance No.2 of 1981 
To amend the Agricultural Credit Act 28 of 1966, to provide that assistance may be rendered by 
the Agricultural Credit Board by way of subsidy. 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land  Amendment Act No. 5 of 1981 
This repeals the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act No.70 of 1970. 
1982-1989  
1990 NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE 
1990 Namibian Constitutions 
According to Article 16 of the Namibia Constitution all persons shall have the right in any part of 
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Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable properties. Rights to pass on their 
properties to the heirs also guaranteed.  
1991-1993  
1994 Registration of Deeds in Rehoboth Government Proc. No.236 of 1994 
An act to amend the Registration in Rehoboth Act of 1976. It provides for the redefining of 
Ministerial duties and adjusting certain requirements for the Deeds registration. 
1995 Agricultural (commercial ) Land Reform  Act No. 6 of 1995 
The Act provided for the acquisition of freehold land and its allocation for resettlement purposes. 
In terms of the provisions of the Act, government will have ‘preferential right to purchase 
agricultural land whenever any owner of such land intends to alienate such land’. 
1996 Deeds Registries Amendment Act. No.2  & Act No.22 of 1996 
Amend the South African Deeds  Registries Act No.47 of 1937 
1997-1999  
2000 Agricultural (Commercial ) Land Reform  Act No. 16 of 2000 
An act to amend the  Agricultural (commercial ) Land Reform  Act 6 of 1995 so as to provide for 
the establishment and administration of the Land Acquisition and Development Fund. 
2001 Agricultural (commercial ) Land Reform  Act  No.2 of 2001 
An act to amend the  Agricultural (commercial ) Land Reform  Act No.6 of 1995 so as to make 
provision for the further regulation of the appropriation of moneys of the Fund. It also provides for 
the further restriction the transfers of agricultural land. 
2002 Communal land Reform Act No.5 of 2002(M15) 
This Act provides for the allocation of rights in respect of communal land. It establishes communal 
land boards and provides for the rights and powers of traditional leaders and communal land board 
in relation to communal land.  Rights under this Act include customary land rights which are 
extending for the natural life of the person. And the rights of leasehold for 99 Years.  
Agricultural (commercial ) Land Reform  Act No. 13 of 2002 
This Act provides for further definitions of certain expressions and various amendments 
concerning functions and powers and organizational structure of the Land Reform Advisory 
Commission of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995. The definition in section 1 
of "alienate" in relation to agricultural land is modified. Various amendments concern functions 
and powers and organizational structure of the Land Reform Advisory Commission. In section 17 a 
new subsection 5(a) is inserted. This provision concerns the withdrawal of an offer to sell land to 
the State. New subsection sets out procedural requirements for the purchase or decline of an offer 
to sell land to the State. 
2003 Agricultural (commercial ) Land Reform Amendment Act  No.14 of 2003 
An act to amend the Agricultural (commercial) Land Reform Act No.6 of 1995. It expands the 
definition of “owner’ to include certain persons acting in a representative capacity. It makes 
provision for further regulation of circumstances in which land is acquired for the purposes of land 
reform. 
Agricultural (commercial ) Land Reform  Act  No.19 of 2003 
An act to amend the  \Agricultural (commercial ) Land Reform  Act No.6  of 1995 so as to 
empower the Minister to prescribe a tariff of different rates of land tax in respect of different 
categories of owners or of agricultural land. 
2004-2009  
 
A.2 Political Rights and Civil liberties Indicator: Namibia 
This includes all relevant legislation passed during the year under consideration – Constitution /Act/Bills 
 Voting Rights / Franchise  
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 Freedom of Association   
 Freedom of Assembly  
 Freedom of Expression  
 Extension of Arbitrary Executive Power  
 Freedom of Movement  
 Independence of the judiciary and Legislature  
 Academic Freedom  
 Government Secrecy/ indemnity  
 Due process of law  
 Religious Freedom  
 Others 
Year Ordinance/Act/Amendments/Proclamations and Regulations 
1884 GERMAN EMPIRE – GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
1884  
1885  
1886 Law for the protection areas (Schutzgebietsgesetz) dated 17.04.1886 
It creates a "dual" legal system for Germans and indigenes. The legal system in SWA is henceforth determined 
by racial differentiation. 
1887-
1894 
 
1895 German imperial decree 
1896 Criminal Jurisdiction over the Natives Ordinance of the Imperial Chancellor of 1896 
Provided for the punishment and disciplinary control of blacks. The offences that were punished included among 
others laziness, negligence, vagrancy, insolence and disobedience.  Employers were to report to the nearest 
police who determine the number of lashes depending on the police’s assessment of the serious of the offence.  
1897  
1898  
1899 Imperial Governor Ordinance of 1899 
Government Proclamation established the first self-government for "white" settlers. 
1900 Ordinance of the Emperor Protectorate Law of 1900 
Amended Law for the protection areas (Neu gefasstes Schutzgebietsgesetz), 10.09.1900 
This amended law continues the dual legal system in SWA  
1901  
1902 Emigration of the Natives Ordinance of the Governor of 1902 
Calls for the control of the natives within the Protectorate.  
1903-
1904 
 
1905 Mixed Marriages Act of  1905 
This is to prohibit marriage between European and non-Europeans and to provide for matters incidental thereto. 
1906 Ordinance of the Governor- Immigration of 1903,1909,1910 
1907 Pass Law Ordinance of the Governor of 1907 
Stipulated that all blacks above the age of seven (with the sole exceptions of the Basters of Rehoboth) had to 
register with authorities and each handed with metal badge which served as a pass to be displayed prominently 
on the person, and a service book. A pass-less black were to be arrested by any white person and handover to the 
police.  
Contracts of Service Ordinance of the Governor of 1907 
Provided that black without a service book which was a second source of identification could not be employed. 
Black without labour contracts possessed no legal rights and could be punished as vagrants.   
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Control of the Natives Ordinance of the Governor of  1907 
 No black could obtain a right or title to fixed property or own cattle or horses. This measure also forbad more 
than ten families or individuals from residing on one farm.  
1908 Ordinance of the Emperor – Control of the Natives 1908 
1909-
1910 
 
1911 Prisons and Reformatories Act 13 of 1911 
1912 Recruiting of Natives Ordinance of the Governor of 1912 
Police Act No14 of 1912 
1913  
1914 WORLD WAR I STARTED 
1914 Riotous Assemblies Act of 1914 
1915 Proclamation of Martial Law No.5 of 1915 
This was declared during the period of Military occupation by South African forces 
1916 Masters and Servants No.2 of 1916 
The control and punishment under this law was centralized, it was the prerogative of the state not individual 
employer to determine the offences, through judicial authorities not just district police stations.  
1917 Native Labour Regulations (Mines & Works) Proclamation No.3 of 1917 
Makes provision for the control and treatment of natives employed on mines and works in the Protectorate. 
Publication of local regulations proclamation 4 of 1917 
This proclamation provides that local regulations issued by competent authorities shall be deemed to be 
‘promulgated” if sufficient copies are exhibited in public. 
1918 Masters and Servants Amendment Proclamation No.1 of 1918 
Outlaw the practise of “fatherly correction” ( whereby white employers had the right to beat their servants) and 
put a stop to the practise of flogging.``` The age limit for compulsory labour of blacks is raised from age seven 
to fourteen. It repealed the Masters and Servants Proclamation No.2 of 1916. Blacks were allowed to acquire and 
owned stock, unlike under the German Laws.  
 
***Publication of the Imperial Blue Book 
The Imperial "Blue Book" depicting the atrocities committed under German rule was published. The Blue 
Book's function was to justify British and South African takeovers, but it forces the new colonial power to 
engage in some kind of reform. This book was destroyed at the requested from the German Authorities and 
disappeared from all libraries and archives holdings.  
1919 Treaty of peace and South West Africa mandate Act No. 49 of 1919  
This gave effect to the Mandate of South West Africa – delegated administration of the territory to the Governor 
General of South Africa who was given both legislative and executive powers. 
Prohibited Areas Proclamation No.15 of 1919 
Crown Lands Trespass Proclamation No.7 of 1919 
This states that any person without a lawful cause loitering or taking up residence upon Crown Land whether 
temporarily or permanently shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence. 
1920 Suppression of Vagrancy and Idleness Proclamation No. 25 of 1920 
Made it an offence for black men to move around the Police Zone unless they could show visible lawful means 
of support. 
Masters and Servants Proclamation No.34 of 1920 Amendment 
Made it a crime for worker to change employers, or leave a job, without his employers’ permission while under 
contract. This generally introduced the Law of the Cape Province as to Masters, Servants and Apprentices to 
Namibia.  
Proclamation of Martial Law 76 of 1920 
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This proclamation repeal the Martial proc No.15 of 1915 
Police Offences Proclamation 27 of 1920. 
This Proclamation criminalises a miscellany of activities, primarily nuisances such as littering and swearing.  
 
1921 South Africa Proclamation No. 1 of 1921 
Made the provision for the Governor General of South Africa to delegate administrative power over the 
Territory to the Administrator of South West Africa (SWA). 
SWA Proclamation No. 1 of 1921 
Established the Advisory Council to advice the Administrator of South West Africa 
Education Proclamation of No.55 of 1921 
Provided for the separation of Natives and Non-Native School.  
Highest attainable qualification for natives were eight – years (Standard Six) of formal  schooling 
Proclamation No.13 of 1921 
It repeals the Masters and Servants Proclamation No.2 of 1916. 
1922 SOUTH AFRICAN MANDATE UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES SYSTEMS  
 SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
1922 The Pass Law Proclamation No. 11 of 1922:  
Controls the movements of the natives in SWA through the possession of a valid pass. The natives were defined 
as every male over fourteen years of age one of whose parents is a member of some aboriginal race or tribe of 
Africa. This replaces the neck metal badge which served as a pass during the German law.  
The Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation 33 of 1922 
Provision for prohibiting and preventing the presence of any natives in the streets public places within the local 
limits of the jurisdiction of such local authority between the hours of 9 p.m. and 4 a.m. without a written pass.  
Regulates the curfew for "blacks" in urban areas. 
1923 Zuidwest-Afrika Naturalisatie van Vreemdelingen Wet 
 London treaty (De Haas-Smuts Agreement) recommends that Germans should obtain SA citizenship  
 Germans in the territory are granted the same rights (thus have the same duties) as South Africans. 
Burgher Force Proclamation No.2 of 1923 
It made provision for the settlers to be called into civilian defence units. 
Education Amendment Proclamation No.45 of 1923 
Repealed by Proclamation No.16 of 1926 
1924 Natives (Urban Areas) No.34 of 1924 amendment 
Made provision to deport the natives deemed surplus to the labour needs of white households, commerce and 
industry, or those leading an idle, dissolute or disorderly life to the Reserves enforcing the Pass law. 
The Natives  (Rural) Regulation of 1924 
Control the for the maximum stock numbers to be owned and made provision for imposing grazing fees for 
stock grazed on the reserves.   
**Formation of (3)Political Party 
 The National Party of SWA (NPSWA) is formed by Afrikaners in the South of Namibia 
 Union party in Central part of Namibia 
 German League 
1925 South West Africa Constitution Act 42 of 1925 
Provided for the Appointment of an Administrator and the election of an all white Legislative Assembly and 
Executive Committee. Had powers to make laws and ordinances except on certain matters which were reserved 
and remained under the legislative power of the South Africa government89.  
                                                             
89 The reserved matters included defence; railways and harbours, posts and telegraphs, matters pertaining to this 
courts, immigration; customs and excise; banking and currency; and native affairs.  
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Native Labour Regulations (Mines &Works) Amendment Proclamation No. 6 of 1925 
-Makes all native labour regulations applicable to every mine and works in the Territory of SWA. 
1926 Colour Bar Law 25 of 1926 (Also known as the Mines and Works Act 25 of 1926 
Restrictive racial law instituted 
The law strengthened the barriers against non-White advancement 
Obscene Publications Suppression Ordinance No. 5 of 1926 
Makes the provision for Administrator and Postal and Customs Official to seize any matter in his opinion is 
indecent or obscene.  
Education Proclamation No.16 of 1926 Amendment 
Makes provision for the establishment of different schools based on colour and race.  
Advisory Council Amendment Proclamation No. 2 of 1926 
This proclamation prolongs the existence of the Advisory Council established under the provisions of the 
Advisory Council Proclamation .of 1921. 
1927 The Native Administration Proclamations No.11 of 1927 
Tighten the Proc. no.34 of 1924, by stating that an employed African could only obtain a pass from his 
employer. The same proclamation amended the Master and Servant proclamation No.34 of 1920 by doubling the 
severity of punishment for servants from 3 pounds to 7 pounds, imprisonment was extended and whipping 
introduced.  
Burgher Force Proclamation No.19 of 1927 
Repeal the Burgher Force Proclamation No.2 of 1923 
Prohibition of Credit to Natives Proclamation No.18 of 1927 
Prohibit the giving of credit to natives, or sell or barter anything to any native to which the native promise to pay 
or deliver anything in future. 
1928 Paramount Chief of the Natives Act No. 38 of 1928 
Laws are introduced which curtail "black" Namibian’s rights to self-determination 
The SWA Administrator is made the "Paramount Chief of the Natives 
Native Administration Proclamation No.15 of 1928(M2) 
Prohibited Areas Proclamation No. 26 of 1928 
Prohibit the entry of persons into the areas beyond the Police Zone (Ovamboland) .It repealed the  Prohibited 
Areas Proclamation No.15 of 1919 
1929 Native Labour Regulation (Mines &Works) Amendment Proclamation No. 33 of 1929 
It further amends Proclamation No.3 of 1917 in order to make better provision for the maintenance of good 
order, discipline, health and bodily safety among Native Labourers in the mines. 
1930 Adoption of SA’s Immorality Act of 1927 
Forbidding sexual relations between blacks and whites. While originally designed to protect helpless servant 
women from being exploited by powerful bosses, the law eventually comes to represent the pursuit of racial 
purity by European settlers. 
Native Passes (Rehoboth Gebiet) Proclamation No.7 of 1930 
Repealed by Proclamation No.36 of 1936 
It extends to the Rehoboth Gebiet with modifications required by the conditions existing therein, certain of the 
provisions of the law in force in the Territory relating to the issue to, and the carrying of passes by the Natives of 
travelling passes, 
Assemblies and Criminal Amendment Ordinance No.9 of 1930 
Prohibited public gatherings in public services. 
 Criminalised the printing, publishing or circulating notice of gathering in public places.  
1931 South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act No.38 of 1931 
The South West African Labour and Farmers’ Party 
Police  Amendment Proclamation No.42 of 1931 
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This is an amendment to the Police Act No.14 of 1912 
Native Labour Regulation (Mines &Works) Amendment Proc. 27 of 31 
Made of provision of returning natives whose contracts are terminated back to the native reserve. 
1932 Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Proclamation No.4 of 1932 
Made provision for the consumption and brewing of Kaffir beer gratis at the work premises given that the 
number of natives or colored employed exceed 50 (particularly at mines) 
Pounds and Trespasses Amendment Ordinance No.10 of 1932  
This is an amendment of Proclamation No.5 of 1917 
1933 Electoral Law (SWA) Amendment Proclamation  No.266 of 1933 
 Made provision for eligible voters to vote by post as an absent voter provided that they registered on the voters’ 
roll.  
1934 Immorality Proclamation No.19 of 1934 
Banned interracial relationship between races. 
Special Voters Rolls Compilation Proc. No. 15 of 1934 
This makes provision for the compilation of special voters’ lists. 
Extradition (SWA) Proclamation No. 78 of 1934 
This deals with the surrender of fugitive criminals as between South West Africa and foreign States 
Education Amendment Proc. No. 24 of 1934 
It prohibits a teacher from being an active member of a political organisation or taking part in political matters. It 
also makes provision for the controlling of appointments of teachers in private schools. 
1935 Extra-territorial and Northern Natives Control Proclamation No. 29 of 1935 
Controls the mobility and employment of migrant labour in the territory. 
Divorce laws amendment ordinance 18 of 1935 
This ordinance amends the common law by setting forth additional grounds for divorce. 
Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment further Amendment Proclamation No.1 of 1935 
This amends the law relating to Natives in Urban Areas by increasing the percentage of strength of absolute 
alcohol in Kaffir Beer saleable to the Natives over the age of eighteen years from 3 to 4 per centum. 
 
1936 Native Administration Amendment Proclamation. No. 7 of 1936 
An amendment of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation No34 of 1924 
Broadcasting Act No. 22 of 1936 
An act to provide for the control of broadcasting within the Union. It amends further the Radio Act No. of 1926. 
1937 South African Proclamation No. 51 of 1937 
Prohibiting aliens in SWA from becoming members of political parties 
Education Amendment Proclamation No. 14 &16 of 1937(NP) 
Amendment of Education Proclamation No. 16 of 1926. 
Native Administration Amendment Proclamation No. 25 of 10937 
This makes provision for the amendment of the law relating to the control and management of native affairs. 
1938 Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment further Amendment Proclamation No.1 of 1938 
Amendment of Natives (Urban Areas) Act No.34 of 1924. It makes provision for the establishment of the Urban 
Areas Pass Fees Fund. 
Native Administration Amendment Proclamation No. 9 of 1938 
This is an amendment of the Native Administration Proclamation No.11 of 1922. It amends the law relating to 
the administration and control of Natives. 
Master and Servants Amendment Proclamation No.22 of 1938 
An amendment of the Master and Servants Proclamation No.34 of 1920. 
Crown Lands (Trespass) Amendment Proclamation No. 31 of 1938 
An act to amend the Crown Lands (trespass) Proclamation No.7 of 1919. 
1939 WORLD WAR II STARTED 
1939 Matrimonial causes Jurisdiction Act No. 22 of 1939 
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This Act concerns jurisdiction over divorce proceedings.  
Police(South West Africa) Act No. 19 of 1939 
This amends the Act No.14 of 1912 by incorporating the SWA Force into the SA Police.  
It repeals the Police Amendment Proclamation No.42 of 1931 
Governor-General Proclamation No.234 of 1939 
The South African Defence Act, No. 13 of 1912 was made applicable to SWA 
Trespass of Animals Ordinance No.16 of 1939 
Repeals the Pounds and Trespasses Proclamation No43 of 1923 
The Native Administration Proclamations No. of 1939 
African female were required to carry passes 
1940 Education Amendment Proclamation No. 7 of 1940 
This is an amendment of the Education Proclamation No.16 of 1926.  Another Bantu school for the natives is 
build in the Waterberg Reserve.  
1941 Employee ‘ Compensation Act No.30 of 1941 
This Act makes provision for the compensation of workers or their dependants if the workers is injured or killed 
in the course of employment .It was previously known as the workmen compensation act 
1942 The "London Treaty" is repealed by SA, and German citizens lose their SA citizenship. 
Civil Restitution Act No. of 1942 
1943 Native Administration Amendment No.6 of 1943 
This amends the Native Administration Proclamation No.11 of 1922 
Friendly Societies Act No.27 of 1943 
It makes provision for the consolidation and amendment of the laws relating to insurance. 
1944 Native Minimum Wage Proclamation No.1 of 1944 
This makes provision for the establishment of the minimum amount that an employer is bound to pay his 
employee in line with the employee’s gender and class  principals  
1945 Matrimonial causes Jurisdiction Act 35 of 1945 
This Act extends court jurisdiction in divorce matters. 
1946 Electoral Consolidation Act No.46 of 1946 
Makes provision for the date on which the voters list of persons who are entitled to vote i.e. the date from which 
every white, adult Union national shall complete a form of application to be registered as a voter with electoral 
officers in SWA. Section 3 restricts the franchise to white citizens over the age of 18. 
Co-operative Societies Ordinance No.15 of 1946 
This makes provision for the consolidation and amendment of the laws relating to the formation and registration 
of corporative societies and co-operative companies.  
Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Proclamation No.8 of 1946 
An amendment of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation No.34 of 1924 
Intestate Succession Ordinance No.12 of 1946 
It sets forth rules for intestate inheritance by surviving spouses and other relatives. 
1947 Masters and Servant Amendment  Proclamation. No. 7 of 1947 
This is an amendment of the Master and Servants Proclamation No.34 of 1920 
Education Amendment Proclamation16 of 1947 
This amends the Education Proclamation No. 16 of 1926  
South West Africa Constitution Amendment Proclamation No. 115 of 1947 
It makes provision for the obligation to apply for Registration as a voter in the South West Africa. 
1948 Electoral Law Amendment Act No.50 of 1948 
Amends section 6 of Act No.46 of 1946. No person who has been guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice at an 
election shall, whether or not he is registered as a voter be entitled to vote at that election. 
1949 South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act 23 of 1949 
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This means a de facto incorporation because the "whites" of SWA are granted representation in the SA 
Parliament. This act gave South West Africa direct representation in the South African Parliament. The 
Governor General no longer had law-making power on reserved matters – this was done through South Africa 
Parliament. It repealed schedule of the South West Africa Constitution Amendment  Proclamation No.115 
Registration of Voters in South West Africa  No.147 of 1949 
Provide the date and preparation of the list of persons who are entitled to vote- applicable to only white adult 
union national. 
South Africa Citizenship Act No.44 of 1949 
Conferred upon all the Namibians the citizenship of South Africa.  
1950 Suppression of Communisms Act No.44 of 1950 
An act to declare the Communist Party of South Africa unlawful or any other organization. This is act is 
applicable in South West Africa. It also provided for organisations to be declared unlawful if the Government is 
satisfied that they are furthering the achievement of any of the aims of communism as defined by in the Act. 
Division of South West Africa into Electoral Division No.105 of 1950 
Made provision for the territory to be divided into 18 electoral divisions –each electing one member to the 
House of Assembly of Parliament. 
This covered the Eastern, Western, Central and Southern part of country. North was totally excluded.  
Education Amendment Proclamation No.8 & 25 of 1950 
Amendment of the Education Proclamation No.16 of 1926 and Proclamation 55 of 1921 respectively 
Masters and Servants Amendment Proclamation No.26 of 1950 
This is an amendment of the Masters and Servants Proclamation No. of 1920 
Defence Act Proclamation No.118 of 1950 
Makes provision for the application of the SA Defence Act (no.13 of 1912) to be applied to SWA and all its 
subsequent amendments. 
1951 Suppression of Communism Amendment Act No.50 of 1951 
This act amends the Suppression of Communism Act No.44 of 1950.No action for damages lies and no criminal 
action may be instituted for describing certain persons as communists. 
South West Africa Affairs Constitution Amendment Act 55 of 1951 
Returned legislative power to the Governor General who was empowered to make laws in respect of reserved 
matters by Proclamation in the Government Gazette, subject to the approval of the South African Parliament. 
Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation No.56 of 1951 
Provide for the restrictions of natives to certain areas for better control of natives in urban areas. Segregation of 
natives in urban areas. Provision of curfew after certain hours of the day.  
It repealed the Native( Urban Areas) Amendment  Proclamation No.1 of 1938 
Police Amendment Act.No.20 of 1951 
This is an amendment of section 1 of the Police Act No.14 of 1912. It substitutes the definition of 
“Commissioned Officer” for “assistant Commissioner”. 
Education Ordinance No.9 of 1951 
Amendment of the Education Proclamation No. 16 of 1926 
Separate Representation of Voters Act No.46 of 1951 
This act amends the law relating to the registration of non-Europeans and Europeans as voters for parliament. 
1952 Electoral Laws Amendment Act No.55 of 1952 
This provides for the amendments of the South Africa Act of 1909 and the Electoral Consolidation Act No.30 of 
1946. This is also applicable in South West Africa. 
General Registration of Voters Act No.50 of 1952 
This makes provision for the continuation of certain regulations relating to the recovery of loans made to ex-
volunteers  
Education Amendment Ordinance No. 9 &18 & 43of 1952 
These amend the Education Proclamation No. 16 of 1926 
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Societies of Employment of Natives Ordinance No.48 of 1952 
It makes provision for the establishment of a Society of South West African Farmer-Employers of contracted 
Extra-Territorial or Northern Natives. 
Natives(Urban Areas)Amendment Proclamation No.20 of 1952 
Made the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act of 1952 applicable to SWA, 
whereby African native were compelled to carry a reference book(pass) 
Radio Amendment Act No.3 of 1952(A) 
An act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the control of radio activities in the Union and matters 
incidental thereto. It regulates radio activities. 
1953 Police Amendment Act.No.17 of 1953 
An amendment of Police Act No.14 of 1912.It makes provision for the Police canteens to be exempted from 
licences. 
Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act No.43 of 1953 
Extends the Act 222 of 1913 of South Africa to be applicable to the territory of Namibia 
This also repeal the Proclamation No.23 of 1924 of the Territory of Namibia 
Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 
Education [will be up to] Standard two, including reading, writing and arithmetic through mother-tongue 
instruction, as well as the knowledge of English and Afrikaans, and the cardinal principles of the Christian 
religion." 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Ordinance No.19 of 1953 
This is to prohibit marriage between European and non-Europeans and to provide for matters incidental thereto. 
Immorality Amendment Ordinance No. 20 of 1953 
An amendment of the Immorality Proclamation No.19 of 1934 
Natives(Urban Areas)Amendment 0rdinance No.21 of 1953 
An amendment of the Promotion of Farming Interests Ordinance No. 29 of 1952 and the Natives Urban Areas 
Proclamation No.56 of 1951. 
Wills Act No.7 of 1953 
This act covers the execution of wills. 
1954 Riotous Assemblies and Suppression of Communism Act No.15 of 1954 
Amends Riotous Assemblies Act of 1914 and Suppression of Communisms Act No.44 of 1950 
Immorality Amendment Ordinance No. 13 of 1954 
An amendment of the Immorality Proclamation No.19 of 1934 
Natives(Urban Areas)Amendment Ordinance No.25 of 1954 
This is a further amendment of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation No.56 of 1951 
Black Education Amendment Act No.44 of 1954 
This amends section 12 of the Bantu Education Act No.47 of 1953. It authorises the Minister to establish 
regional, local or domestic councils with due regard to the principle of providing for active participation by the 
Bantu people in the control and government of Government Bantu Schools. This act spells out the functions, 
duties and privileges of such councils. 
SWA Bantu Affairs Administration Act No.56 of 1954 
1955 Matrimonial Affairs Ordinance No.25 of 1955 
This ordinance places certain limitation power of the husband in a civil marriage, in manner similar to the RSA 
matrimonial Affairs act 7 of 1953 
South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act No.26 of 1955 
An act to amend section 3 of the South West Africa Constitution Act No. 42 of 1925. It makes provision for the 
Administrator in Executive Committee to delegate power, authority or function to the Administrator. 
Native Affairs Administration Proclamation No.87 of 1955 
The State President delegated certain powers that had been conferred to him to the Minister of Bantu 
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Administration and Development. 
Police Act No.15 of 1955 
This amends sections 10 and 21 of the Police Act No.14 of 1912. This act outlines the functions of the South 
African Police. It is applicable in South West Africa. It amends section 21 of Act No.14 of 1942 by substituting 
the word “captain” for “inspector”. 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.23 of 1955 
An ordinance to amend the Education Proclamation No.16 of 1926 
 
Departure from the Union Regulation Act No.34 of 1955 
Section 2 prohibits any person from leaving South Africa or Namibia for foreign destination without a valid 
passport or permit. Penalty 3months to 2 years imprisonment. 
1956 Riotous Assemblies Act No.17 of 1956 
An act to consolidate the laws relating to riotous assemblies and the prohibition of the engendering of feelings of 
hostility between the European and non-European dwellers of South Africa. This act is also applicable in South 
West Africa. 
Labour Relations Act No.28 of 1956 
An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the registration and regulation of trade unions and 
employers’ organisations. It makes provision for the establishment of an industrial tribunal and to define its 
functions; to safe-guard against inter-racial competition. 
Black Education Act No.36 of 1956 
This amends sections 6, 8 and 9 of the Bantu Education Act No.47 of 1953. This makes provision for the 
Minister of Native affairs to delegate power to the Secretary of Finance to constitute school boards and to 
prescribe their powers. It also makes registration of schools be subject to conditions determined by the Minister. 
Voters, Operation of New Voters’ Lists Proclamation No.232 of 1956 
This state the date on which the new voters’ list come into operation. This restricts representation of non-whites. 
Friendly Societies Act No.25 of 1956 
It makes provision for the registration, incorporation, regulation and dissolution of friendly societies. 
Official Secret Act no.16 of 1956 
1957 Electoral Laws Further Amendment Act No.8 of 1957 
An act to amend the Electoral Commission Act No.46 of 1946 and the Separate Representation of Voters Act 
NO. 46 of 1951.  
Police Amendment Act No.32 of 1957 
An act to amend section 5 of the Police Act No.14 of 1912. This act exempts every member of the Force from 
paying tolls, fees and dues when he is on duty.  This makes provision for any person who assaults or resists any 
member of the Force in the execution of his duty, to be guilty of an offence. 
Defence Act  No.44 of 1957 
This act makes provision for the defence of South Africa. It outlines the composition of the defence force and it 
is also applicable in  South West Africa 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.20 & 21 of 1957 
An amendment of section 12 of the Education Proclamation No.19 of 1926 and other laws relating to Public 
Education 
1958 Police Act No.7 of 1958 
It makes provision for establishment, organisation and control of the South African Police. This is also 
applicable in South West Africa. 
Repeal Act 15 of 1955, as well Act 14 of 1912, Act no.20 of 1951, Act No. 17 of 1953, Act no. 32 of 1957 
Native Proclamation No.119 of 1958 
It repeals the Native Administration Proclamation No. 87 of 1955 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act No.30 of 1958 
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An act to amend the Electoral Consolidation Act No.46 of 1946. The voting age for the White population is 
lowered to eighteen years whereas that of the other Races is kept at twenty years. 
Defence Proclamation No.246 of 1958 
It makes provision for the Defence Act No.44 of 1957 to come into operation. 
1959 Prison Act No. 8 of 1959 
This is an act to consolidate and amend laws relating to prisons. It makes provision for the establishment, 
administration and functions of the prison department. 
Black Affairs Act No. 55 of 1959, 
This Act establishes a Commission for Black Affairs, so as to facilitate the administration of black affairs. 
Black Education Amendment Act.No.33 of 1959 
Amendment of section 1 of the Bantu Education Act No.47 of 1953. It gives the Minister power to disestablish 
any school board or similar body whenever he deems this expedient, provided that an enquiry has first been held 
at which the board has the right to be heard. 
Friendly Societies Act Proclamation No.289 of 1959 
1960 Unlawful Organizations Act No.34 of 1960 
An act to empower the Governor–General with the view to the maintenance of public order by declaring the Pan 
Africanist Congress, ANC unlawful or any other organization. This act also amends the Riotous Assemblies act 
No.17 of 1956 
Broadcasting Amendment Act No. 49 of 1960 
This amends the Broadcasting Act No. 22 of 1926.This Act empowers the Boards of Governors to have 
increased powers of control. It makes provision for Bantu Programme Control Board to Consist exclusively of 
Whites. 
Referendum Act No.52 of 1960 
This provides for a referendum to determine whether the white voters in South West Africa and in South Africa 
are in favour of a republic Union or not. 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.3 of 1960 
Amendment of section 89 of the Education Proclamation No.16 of 1926. It makes provision for the authorization  
of any child who will reach or has reached the age of six years on or before the thirty-first day of March to start 
school from the first day of the school year. 
Natives(Urban Areas )Amendment Proclamation No.335 of 1960 
This amends the Natives (Urban areas) Proclamation No56 of 1951 
1961 Marriage Act No.25 of 1961 
This Act governs the solemnisation of civil marriages. 
Defence Amendment Act No.12 & 42 of 1961 
 These acts amend section 1 of the Defence Act No.44 of 1957 and give retrospective effect to certain 
regulations for the Permanent force. Act 12 makes provision for the Minister of Defence to order any person, 
persons or a class of person to evacuate of assemble in any particular building in period of war or during 
operations for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder. Act No.42 makes provision for longer periods 
of military training for White youths selected by ballot. 
Police Amendment Act. No. 53 of 1961 
Amendment of section 1 of the Police Act No. 7 of 1958 by defining “commissioned officer.’  It makes 
provision for the establishment of a reserve police force-a citizen unit to assist in performing ordinary police 
duties when regular members are required for more urgent tasks. Membership was limited to white citizens. 
Black Education Amendment Act No. 55 of 1961 
An act to amend the Bantu Education Act No 47 of 1953.  It provides that any establishment of a Native school 
should confirm to requirements and registration procedures as set out by Minister of Bantu Education in the 
Union of South Africa. 
Electoral Laws Act No. 81 of 1961 
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This act amends the Electoral Consolidation Act No. 46 of 1946. It makes provision for the membership of any 
person declared to be a duly elected member to come into effect from the date the declaration is made.  
Education Ordinance No. 26 of 1961 
Establishment of Coloured Council Ordinance No.34 of 1961 
 
1962 Radio Amendment Act No.51 of 1962 
An act to amend sections 1,8 and 17 of the Radio Act No.3 of 1952.This act prohibits the use of radio 
transmitting apparatus without the authorization from the Postmaster-General. 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act No.72 of 1962 
This act amends the Electoral Consolidation Act No.46 of 1946 and the Separate Representation of Voters Act 
No. of 1951.It makes provision for election agents, polling agents and messengers to be Whites except at 
Coloured elections. 
Vagrancy Amendment Ordinance No.3 of 1962 
An ordinance to prohibit entry or presence upon land and the entry of or presence in buildings in certain 
circumstances. 
Education Ordinance No.8  and 27of 1962 
This ordinance amends the law relating to Education. It makes provision for the consolidation of the laws 
relating to education and allows the general control, supervision and management of education to be vested in 
the Administrator. 
Sabotage Act No.76 of 1962 
Section 21: 
Native(Urban areas)Amendment Proclamation No.168 of 1968 
1963 Natives Urban Areas Act No.47 of 1963 
An act to provide for the control of education for the Coloured persons by the Department of Coloured Affairs. It 
amends the Special Education Act No. of 1948 
Defence Amendment Act. No.77 of 1963 
This act amends the Defence Act No.44 of 1957.It makes provision for the different regulations to be made in 
respect of commandos and air commandos. 
Radio Amendment Act No.90 of 1963 
This Act prohibits the sale of radio apparatus without valid listener’s licence. It amends the  Radio Act No.3 of 
1952 
General Registrations of Voters Proclamation No.49 of 1963 
Electoral Laws Amendment Proclamation No.135 f 1963 
1964 Marriage Amendment Act No.11 of 1964 
This act amends section 12 of the Marriage Act No.25 of 1961 
Bantu  Special Education Act 24 of 1964 
An act to provide for the establishment, control, management and subsidization of special schools for the 
provision of special education for the handicapped Bantu children. This act amends the Bantu Children Act 
No.47 of 1953. 
Tear gas Act No.16 of 1964 
This act provides for the control of the manufacture, importation and possession of tear-gas. 
Bantu Laws Amendment Act No.42 of 1964 
An act to repeal the Native Service contract Act No. of 1932. It amends the Natives (Abolition of Passes and 
Coordination of Documents) Act of 1952. It makes provision for the regulating of the Native women’s 
movement to urban areas. 
Electoral laws amendment Act No. 51 of 1964 
Amendment of the Electoral Consolidation Act No. 46 of 1946. A voter is obliged to notify the electoral officer 
in writing, of a permanent change in residential, business or branch office address 
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Police Amendment Act No.64 of 1964 
This act makes provision for incidental matters and amends the Police Act No. 7 of 1958 
Establishment of Coloured Council Amendment Ordinance No.16 of 1964 
An Ordinance to amend the Establishment of the Coloured Council Ordinance No.34 of 1962 
1965 Police Amendment Act No.21 & 74 of 1965 
Amendment of the Prison Act No. 8 of 1959. Act 74 outlines the services to which the revenue generated by the 
Act shall be applied. Act No.74 empowers any policeman at any place within a mile of the border between South 
West Africa and other state to search without warrant any person, premises, vehicle or aircraft and to seize 
anything found. 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act No.84 of 1965 
An act to amend sections 42 and 43 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No. 32 of 1961. This act is 
applicable in the South West Africa. The officer for votes of special voters shall render to a special voter all 
possible assistance and shall in the presence of the required witness inform the voter to vote in secret. 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.30 of 1965 
An amendment of section 37 of the Education Ordinance No. 27 of 1962.  It makes provision for a teacher who 
with the approval of the Department acts as a principal for any period of not less than one month to be 
remunerated for such period as if he had been appointed principal of such school. 
1966 Electoral Laws Amendment Act No.29 of 1966 
This act amends the Electoral Consolidation ActNo.46 of 1946 and the Separate Representation of Voters Act 
No of 1951 
Bantu Affairs Act No.63 of 1966 
An act to amend section 9 of the Bantu Administration Act No.38of 1927 ,Section 40 of the Bantu (Urban 
Areas) Consolidation Act No of 1959 and section 52 of the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 
Suppression of Communism Amendment Proclamation No.38 of 1966 
Civil Defence Act No.39 of 1966 
This act provides for a directorate of Civil Defence in the public service and deals with emergency powers. 
Oct 
1966 
On 27 October 1966 South African Mandate declared unlawful 
1967 Suppression of Communism Amendment Act No.24 of 1967 
Empowers the police officer or above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to detain persons for interrogation for an 
indefinite period. 
Matrimonial Affairs Amendment Ordinance No.9 of 1967 
An act to amend the Matrimonial Affairs Ordinance No.25 of 1955 in order to make provision for a married 
woman to be a depositor in any account in a banking institution 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.5 of 1967 
 Amendment of the Education Ordinance No. 27 of 1962. This amendment makes provision for the change in the 
designation of certain professional posts and the amended condition of service. 
Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act No.37 of 1967 
This act makes it an offence to possess indecent or obscene photographic matter. 
Border Control Act No.61 of 1967 
1968 South West Africa Constitution Act  No.39 of 1968   ( Second Constitution) 
Replaced the SWA Constitution Act 42 of 1925 – gave powers to South Africa to make laws in respect of an 
expanded list of reserved matters as per section 38. SWA Administrator powers were subject to the State 
President of South Africa, who had power to administer the territory as an integral part of the Republic. 
Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in SWA Act No.54 of 1968 
This Act makes provision for the native nations in SWA to develop in an orderly manner to self-government 
nations and independence. 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act No.2 of 1968 
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Amendment of the Electoral Consolidation Act No.46 of 1946 in order to make provision for a general 
registration of voters at intervals of not more than six years. 
Marriage Amendment Act No.19 0f 1968 
This act amends the Marriage Act No.25 of 1961. It makes provision for a special licence issued in South West 
Africa to be regarded as having been published or issued in South Africa. 
Prohibition of Political Interference Act No.51 of 1968 
An act to prohibit interference by one population group in the politics of any other population group. 
Black Laws Amendment Act No.56 of 1968 
This act amends the provisions of the Bantu Administration Act No.38 of 1927 relating to the issues of the deeds 
of grant. 
Natives(Urban Areas)Amendment Proclamation No.85 & 194& 243& 246 of 1968 
Amendment of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation No. of 1951 
1969 South West Africa Affairs Act  No.25 of 1969 
This made provision for the South African government to have  more tighter legal and administrative power over 
South West Africa – the list of reserved matters grew further and further 
Police Offences Act No.16 of 1969 
It prescribes penalties for being in disguise in suspicious circumstances. 
Radio Amendment Act No.93 of 1969 
Amendment of the Radio Act No.3 of 1952 in order to provide for s common date of expiry for certain listeners’ 
licences. 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.19 of 1969 
An amendment of the Education Ordinance No. of 1962. It provides for the instruction of pupils whose home 
language is German through the medium of German in standards up to and including standard eight. 
General Law Amendment Act No.101 of 1969 
This act authorises the withholding of evidence from any court of law if the Administrator-General (or the 
responsible Minister) is of the opinion that disclosure of the information could be detrimental to state security. 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act No.99 of 1969 
It provides that a person would be disqualified for ever as a voter in general elections or in elections for the 
Coloured Persons’ Representative Council if he had been convicted of an offence under the Suppression of 
Communism Act and had been sentenced to a period in prison without the option to fine. 
1970 Electoral Laws Amendment Act No.12 of 1970 
This act amends the Electoral Consolidation Act No.46 of 1946. It makes provision for the preparation and 
coming into operation of voters’ lists and applications to vote as absent voters. 
Black/ Bantu Education Act No. 44 of 1970 (tighned control over SWA) 
This act amends section 9 of the Bantu Education Act No.47 of 1953.This act gave Pretoria control over primary 
and secondary education for Africans, which had previously been carried out on by the provincial (and 
territorial) government and by missionaries with some subsidies from the national government. This excluded 
the Nama –tribe as they were no longer classified natives or Bantu, but deemed to be coloured.  
Marriage Amendment Act No.51 0f 1970 
Amendment of section1 of the Marriage Act No.25 of 1961 so as to assign the administration of the provisions 
thereof in respect of any Bantu in South West Africa to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. 
It makes provision for girls of the age of fifteen to marry without the permission of the Minister. 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.14 of 1970 
 Under this ordinance, the Administrator shall determine the salary scales, increments and allowances payable to 
teachers. It amends section 37 of Ordinance 27 of 1962. 
1971 Publications and Entertainments Amendment Act.No.32 of 1971 
This act makes provision for the prohibition of the exhibition to any persons of any cinematograph film intended 
to be exhibited in public except at the approval of the Control Board. 
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Black Affairs Admin Act No.45 of 1971 
An act to make better provision for the administration of Bantu Affairs outside the Bantu homelands  and to 
provide for the establishment of the Bantu  Affairs Administration Boards 
Newspaper and Imprint Registration Act No. 63 of 1971 
This act provides for the registration of news papers and imprints in order to regulate certain matters in 
connection with printed matter. 
1972 Suppression of Communism Amendment Act No.2 of 1972 
Amendment of the Suppression Communism Act No.44 of 1950 on provisions regarding the participation of 
certain persons in the activities of certain organisations. 
Marriage Amendment Act No.26 of 1972 
An act to amend the Marriage Act No.25 of 1961 in order to validate certain marriages. 
Black Special Education Act No. 27 of 1972 
This act makes provision for the payment of contributions by employers towards the cost of transport services 
for their Coloured of Indian employees. 
Age of Majority Act No.57 of 1972 
An act to consolidate and amend certain laws relating to the age of majority and to the declaration of a minor to 
be a major. 
Police Amendment Act No.94 of 1972 
Amendment of the Police Act No.7 of 1958.  It amends the provisions relating to the appointment of officers and 
the powers of the Sate President. 
Basters of Rehoboth Education Act No.85 of 1972 
An act to provide for the control of education for members of the Rehoboth Baster Community of the South 
West Africa  
Namas in South West Africa Education Act No,86 of  1972 
This act provides for the control of education for Nama in South West Africa. It classifies certain posts as posts 
in the public service. It gives the Minister the power to appoint any person to any post and to discharge any 
person occupying such post. 
1973 Black Laws Amendment Act No.7 of 1973 
An act to amend the Bantu Administration Act No. of 1927 in order to further define circumstances in which a 
tribe, portion of a tribe or Bantu community may be required to withdraw from a place. 
Police Amendment Act No.34 of 1973 
An act to amend the Police Act No. 7of 1958 in order to provide for the discharge and dismissal of 
commissioned officers on account of ill-health. 
Education Laws Amendment Act No. 69 of 1973 
This act amends the National Education Policy Act No.29of 1967, the Advances Education Act No. of 1967 and 
the Higher Education Act No. of 1923. This act amends the provisions of the Educational Services Act No of 
1967 relating to the definitions; to the transfer of subsidized schools to the Government. 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act No. 79 of 1973 
Amendment of the Electoral Consolidation Act No.46 of 1946 in order to provide for the continuance of the 
registration as voters of certain persons who are in detention. 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.13 of 1973 
Amendment of section 2 of the Education Ordinance No. 27 of 1962 so as to substitute the expression 
“Executive Committee” for the word Administrator.’ It amends the minimum time to be devoted to religious 
instruction in standard eight. 
1974 Electoral Laws Amendment Act No. 1& 33 of 1974 
Amendment of the Electoral Consolidation Act No.46 of 1946 in order to give effect to a resolution of the 
Senate and House of Assembly to establish a staff of Parliament. 
Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act.No.30 of 1974 
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Amendment of the Riotous Assemblies Act No.17 of 1956 by deleting the definitions of certain expressions and 
defining of further defining certain expressions. 
Publications Act No.42 of 1974 
This act provides for the control of certain publications or objects, films and public entertainments. It makes 
provision for the establishment of a Directorate of Publications. 
Radio Amendment Act. No.50 of 1974 
An act to amend section 15 of  the Radio Act No.3 of 1952 so as to extend the powers of the State President to 
make regulations relating to the control and prevention of interference with radio reception. 
Police Amendment Act No.68 of 1974 
Amendment of section 32the Police Act No. 7 of 1958 so as to make further provision for the giving of notice of 
certain actions. 
Black Laws Amendment Act No.70&71 of 1974 
An act to authorize certain officers to perform certain functions of the Minister and to extend the legislative 
power of the legislative assembly. 
1975 Police Amendment Act No.15 of 1975 
Amendment of the Police Act No.7 of 1958 in order to provide for the inclusion of the Police Reserve of certain 
former members of the South African Police and persons liable to serve under the Defence Act No. 44 of 1957. 
Black Laws Amendment Act No.9 of 1975 
It increased the President’s powers to determine which laws of the South Africa should apply to the various 
homelands. This law is applicable in South West Africa. 
Education Amendment Ordinance No.21 of 1975 
This made provision for the consolidation and amendment of the laws relating to education for whites in South 
West Africa. It gave the Executive Committee the right to refuse admission and allow exclusion of any pupil 
from a government educational institution. It allowed the appointment of married women to the education 
personnel only in a temporary capacity. 
1976 Security Council Resolution .385 of 1976 
Free election to be held for Namibia as one political entity 
Black Laws Amendment Act No.4 of 197 
Amendment of the Bantu(Urban Areas )Consolidation Act No. of 1945 in order to transfer from the State 
President to the Minister the power to make regulations and in this respect to curtain the Minister’s power of 
delegation 
Broadcasting Act No.73 of 1976 
This act makes provision for the consolidation and amendment of certain laws relating to the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation and the control of broadcasting in South West Africa. 
Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act No. 79 of 1976 
It makes provision for the Minister of Justice if satisfied that a person is endangering the security of the State, to 
prohibit that person from attending any gathering or any particular gathering. 
Police Amendment Act No.34 No. of 1976 
This is an amendment of section 34A of the Police Act No. 7 of 1958. 
Electoral Laws Amendment Act 98 of 1976 
Amendment of the provisions of the Electoral Consolidation Act No .46 of 1946 so as to regulate the registration 
of and voting by any voter having his home within an independent State.                                                  
1977 South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act No. 95 of 1977 
Made provision for SA President to make laws for the territory of SWA with a view to the eventual attainment 
of independence 
RSA Proclamation R249 of 1977 
Abolished the SWA seats in the South African Parliament 
SA Proclamation 180 and 181 of 1977 
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Established the office of Administer General (AG) for SWA/Namibia and empowered to make laws by 
Proclamation in the official gazette. Furthermore the AG could repeal or amend laws passed by the South 
African Parliament 
Marriage Act  AG 8 of 1977 
Amends sections 2, and 3 of the Marriage Act No.25 of 1961 
Abolishment of Civil Imprisonment Act No.2 of 1977 
This act abolishes the civil imprisonment of a debtor for his failure to pay a sum of money in terms of any 
judgement. 
It repeals the  Civil Imprisonment Restitution Act No. of 1942 
Electoral Law Amendment Act No.34 of 1977 
An act to amend the Electoral Consolidation Act No. of 1946.It extends the period in which an application for 
registration as a voter may be lodged during a general registration of voters. 
Riotous Assemblies Amendment Proclamation No.10 of 1977 
This repeals sections 4, 9 of Act 17 of 1956. It also amends Act 7 of 1956 by substituting the term “administrator 
General with the State President. 
Police Amendment Act No.90 of 1977 
An amendment of the Police Act No. 32 of 1958 in order to increase certain penalties, create certain additional 
offences and to prohibit the making of sketches or the taking of photographs of certain persons detained in 
lawful custody. 
Black Laws Amendment Act No. 115 &119 of 1977 
An amendment of the Bantu Consolidation Act No. of 1945 so as to enable associations of Bantu and certain 
juristic persons to acquire business rights in locations and Bantu villages. 
1978 Constituent Assembly and Election Proclamation (AG63 of 1978) 
Was given power to draw up the constitution for Independent Namibia despite International opposition.  
Detention for Prevention of Political Violence Proclamation  No.26 of 1978 
This proclamation makes provision for the detention of persons in order to prevent political violence and 
intimidation. 
Native Administration Amendment Proclamation  No.46 of 1978 
 This amends the Native Administration Proclamation No. 15 of 1928 
Civil Defence Proclamation ,AG No.54 of 1978 
This Proclamation deals with disasters and civil defence. 
It makes provision for ordinances relating to civil defence to be introduced in the Legislative Assembly only 
after consultation between the Minister and the Executive Committee. 
Radio Amendment Act No.2 of 1978 
An amendment of the Radio Act No. of 1952 so as to redefine the expressions “radio”,” broadcasting licence” 
and “radio dealer”. 
Police Amendment Act No.14 of 1978 
An act to amend the provisions of the Police Act No. of 1958 so as to control the importation, lending, use and 
possession of certain textiles. 
The Publication Proclamation (AG) No.43 of 1978 
Amends the Publication Act No.43 of 1974by giving the Administrator-General the power to overrule the 
Publications Appeal Board. 
Mentally Retarded Coloured, Baster and Nama Children’s training Proclamation, AG 76 of 1978 
Amendment of the regulations made under the Coloured Persons in South West Africa Education Act, No.68 of 
1972. 
1979 National Assembly Proc(AG21 of 1979) 
Transformed the Constituent Assembly into a National Assembly with law making powers. 
Abolishment of Racial Discrimination Act No. 3 of 1979 
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An act to remove the restrictions based on race in connection with residential erven in urban areas and certain 
public amenities. 
Black Laws Amendment Proclamation No. 3 of 1979 
It amends section 3A of the South West Africa Native Affairs Administration Act No.56 of 1954. It makes 
provision for the change of names or official titles of certain institutions and holders of such institutions and the 
replacement of the word “Bantu” and derivatives thereof. 
Detention for Prevention of Political Violence Proclamation No.26 of 1979 
This amends the Detention for the Prevention of Political Violence and Intimidation Proclamation AG No. 26 of 
1978. It makes provision for a justice of peace to interrogate a detainee at anytime 
1980 Representative Authorities Proc (AG8 of 1980) 
Made provision for second-tier governmental authorities based on ethnic division of the country into 11 
population groups – assumed control over a number of issues including communal land rights, education, health 
services and social welfare. 
Combating of Immoral Practices Act 21 of 1980. 
This Act covers the keeping of brothels, various acts related to prostitution, and various other sexual offences. 
Abolition of Racial Discrimination Act No. 10 of 1980 
Amendment of the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination so as to provide for the cancellation of  any licence, 
registration certificate or other authorization in writing issued in respect of any public amenity to any person 
who conducts such public amenity in contravention of any prohibition in respect of racial discrimination.  
Electoral Laws Amendment Proclamation No.46 of 1980 
This makes provision for holding elections for members of legislative authorities in electoral divisions and for 
amendment of divisional voters’ list. 
National Education Act No.30 of 1980 
This provides for the provision and control of education other than tertiary education provided by the Academy 
for Tertiary Education under the Academy for Tertiary Education Act No. of 1980 to establish a National 
Education Council for South West Africa and an Examination Board for South West Africa. 
1981 Abolition of Racial Discrimination Act No. 21 of 1981 
Amendment of the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination (Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities) Act 
No of 1979so as to extend the incidence of the provisions relating to the removal of restrictions based on race in 
connection with certain land in Urban areas and the prohibition to impose such restrictions. 
Meetings, Prohibition and Notification Act No.22 of 1981 
This makes provision for the prohibition of certain organisations from holding meetings. 
Police Amendment Proclamation No. 9 of 1981 
Amendment of the Police Act No. 7of 1958 so as to establish a police force for South West Africa. 
Defence Matters in SWA Proclamation No.14 of 1981 
This is a proclamation for the commencement of section 2 of the Defence Matters in South West Africa 
Proclamation No. of 1980. 
1982 Demonstration in or near court buildings prohibition Act  No. 71 of 1982 
This Act prohibits demonstrations and gathering within a five hundred metre radius of a building containing a 
courtroom ,except on weekends and public holidays 
Intimidation Act No.72 of 1982 
An act to prohibit certain forms of intimidation and to establish penalties for such acts. 
Defence Amendment Act. No.  103 of 1982 
Amendment of the Defence Act No.44 of 1957 so as to make different provision relating to the liability to serve 
in the Permanent Force Reserve. It abolishes the Reserve of Officers and the Commando Reserve. 
1983 Party List Elections Proclamation  No.17 of 1983 
This makes provision for the Chief Electoral Officer to fill a casual vacancy in the legislative assembly by way 
of a declaration. 
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Voters List for Legislative Authorities Amendment Proclamation No.11 of 1983 
This is an amendment of the Voters’ list for legislative authorities Proclamation No. of 1980. It makes provision 
for the electoral officer to cause necessary amendments to the divisional voters’ list to be made if in his opinion 
there are inaccuracies, omissions or defects. 
Police Amendment Proclamation No. 21 of 1983 
Amendment of the Police Act No. 7 of 1958. It authorizes members of the Force to by means of appropriate 
indications or direction order a driver of a vehicle on a public road to bring that vehicle to a stop. 
1984 Party List Elections Amendment Proclamation No.4 of 1984 
This makes provision for a casual vacancy in the Legislative Assembly of Coloureds to be filled by way of a 
declaration by the Chief Electoral Officer 
Defense Amendment Act No.87 of 1984 
1985 Trespass Amendment Act No. 20 of 1985 
An act to amend the Trespass Ordinance No.3 of 1962 so as to increase the penalties of contravention of the said 
Ordinance from R50 to R1000 fine and  from 3 months to 12 months time period of  imprisonment. 
Constitutional Council Amendment Act No.19 of 1985 
An act to amend the Constitutional Council Act of 1985 in order to further regulate the qualifications of 
members of the Constitutional Council. 
Party List Election Proclamation No.1 of 1985 
It gives direction that a casual vacancy in the legislative assembly of the Coloureds be filled by way of a 
declaration by the Chief Electoral Officer. 
Prevention of Unlawful Squatting Proclamation No. 21 of 1985 
It makes provision for the prevention and termination of unlawful squatting.  Those found contravening the law 
shall be charged with a criminal offence and will be liable to a fine or imprisonment. 
Defence Matters in SWA Amendment  Proclamation No. 5 of 1985 
An amendment of the Defence Matters of South West Africa Proclamation No.198 of 1980 in order to further 
regulate the application of Act No.44 of 1957 in South West Africa. 
Residence of certain Persons in South  West Africa Regulation No.33 of 1985 
An act to restrict the right of certain persons to remain or stay in South West Africa and to provide for orders 
prohibiting certain person to depart from South West Africa. 
Indecent or Obscene Photographic Amendment Act No.4 of 1985 
This amends the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act No. 37 of 1967 by extending the meaning of 
cinematograph film. 
1986 Electoral Ordinance No.4 of 1986 
Squatters Proclamation  No. 28 of 1986 
A proclamtion to make sections 2, 3, 4, 6. 7. 9 and 10 of the Squatters Proclamation of 1985 applicable to  
South West Africa. 
Education Ordinance No.3 of 1986 
This provides for the provision of education to members of the Herero population group. 
Defense Matters in SWA Proclamation No. 204 of 1986 
Civil Defense Amendment Act No.19 of 1986 
An act to amend the Civil Defense Ordinance No .3 of 1979 so as to make provision for the appointment or 
designation of a Deputy Chief  of Civil Defense 
1987 Police Amendment Act No.20 of 1987 
An act to amend the Police Act No. of 1958 in order to increase certain fines. 
Defense Amendment Act No.45 of 1987 
1988 Protection of Fundamental Rights Act No. 16 of 1988. 
This Act provides for the protection of certain fundamental rights. 
Natives(Urban Areas) Amendment Act No. 22 &23 of 1988 
Amendment of the Native (Urban Areas) Proclamation No. 56 of 1951 in order to remove the power of a local 
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authority to regulate by regulation the entry or sojourn of person into or in certain residential places. 
National Education Amendment Act No.12 of 1988 
An amendment of the National Education Act No.30 of 1980 in order to further regulate the powers of the 
Cabinet to close or establish schools. 
1989 Public Gatherings Proclamation No. 23 of 1989 
This proclamation requires advance notices to the police of all public gathering and prohibits the carrying of 
weapons .It also gives the police powers to place condition on gathering and to disperse riots.  
First law Amendment (Abolition of Discriminatory or Restrictive Laws for Purposes of Free and Fair 
Election ) Proclamation No. 14 of 1989. 
This proclamation repealed a number of legal provisions in preparation for the elections held in term s of UN 
Resolution 435. It amends the definition of “undesirable” in section 48 of the Publications Act No.42 of 1974. 
Registration of Voters Proclamation No. 19 of 1989 
Provision for the registration of voters for the purposes of an election for a constituent assembly for South West 
Africa. 
Second law amendment (abolition of Discriminatory or Restrictive  laws for purposes of free and fair 
election) Proclamation No. 25 of 1989 
This proclamation repealed a number of legal  provisions in preparation for the elections held in terms of UN 
Resolution 435 
Intimidation Proclamation, Proclamation No. 24 of 1989. 
This Proclamation makes it an offence to intimidate any other person. 
Amnesty Proclamation No.13 of  1989 
This Proclamation grants amnesty for offences committed by persons in exile, so that they may return to 
Namibia. 
1990 NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE 
1990 Constitution Act No. of 1990 
Bills of rights ensured protection of all human rights 
1991 Recognition of Certain Marriages Act No.18 of 1991 
This Act provides for the recognition of marriages contracted in terms of the SWAPO Family Act 1977, and for 
the adoption of children in term of this Act. 
Racial Discrimination Prohibition Act No. 26 of 1991. 
This Act gives effect to Article 23 of the Namibian Constitution by making certain acts of racial discrimination 
and apartheid criminally punishable. It covers public amenities, the provision of goods and services, transactions 
relating to immovable property, educational and medical institutions, employment, associations, religious 
services, the incitement of racial disharmony and victimisation.  
Namibian Broadcasting Act No.9 of 1991 
It makes provision for the establishment of a broadcasting corporation for Namibia and sets forth its objectives, 
powers, duties and functions. 
An act to amend the Radio Act No.3 of 1952. 
1992 Electoral Act No.24 of 1992 
This Act governs election for the office of president, the National Assembly, regional councils and local 
authority councils. It also provides for the establishment of an electoral Commission, for the registration of 
voters and political parties, and for the conduct of election. 
Namibia Communications Commission Act No.4 of 1992 
It establishes a Namibian Broadcasting Commission and sets forth its powers, duties and functions which 
include issuing licences and the control and supervision of certain broadcasting activities and programme 
content. 
Amends the Radio Act No.3 of 1952 
University of Namibia Act No 18 of 1992 
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It makes provision for the establishment of the University of Namibia. 
New Era Publication Corporation Act No.1 of 1992 
This Act establishes a publication corporation for Namibia and sets forth its powers, duties and functions. 
1993 Dissolution of marriages on presumption of death  Act No. 18 of 1991 
This Act provides for the dissolution of marriages of persons presumed to be dead. 
Immigration control Act No.  7 of 1993 
This Act amends the Namibian Citizenship act 14 of 1993. It controls and regulates the entry of person into and 
their residence in Namibia and to provide for the removal from Namibia of certain immigrants. 
1994 Electoral Amendment Act No.23 of 1994 
It amends Act No 24 of 1992. It repeals the requirement that provisional voters’ registers be published in the 
Gazette. It makes provision for a system of continuous registration of voters. 
National Vocational Training Act No.18 of 1994 
Makes provision for the regulation of the training of apprentices and vocational trainees. It establishes a 
Vocational Training Board and trade advisory committees. 
Polytechnic of Namibia Act No.33 of 1994 
It makes provision for the establishment of a Polytechnic of Namibia and its administration. 
Walvis Bay and Off-shore Islands Act No.1 of 1994 
This amends the Wills Act No.7 of 1953 by defining “Courts” and “Master”. 
It makes provision for the transfer of control over Walvis Bay and the off-shore islands from South Africa to 
Namibia. 
1995 Presidential Pardon GN Regulations No.3 of 1995 
It makes provision for the announcement of Presidential Pardon to certain categories of offenders. 
Namibia Communications Commission Amendment Act No. 1 of 1995 
This Act amends sections 1, 11 and 27 of the Namibian Communications Commission Act No.4 of 1992. The 
amendments empower the commission to issue postal licences and telecommunications service licences. 
1996 Married Persons Equality Act  No.1 of 1996 
This Act abolishes the marital powers which previously applied to civil marriages and amend the law on 
matrimonial property in civil marriages in community of property.  
It also amends the common law on the domicile of married woman and minor children, and on the guardianship 
of minor children. This came into force on 15 July 1996 
Powers, Privileges and Immunities  of Parliament Act No. 17 of 1996 
It makes provision for the right of freedom of speech and debate as well as other powers, privileges and 
immunities for Parliamentarians. 
1997 Namibia Central Intelligence Service Act No.10 of 1997. 
This act amends the  Police Act 19 of 1990 .It makes provision for the establishment of the Namibia Central 
Intelligence Service 
Regional Councils Act No 17 of 1997 
This act amends the Regional Councils Act No.22 of 1992. It makes provision for the appointment of the 
delimitation commission at intervals of not less than five years 
Local Authorities Act  No. 3 of 1997 
This act amends the Local Authorities Act No.  23 of 1992. It provides that the second general elections for 
members of local authority councils shall be conducted according to the party list system instead of the ward 
system. 
Local Authorities Act No. 14 of 1997 
This act amends the  Local Authorities Act No. 3of 1997 by extending the period within which the second 
general election of members of local authority councils is to be help after the first such election which was held 
in December 1992. 
Namibian College of Open Learning Act No. 1 of 1997 
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It makes provision for the establishment of the Namibian College of Open Learning which aims to broaden 
access to education by providing alternatives to school-based education. 
1998 Namibian Constitution First Amendment Act No.34 of 1998 
An act to amend Article 134 of the Namibian Constitution in order to make provision for the first President of 
Namibia to hold office for three terms. 
Prison Act No.17 of 1998 
This act provides for the establishment of the Namibia Prison service and replace the prison act  8 of 1959 
Banking Institutions Act No.2 of 1998 
It repeals section 26 of the Married Persons Equality Act No.1 of 1996 
1999 Police Act No. 3 of 1999 
This amends the Police Act No. of 1998 in order to provide for the accountability of the Inspector-General to the 
Minister. 
Act No 19 of 1999 
It amends sections51, 87 and 88 of the Electoral Act No.24 of 1992.It makes provision for the suspension of the 
process of continuous registration of voters when a general registration of voters is to take place. 
Prison Act  No. 5 of 1999 
This act amends the Prison Act No. 17 of 1988 This act amends Prison Act No. of 1998 by correcting certain 
references .It makes provision for all Ministries and Agencies as far as is practical, to purchase supplies from 
amongst such as the Prison Service may produce. 
2000 Local Authorities Act  No. 24 of 2000 
This act amends the Local Authorities Act 14 of 1997. It makes provision for the  mayor and deputy mayor for a 
municipal council or town council to be the chairperson and vice-chairperson of the municipal council. 
Trust fund for regional Development and equity provisions Act 22 of 2000 
This Act establishes a Trust Fund to be used for financial and technical assistance to the Development of regions 
and local authorities, and assistance implementation of decentralisation programmes. 
Decentralisation enabling Act 33 of 2000 
This Act provides for and regulates the decentralisation of central government function to regional and local 
authorities. 
Namibian Students Financial Assistance Fund Act No.26 of 2000 
This act makes provision for the establishment of a fund to facilitate study and research by students at approved 
institutions of higher education. 
 General Law Amendment Act No.18 of 2000 
It amends sections 1 and 6 of the Namibian Broadcasting Act No. 9 of 1991 
Regional Councils Act  No. 30 of 2000 
This act amends the  Regional councils act 17 of 1997 
2001 Police Act No. 5 of 2001 
An act to amend the Police Act No of 1990 so as to make provision for certain requirements for persons who 
wish to be appointed to the Police Force. No person shall be allowed to join the Police Force unless he or she 
undergoes the prescribed medical examination. 
Education Act No.16 of 2001 
It repeals: the Education Ordinance No, 27 of 1962, the Black Special Education Act No.24 of 1964, the 
Coloured Persons in South West Africa Education Act No.63 of 1972, the Basters of Rehoboth Education Act 
No.85 of 1972, the Namas in South West Africa Education Act No.86 of 1972, the Education Ordinance No. 21 
of 1975, the Mentally Retarded Coloured, Baster and Nama Children’s training Proclamation AG No.76 of 1978 
and the National Education Act No.30 of 1980. 
2002 Local Authorities Act No. 17 of 2002 
This act amends the Local Authorities Act No. 24 of 2000 by repealing a provision providing for the election of 
members of local authority councils according to ward system. 
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Act No.20 of 2002 
This act amends section 15 of the Electoral Act No.24 of 1992 It provides for the period during which the 
second general registration of voters shall take place. 
Defence Act No.1 of 2002 
This repeals sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Civil Defence Act No.39 of 1966. It replaces the Defence Act No.44 
of 1957. 
2003 Higher Education Act No.26 of 2003 
This amends column 3 of the Schedule to Education Act No.16 of 2001. It makes provision for the establishment 
and composition of the National Council for Higher Education 
Teachers’ Education College Act No. 25of 2003(M8) 
Makes provision for the establishment of teachers’ colleges for education and training of students and serving 
teachers in order to enable them to obtain the necessary qualifications. It repeals the National Education Act 
No.30 of 1980. 
Higher Education Act No. 26 of 2003 
It regulates higher education, provides for the establishment of a National Council for Higher Education. It also 
provides for the registration of private higher education institutions and the funding of public higher education 
institutions. 
Electoral Amendment Act No.7 of 2003 
An act to amend the Electoral Act No. of 1992 so as to remove all provisions relating to wards, to substitute 
certain expressions and to further regulate certain provisions relating to the registration of voters. 
2004 Criminal Procedure Act 25 of 2004 
This Act governs procedure in criminal proceedings. It replaces all that remains of the Criminal Procedures 
Ordinance of 1963 and the Criminal  Procedure Act 51 
Companies Act No.28 of 2004 
This act repeals sections 31 and 32 of the Married Persons Equality Act No.1 of 1996. 
Defence Act of  2004 
This act prohibits anyone from publishing any information calculated or likely to endanger national security or 
the safety of members of  the Defence Force 
2005-
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3. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE INDICATOR –NAMIBIA 
This includes all relevant legislation passed during the year under consideration – Constitution /Act/Bills 
governing the status of the de jure judicial independence. This covers the following issues:  
 Establishment of courts according to law ( Constitutional separations of power from arms of 
Government in law 
 Appointment procedures, including compensation 
 Impartiality: Judicial decisions are not influenced by the judge’s personal interest in the outcome of 
the case. Judges selections are primarily based on merits not because of their political views or 
affiliations.  
 Access to Courts and Courts record: The people rely on courts to protect their access to justice and to 
protect their legal rights; Public access to court information.  
 Judicial Accountability: Ability to do what is right, for instance the ability of High Courts to reverse 
erroneous lower court decisions on appeal. Enforcement of ethical standards and administrative rules 
between judges and their peers.  
Year Ordinance/Act/Amendments/Proclamations and Regulations 
1884 GERMAN EMPIRE – GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
1884 Maharero’s Proclamation(King of Hereroland) 1884 
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1885 General Act of Berlin of 1885 
1886 Law for the protection areas (Schutzgebietsgesetz) dated 17.04.1886 
This made provision for the creation of courts handling cases which involved whites only. It creates a 
"dual" legal system for Germans and indigenes. The legal system in SWA is henceforth determined 
by racial differentiation. 
1887-1890  
1891 Attorney Köhler becomes the First judge in the colony* 
1892-1894  
1895 German imperial decree 
 
1896 Criminal Jurisdiction over the Natives Ordinance of the Imperial Chancellor of 1896 
Provided for the punishment and disciplinary control of blacks. The offences that were punished 
included among others laziness, negligence, vagrancy, insolence and disobedience.  Employers were 
to report to the nearest police who determine the number of lashes depending on the police’s 
assessment of the serious of the offence. 
1897-1898  
1899 Imperial Governor Ordinance of 1899 
Government Proclamation established the first self-government for "white" settlers. 
1900-1913  
1914 WORLD WAR I STARTED 
1914-1915  
1916 Constitutions of the Criminal Courts Amendment Proclamation No.3 of 1916 
A proclamation to amend Proclamation No.11 of 1915 
Constitutions of the Criminal Courts Amendment further amendment Proclamation No.5 of 
1916 
Amendment of proclamation No. 3 of 1916. 
1917  
1918 Magistrates’ Mayoral Functions Proclamation No.8 of 1918 
It makes provision for the Magistrates to exercise Mayoral functions. 
1919 Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 21 of 1919 
This proclamation introduces Roman Dutch law of Namibia. It originally contained provision of 
courts and legal practitioners. 
Act No. 49 of 1919 (to administer SWA as mandatory territory) 
This gave effect to the Mandate of South West Africa – delegated administration of the territory to 
the Governor-General of South Africa who was given both legislative and executive powers. 
1920 Rules of the Court Proclamation No.1 of 1920 
It makes provision for the Judge of the High Court of South West Africa to subject to the approval of 
the Administrator; frame Rules for the conduct of proceedings of Magistrates’ Courts within the 
Protectorate. This proclamation repeals any Rules of the Magistrates’ Courts which may be in force 
for the time being. 
Interpretation of laws Proclamation No. 37 of 1920 
This proclamation sets forth rules of interpretation for statutes.  
Administration of justice Proclamation No. 45 of 1920 
An act to amend the Administration of Justice Proclamation No.21 of 1919. 
1921 South Africa Proclamation No. 1 of 1921 
Made the provision for the Governor General of South Africa to delegate administrative power over 
the Territory to the Administrator of South West Africa (SWA). 
Government Attorney Proclamation No. 46 of 1921 
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It makes provision for the Administrator to appoint an attorney of the High Court of South West 
Africa to be Government Attorney. The government attorney shall possess the right to receive 
allowances as are customarily paid to attorneys practising in the High Court of South West Africa. 
Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 52 of 1921 
An act to amend the Administration of justice proclamation 45 of 1920. It gives the entire 
Magistrates’ Courts in the Territory the same jurisdiction. It provides for the Magistrates’ Courts to 
follow the same procedure in all matters. This proclamation makes provision for the powers of 
making regulations vested in the Governor-General to be vested in and exercised by the 
Administrator. 
1922 SOUTH AFRICAN MANDATE UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES SYSTEMS - 
TANGANYIKA 
1922 Law Society Validation of Proceedings Proclamation No.8 of 1922 
It validates and confirms the notice given by the Secretary of the Law Society of West Africa with 
regards to the proceedings of the society’s Annual General Meetings. 
1923-1924  
1925 South West Africa Constitution Act No. 42 of 1925 
Provided for the Appointment of an Administrator and the election of an all white Legislative 
Assembly and Executive Committee. Had powers to make laws and ordinances except on certain 
matters which were reserved and remained under the legislative power of the South Africa 
government90.  
 
1926 Magistrate Courts Amendment Proclamation. No. 24 of 1926 
It empowers Magistrates’ Courts to be held at any place or places within the limits of jurisdiction of 
such courts 
1927-1934  
1935 Magistrate Court Proclamation No.31 of 1935 
It repeals section 2 of the Better Administration of Justice Amendment Proclamation No. 44 of 1923 
and the Magistrates’ Court amendment Proclamation No. 24 of 1926. 
1936  
1937 Rules of Court Proclamation No. 24 of 1937(NP) 
It amends  the law relating to provision for the framing of rules of court 
1938  
1939 WORLD WAR II STARTED 
1939 Local Limits of Magisterial Districts Proclamation No.18 of 1939 
It provides for the alteration of the local limits of the districts of Bethany, Luderith, Maltahoehe, 
Rehoboth and Swakopmund 
1940-1943  
1943 Attorneys Admission Amendment Proclamation  No. 9 of 1943 
This amends proclamation No. 4 of 1936 
1944 Law Society SWA Amendment Proclamation No.34 of 1944 
It further amends proclamation No. 9 of 1943 
Magistrate Courts Act No. 32 of 1944  
1945 Law Society SWA Amendment Proclamation No. 34 of 1945 
It further amends the Law Society SWA amendment proclamation No. 34 of 1944. 
                                                             
90 The reserved matters included defence; railways and harbours, posts and telegraphs, matters pertaining to the 
courts, immigration; customs and excise; banking and currency; and native affairs.  
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1946 Attorneys, Notaries, Conveyancers etc Amendment Proclamation No.14 of 1946 
Further amendment of proclamation No. 9 of 1943 
1947  Law Society SWA Amendment Proclamation No.20 of 1947 
This further amends proclamation No. 32  of 1921 
South West Africa Constitution Amendment Proclamation  No.115  1947 
This proclamation amends Act No. 42 of 1925 
1948  
1949 Administration of Justice Amendment Proclamation No.18 of 1949 
It amends proclamation No. 21 of 1919 
1950 Attorneys, Notaries, Conveyancers etc Amendment Proclamation No.58 of 1950 
This proclamation further amends proclamation No. 32 of 1921 
1951 South West Africa Affairs Constitution Amendment Act No. 55 of 1951 
Section 4: Makes provision for the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel to be removed the jurisdiction of SWA 
High Court and to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Transvaal Provisional Division of the 
Supreme Court 
1952 General Law Amendment Act No. 32 of 1952 
Amendment of the General Law Amendment Act No.54 of 1949. It makes provision for the 
appointment of acting deputy sheriffs and acting deputy bailiffs. The appointment is subject to the 
approval of the Minister of Justice 
Magistrates Courts Amendment Act No.40 of 1952 
This amends the Magistrates’ Court Act No. of 1944.It provides that a court of a regional division 
may only be held by a magistrate of the regional division. 
1953  
1954 Magistrates Courts Amendment Act No.14 of 1954 
Amendment of the Magistrates’ Court No. of 1944.It makes provision for a Magistrate with the 
approval of the Minister to be assisted by assessors. 
1955 Appellate Division Quorum Act of 1955: 
Made provision for the S.A. President to appoint additional judges to higher courts to sit in cases 
concerning the validity of an Act of Parliament. This was also applicable to SWA/Namibia 
Interpretation of Laws Ordinance 4 of 1955 
An act to amend the  Interpretation of laws proclamation 11 of 1926 
1956 -1958  
1959 SA Supreme Court Act  No.59 of 1959 
The Chief justice, the judges of appeal and all other judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
by the Governor-General and the Great Seal of South Africa. Remuneration of judges shall be 
prescribed by Parliament and it shall not be reduced during the judges’ continuance in office. No 
judge of the Supreme Court shall without the consent of the Governor-General hold or perform any 
other office of profit. It repeals Administration of Justice Amendment proclamation No. 18 of 1949 
Judges Remuneration and Pensions Act No.73 of 1959 
This act consolidates and amends laws relating to the salaries, retirement from office and retirement 
pensions of judges of the Supreme Court of South Africa. Any person, who holds the office of a 
judge in a permanent capacity, may retire at the age of sixty-five years. It makes provision for 
monthly pensions to be paid to judges after retirement or removal from office on grounds of 
infirmity. 
1960 Administration of Justice Ordinance No. 29 of 1960 
An act to amend the Administration of justice ordinance 37 of 1939 
Prisons and Reformatories Repeal Ordinance No.31 of 1960 
An act to amend the Administration of justice ordinance 29 of 1939. It repeals section fifteen of 
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Proclamation No. 21 of 1919. 
1961 Interpretation of laws Ordinance No. 19 of 1961 
An act to amend the  Interpretation of laws proclamation 4 of 1955 
1962  
1963 Administration of Justice Ordinance No.34 of 1963 
An act to amend the Administration of justice ordinance 31 of 1960.It consolidates the laws relating 
to procedure and evidence in criminal proceedings. It gives the Attorney-general power to intervene 
in private prosecutions and the peace Officers, power to arrest without warrant.  
Justice of the Peace and Commissioners of Oath Act No.16 of 1963 
This Act covers the appointment, powers and duties of the peace and commissioners of oaths. 
1964 RSA Admission of Advocates Act No. 74 of 1964 
This Act provide for the admission of persons to practise as advocates of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa. It gives the Court power to permit attorneys to discharge functions of advocates in particular 
proceedings. This act is also applicable in South West Africa. 
1965  
1966 Administration of Justice Ordinance No.13 of 1966 
An act to amend the Administration of Justice Ordinance No. 34 of 1963. It also amends section 11 
of the Administration of justice proclamation No.21 of 1919 by the deletion of sub-section 10. 
1967  
1968 South West Africa Constitution Act No. 39 of 1968 
Replaced the SWA Constitution Act 42 of 1925 – gave powers to South Africa to make laws in 
respect of an expanded list of reserved matters. SWA Administrator powers were subject to the State 
President of South Africa – who had power to administer the territory as an integral part of the 
Republic. 
1969 South West Africa Affairs Act No. 25 of 1969 
Gave South Africa even tighter legal and administrative over South West Africa – the list of reserved 
matters grew further and further 
1970-1976  
1977 South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act No.95 of 1977 
Made provision for SA President to make laws for the territory of SWA with a view to the eventual 
attainment of independence 
RSA Proclamation R249 of 1977 
Abolished the SWA seats in the South African Parliament 
SA Proclamation Nos. 180 and 181 of 1977 
Established the office of Administer General (AG) for SWA/Namibia and empowered to make laws 
by Proclamation in the official gazette. Furthermore the AG could repeal or amend laws passed by 
the South African Parliament  
1978 Constituent Assembly and Election Proclamation AG63 of 1978 
Was given power to draw up the constitution for Independent Namibia despite International 
opposition.  
1979 National Assembly Proclamation(AG21 of 1979) 
Transformed the Constituent Assembly into a National Assembly with law making powers.  
1980-1986  
1987 Judges Remuneration Act No.18 of 1987 
To amend the Judges’ Remuneration Act of 1981, so as to increase the remuneration of the Judges of 
the Supreme Court of SWA 
 Judge President Rand 107 000 
 Judge Rand 101 500 
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1988-1989  
1990 NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE 
1990 Constitution of Namibia of 1990 
Made provision for the independence of the judiciary. Article 78, (1) (2) and (3) of the Republic of 
Namibia Constitution of 1990 provide for the establishment of the judiciary and its independence, 
consisting of the Supreme Court, a High and Lower Courts.  
Judges’ Remuneration Act No. 18 of 1990 
This Act covers remuneration, additional service benefits and motor vehicles for judges. 
Legal Aid Act No. 29 of 1990 
T his Act provides for the granting of legal Aid in civil and criminal matters to persons whose means 
are inadequate to enable them to engage  legal practitioners to assist and represent them.              
1991 Law Reform and Development Commission Act No.29 of 1991 
This act establishes a law reform and development commission. It outlines the constitution of 
commission. The Commission shall consist of a judge of the supreme court of High Court appointed 
by the president, the Attorney –General, the Ombudsman and one practising advocate appointed by 
the President after consultation with the Council of the Bar of Namibia. The period of office is four 
years. Any person, whose period of office as a member of the Commission has expires, shall be 
eligible for re-appointment. 
Attorneys Amendment Act no. 17 of 1991 
Made provision for Namibian who obtained legal qualification from universities other than South 
African’s Universities to become attorneys in Namibia. 
Admission of Advocates Amendment Act no. 19 of 1991 
Made provision for Namibian who obtained legal qualification from universities other than South 
African’s Universities to become advocates in Namibia. 
1992 Labour Act no.6 of 1992 
The Act also established the District Labour court which is the hierarchy of the lower courts. The 
composition of judges and acting judges were to be determined by the Judge President 
1993  
1994 Judges’ Remuneration  Proclamation Act  No.12 of 1994 
An act to amend the Judges’ Remuneration act No.18 of 1990. It makes provision for any judge of 
the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice who is not ordinarily resident in Namibia to be 
entitled to the costs of air travel from his place of permanent residence on as many occasions as are 
considered reasonable. Any judge who is on an official journey outside Namibia shall be entitled to 
the same subsistence allowances payable to any Minister. 
Judges’ Remuneration  Proclamation Act  No. 24  of  1994 
An act to amend the Judges’ Remuneration act No 18 of 1990 so as to increase the non-taxable 
allowance and the salary payable to judges. 
 
1995 Judicial service commission Act No. 18 of 1995 
This Act governs the operation of the judicial service commission established by articles 85 of the 
constitution. 
Legal Practitioner  Act No. 15 of 1995 
This Act governs the legal profession and legal practitioners, who were formerly known as attorneys 
and advocates. It establishers a board for legal education, a law society of Namibia and a legal 
practitioners’ Fidelity Fund. It replaces the RSA Admission of advocates act 74 of 1964,the legal 
practitioner’ Fidelity fund ordinance 28 of 1967,the RSA attorneys’ act 53 of 1979, the legal 
practitioners fidelity fund act 22 of 1990 and the admission of advocates act 19 of 1991 
Law Reform and Development Commission Act No. 4 of 1995 
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An act to amend the Law Reform and development commission 29 of 1991 so as to amend the 
constitution of the Law reform and Development Commission. It makes provision for an appointed 
member of the Commission who is not employed in the Public Service, to be entitled to 
remuneration, allowances and privileges as the Minister in consultation with the Minister of Finance 
may determine. 
1996  
1997 Legal Practitioner  Act No. 4 of 1997 
An act to amend the Legal practitioner 15 of 1995. It provides for an exception on the provision 
prohibiting an unqualified person from representing another person in court. 
1998  
1999 Judges’ Remuneration  Proclamation Act No. 2 of 1999 
An act to amend the Judges’ Remuneration act 24 of 1994 by changing the annual salary of Chief 
Justice from N$225 000to N$290 000 and that of the Judge president from N$220 000 to N$285 000.  
Legal Practitioner  Act No.6 of 1999 
It provides for temporary suspension of the provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act no. of 1995 
relating to the conferment of the status of the Senior Counsel to legal practitioners 
2000 Legal Aid Act No. 17 of 2000 
An act to amend the Legal Aid Act No.29 of 1990. It empowers the Minister to withdraw the 
appointment of any person as legal aid counsel or to limit any act or function of such counsel: to 
provide for the repeal of provision dealing with the issuing of legal aid certificates in certain 
circumstances; to provide for a refund of any amount of contribution and to provide for offences and 
penalties. 
2001  
2002 Legal Practitioner  Act  No. 10 of 2002 
An act to amend the  Legal Practitioner Act No. 15 of 1995 so as to make provision that persons who 
hold a prescribed qualification in law and who for a continuous period of at least five years 
performed  certain legal working the service of the State are duly qualified to be admitted as a legal 
practitioner. 
2003 Judges’ Remuneration  Proclamation Act No.14 of 2003 
An act to amend the Judges’ Remuneration act No.18 of 1990. It stipulates the annual salary of the 
Chief Justice to be N$377 000 and that of the Judge-President to be N$370 000. This proclamation 
was made by the President of the Republic of Namibia, S. Nujoma at the time. 
2004 Law Reform and Development Commission Act  No.2 of 2004 
An act to amend the Law Reform and development commission Act of 1991 so as to alter the 
Constitution of the Law Reform and Development Commission. It makes provision for the 
chairperson of the commission to hold office in the full-time capacity, to expand the objects of the 
Commission and to alter method of determining a quorum for meetings of the Commission. 
2005-2009  
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Appendices B: Tanzania: List of laws 
 
 A.1 Property rights Indicator: Tanzania 
This covers all legislations passed that affect the issue of immovable property with special reference to 
land rights in Tanzania. Full liberal ownership comprises of  the right to possess, the right to use, the right 
to manage, the right to capital, the rights to security, the incident of transmissibility and liability to 
execution. 
 
YEAR Ordinance/Act/Amendments/Proclamations and Regulations  
1884 *GERMAN EMPIRE – GERMAN EAST AFRICA 
Application of Customary law and signed treaties 
1885 The Imperial Charter of 27 February 1885 
Made provision for the respective acquisition in East Africa. The German Emperor promise to 
secure the African land claims from the foreign powers. In return for the promise of protection, 
the occupied land came under the sovereignty of the German Emperor.  
1886-1887  
1888 German Colonial Company Treaties 
Under the treaties with African Chiefs, as contained in the Imperial Charter of 1885, the 
Company received the right to occupy all the land which was not cultivated by the African 
Population of the Protectorate. 
1889  
1890  
1891 Land acquisition of real estates Imperial Ordinance of 1 September 1891 
According to section 1 of decree only the colonial government had the right to occupy unowned 
(herrenlos) land within the German sphere of interest in German East Africa. 
Abolished all regulations which have been applicable during the Company rule.  
1892  
1893  
1894 Imperial Ordinance of 24 July 1894 
Provision for the legal affairs of immovable properties – It required that all contracts by which 
property in real estate was acquired or leased for longer than 15 years had to be consented to by 
the Governor in charge. 
Consular Jurisdiction Act No.  of 1894 
Make provision for the establishment of land registries at local administrative authorities’ i.e. 
district officers and the military stations.  
1895 Imperial Decree regarding Creation, Acquisition and Conveyance of Land of 1895 
Declared all land in German East Africa to be un-owned Crown Land vested in the German 
Empire. The only exception was where proof of ownership could be shown either through 
documentation or in case of natives, through effective occupation. 
Section three calls for the creation of Land reserves for the African peasants within the colony.  
1896-1899  
1900 The Land Commission Ordinance  
 
1901  
1902 Imperial Ordinance of 1902 
Made provision for the introduction of land registries under the supervision of the judge of the 
district courts for all German Colonies. This was only open to white or Europeans owners to 
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register their lands.  
Section 6 of the Ordinance: issued a decree concerning the registration of coloureds (land 
owners of Arab or Indian Origin in Dar es Salaam) to be registered.  
1903 The Land Registration Ordinance of 1903 
Established a land registry system which allowed the registration of indigenous lands as long as 
they were located within the boundaries of the communities or villages. 
1904-1906  
1907 Germany Industries Tax Ordinance of 1907 
This established taxes levied on all kinds of industries in the colony. 
1908-1913  
1914 WORLD WAR I STARTED  
1914  
1915  
1916 Martial Law of 1916 
Regulations under the martial law declared that the German Ordinances, rules and circulars to 
remain force except where they were inconsistent with the future British Law. 
1917 The Enemy Property (Vesting) Proclamation No.5 of 1917 
Makes provision for all property moveable or immovable belonging to enemy subject to be 
vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property, who had power to issue temporary leases of business 
enterprises for the carrying on and maintenance of plantations or the productivity thereof.  
1918  
1919 The Peace Treaty of Versailles 1919 
Renounce German Rights over the territory 
Article 297(b): stated that the Allied and Associated Powers reserved the right, to retain and 
liquidate all property, rights and interests belonging to German nationals, or companies 
controlled by them, within the colonies. 
Article 120 and 257: made provision for the transfer of all movable and immovable properties in 
the German former colonies belong to the German Empire or State to be pass on to the 
Government exercising authority over such territories.   
Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act No. of 1919 
The amount of compensation to be amount which the properties if sold in the open market by a 
willing seller to be the amount realize.  
1920 Peace and Order Ordinance No.5 of 1920 
Made provision for most of the German Ordinances, rules and circulars to remain force except 
where they were inconsistent with the future British Law extending regulations made under the 
martial of 1916 and Peace regulations under the treaty. 
(This was repealed by Revised Edition of Laws (Repealed of Obsolete Enactments) Ordinance 
No.35 of 1928) 
The Enemy Property(Disposal) Proclamation No. 3 of 1920 
Townships Ordinance No. 10 of 1920 
Makes provision for zoning Dar es Salaam based on racial differences. This re-emphasizes the 
town division as per German division of 1891.  
1921  Registration of Documents Ordinance No.8 of 1921 
Enemy Property(Retention) Ordinance No.4 of 1921 
Declared that 44 plots situated in the city of Dar es Salaam owned by Germans or Germans 
companies to be retained and vested in the Governor as part of public land. 
German Property(Liquidation) Ordinance No.42 of 1921 
Establishes a German liquidation fund to credit by proceeds of the sale of land previously owned 
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by the Germans. 
1922 BRITISH MANDATE UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES SYSTEMS - 
TANGANYIKA 
1922 Enemy Property(Retention) Amendment Ordinance No.5 of 1922 
Amends the Enemy Property (Retention) Ordinance No.4 of 1921, by adding another some 60 
farms and plots situated all over Tanganyika. 
German Missions Ordinance No.21 of 1922 
Provided for the transfer of all German mission property in the territory to the Custodian of 
Enemy Property. 
German Property(Liquidation) Amendment Ordinance No.37  of 1922 
Amends German Property(Liquidation) Ordinance No.42 of 1921 
Deceased Natives Estates Ordinance No. 21 of 1922 
Allowed estates of natives to be administered in the customs of their tribes and not by common 
law. Also allowed administration using Mohammedan Law for the Swahili. Section 4 and 5. 
Administration (Small Estates) Ordinance Cap 30 of 1922 
1923 Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance – No.2 of 1923 
Applied the English law of Property and Convenyancing to the Territory. In case of 
inconsistency application with 62the Indian Act provision, the Indian Act provision pre62vailed.  
Section 11 (1) and (2) – Natives could dispose land to non-natives but only if such disposition is 
in writing and approved by the Governor. 
Land Ordinance No.3 of 1923(M) 
Declared all land in the territory except the freeholds acquired before the passage of that law as 
being public land.  All rights of the Public land were place in under the Governor of territory. It 
abrogated the German Law concerning the granting of public lands.  
Introduced the right of occupancy system in Tanganyika 
Land Registry Ordinance No.15 of 1923  
Authorized the conversion into freehold – all ownership held dating back from German times 
whether it was through registration or land held under grants. 
Enemy Property(Retention) Amendment Ordinance No.26 of 1923 
Amends the Enemy Property(Retention) Ordinance No.4 of 1921 
Ex-enemy(Land Holding) Ordinance No.20 of 1923 
Requires the ex-enemies to hold licenses from the Governor in order to hold land. 
The Asiatics (Marriage, Divorce and Succession) Ordinance No.12 of 1923 
Declared the law applicable in the matters to be determined by the religion of the parties. 
1924  
1925 Land Registry (Amendment) Ordinance No.2 of 1925 
Amended the Land registry No.15 of 1923, by allowing the Africans/natives to apply for the 
registration of land.  
Ex-enemy(Land Holding) Repeal of Restrictions Ordinance No.7 of 1925 
1926 Land Acquisition Ordinance No. 13 of 1926(M) 
Empower the Governor to acquire land for public purposes and no compensation is offered in 
respect of unoccupied land. 
Land Regulations No. 8 of 1926 
 Regulate the transfer, mortgage, lease and sub-lease of a right of occupancy  
 The provision is not applicable to transfers between natives and sub-leases of right of 
occupancy granted by the Custodian of Enemy Property. 
 20 members representative from the White and Asian Communities appointed by the 
Governor 
Native Authorities Ordinance No.18 of 1926 
The traditional land allocation authorities (chiefs) were replaced by the creation of the Native 
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Authorities who regulated land use through a system of by laws and enforced cultivation 
regulations. 
1927 Land (Perpetual Succession) Ordinance No.7 of 1927 
Provided for perpetual succession to land for corporate bodies. 
Land (Pastoral Purposes) Regulations No.90 of 1927 
Provides for the improvements to the value of 5 shillings per acre in the five years of the term. 
50% of the improvements must be in livestock. 
1928 Land (Amendment) Ordinance No.7 of 1928 
Amend the definition of right of occupancy by including the titles of native (formalized the 
customary land rights). A right of occupancy is defined as a right to use and occupy land.  
Coffee Industry(Registration and Improvement) Ordinance 
Provides for the registration of native coffee plantations in the Northern provinces of the 
territory. 
Native Authority Ordinance No.7 of 1928 
Title of a native lawfully in accordance with native law and custom 
1929 Enemy Property(Divesting) Ordinance No.12 of 1929 
Divested all rights, titles and interest in land which claims was not establish to the Governor – 
land to deemed public lands. 
The Disposal of Enemy Property (Validation) Ordinance No.2 of 1929 
Religious and Charitable Societies(Disposal of Land) Ordinance No. 14 of 1929 
Regulated the disposal of land held by such societies by requiring them to transfer their freehold 
or leasehold interest through public action.  
1930 Land(Amendment) Ordinance no.17 of 1930 
An ordinance to amend the land ordinance of 1923 – it allows for the Governor without an 
auction – to grant a right of occupancy to for charitable or religious organization – as well as for 
production of cotton.  
1931 Land Regulations No.168 of 1931 
Every right of occupancy of land shall not erect, fix, place or use upon such land or permit to be 
erected any building without first obtaining the consent in writing of the administrative officer in 
charge of the district. 
This was not applicable to land within the township. 
Land Acquisition Amendment Ordinance No. 54 of 1931 
Makes provision for companies to acquire land for works of public utility.  
German Missions, Societies and Associations (Revesting) Ordinance No.40 of 1931 
Provides for re-transfer of property to the original owner, i.e. The German Mission. 
1932 Land Regulations No.33 of 1932 
Makes a provision for the Governor to acquire portion of land as may be required in connection 
with railway works, on payment of the occupier of compensation to the value, at the date of 
resumption. 
1933 General Government Notice No. 936 of 1933 
Leases with an option to buy issued by German administration, were no further to be extended 
after 31 December 1936.  
1934 Land(Maintenance of Boundaries)Regulations No.113 of 1934 
Provides for the maintenance and repair of any boundary mark made or erected by or under the 
direction of any Government Department. 
1935 General Government Notice No. 198 of 1935 
Dealt with leases with an option to buy issued during the German Administration requiring 
holders to acquire the freehold or allow the lease to expire thereby vacating the land. 
Land Ordinance (Amendment) No.5 of 1935 
Made provisions that all rights of occupancy to be deemed and duly executable – should be 
signed by the Director of Lands and sealed with the official seal.  
1936 General Government Notice No. 265 of 1936 
Leases with an option to buy issued by German administration, were terminated. Transferred 
either in public lands, freehold land or into rights of occupancy. 
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Town Development(Control) Ordinance of 1936 
1937 Religious and Charitable Societies(Disposal of Land) Regulations No. 57 of 1937 
In line with Ordinance of 1929, calls for the advertisement in more one local newspaper  a month 
before, the place, date and hour on any intend public auction of any freehold or leasehold interest 
in land held by the societies referred to in the Ordinance.  
Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) Ordinance No.26 of 1937 
Makes provision for the establishment of a Native coffee Board, which had powers to give 
directions as to the method of sowing, planting, cultivation harvesting or preparation of native 
coffee. 
Land Acquisition Amendment Ordinance No. 5 of 1937 
1938  
1939 Land Registry Regulations No.91 of 1939 
Provision for registrar of titles 
1940 Game Ordinance Cap 159 of 1940 
Repealed the Ordinance of 1921 and in it Customary Rights of ownership in areas reserved for 
game reservation were recognized. 
Native Tobacco(Control and Marketing) Ordinance NO.39 of 11940 
Makes provision for the establishment of a Native Tobacco Board, which had powers to give 
directions as to the method of sowing, planting, cultivation harvesting or preparation of native 
tobacco.  
1941 Land (Rent and Mortgage Interest Restriction) Ordinance No.26 of 1941 
The Ordinance restricted increases in rent and mortgage in certain cases, especially in subletting 
of land.  
Tobacco(Non-Native Industry ) Ordinance NO.17 of  1941 
Makes provision for the establishment of a Non-native Tobacco Board, which had power to make 
regulations relating to tobacco production.  
1942  
1943 Land Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance No. 21 of 1943 
It extended the definition of public purposes for which land may be acquired to include the 
laying out of new township, minor settlement or Government station. 
Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Ordinance No.7 of 1943 
Provided for certain dispositions of land between non-natives to be invalid without the consent of 
the Governor. 
Asiatic (Marriage, Divorce and Succession) Construction Ordinance No.2 of 1943 
Deals with succession act 
1944 Township (Building) Rules No.201 of 1944 
Makes provision for submission of a plan of envisaged buildings, therefore restricting the 
building of traditional huts in urban or township areas.  
1945  
1946 TRUST TERRITORY ADMINISTERED BY THE UK - TANGANYIKA 
1946 Trusteeship Agreement of 1946 
Article (8) of the agreement makes provision for respect and protection of natives customary land 
rights. 
1947 Land Registry Ordinance of 1947 
Ordinance No.44 of 1947 
Deals with succession act 
1948 Land Regulations –First schedule No. 232 of 1948 
Makes provision for the land users to use land specifically for the aim on which the state grant a 
plot. E.g. Agricultural for cultivation only, while occupier of pastoral land is required to stock 
National Parks Ordinance, Cap 253 of 1948 
It separated National Parks from that of Game Reserves. However it did not fundamentally effect 
the Customary Rights of land enjoyed by individuals living in National Parks as under S.11 
German Property(Disposal) Ordinance No. 24 of 1948 
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1949 German  Mission Property(Disposal) Ordinance No. 48 of 1949 
African Agricultural Products(Control and Marketing)Ordinance No.57 of 1949 
Makes provision for the establishment of a African Agricultural Products Board, which had 
powers to give directions as to the method of sowing, planting, cultivation harvesting or 
preparation of agricultural products.   
Land Registry (Amendment) No.24 of 1949 
1950 Land Amendment Ordinance No.5 of 1950 
Minor Settlements (Amendment) No.6 of 1950 
1951 Fauna Preservation Ordinance Cap.302 of 1951 
 This was an Act to make further and better provisions for the conservation and control of 
wildlife. It repealed the Game Ordinance of 1940 and under Section 6 (c) also bestowed same 
interests in land for the customary occupiers of rights in those lands.  
Native Authority Land Usage(Morogoro) Rules of 1951 
1952  
1953 Land Registration Ordinance  No.36 of 1953 
 Repealed and replace the earlier Ordinance 
 All grants of public land whether freehold or under a certificate of occupancy made 
after the coming into force of the Ordinance must be registered. 
 German titles of absolute ownership or known wakf is to be deemed to be freehold.  
The Ngorongoro Conservation Area Ordinance Cap 413 of 1953 
This Act was enacted to create a multiple land use strategy to be adopted in the area in order to 
protect the wildlife and the rights of occupancy (nomadic) of the pastoral community of the 
Maasai.  
The Township (Building) rules Cap 101 of 1953 
1954 Enemy Property(Final Disposal Ordinance No. 53 of 1954 
Land Registration Ordinance Cap 334 of 1954 
Land Registration Rules of 1954 
1955 Ordinance No.43 of 1955 
Deals with the registration of documents Act 
1956 Town and Country Planning Ordinance Cap 378 of 1956 
Empowered the state to acquire land for public interest and town planning purposes from its 
owners compulsorily. 
Registration of documents Rules of 1956 
Ordinance No. 42 of 1956 
*Government Paper No.2 of 1956 
This facilitated the acquisition of all customary interest in land. It was the beginning of the 
erosion of the customary rights of occupancy in National Parks.  
1957  
1958 Land Registration Ordinance  No.26 of 1958 
Any person, who claims to be entitled to a registrable estate in any unregistered land, whether 
beneficially or as a trustee, may apply to the Registrar in the prescribed manner for first 
registration of his estate. Any dismissed applications by the Registrar are not allowed by the 
same person or same estate on the same land in the future.  
1959 National Parks Ordinance Cap 253 of 1959 
It took away all proprietary rights in all areas declared to be National Parks. Customary land 
rights were formally extinguished subject to compensation to the holders of the rights. 
The Land Survey (General)Regulations of 1959 
Land Registration Ordinance  No.3 of 1959 
1960 Land Registration Ordinance  No.13 of 1960 
Deals with mortgagees by companies and cooperative societies that they should be registered in 
accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act and Co-operative Societies Act 
respectively. 
Registrable estates  Ordinance  No.22 of 1960 
Defines registrable estates as a freehold estate or a lease or any estate which by the provision of 
Act deemed to freehold or leasehold. It recognizes the hereditary right of construction granted 
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under German Law, the wakf under Muslim Law etc.). 
1961 FULL INDEPENDENCE - TANGANYIKA 
1961 Town and Country Planning(Amendment) Ordinance No.14 of  1961 
Makes provision for the holder of land with right of occupancy to seek planning consent from 
relevant authority before undertaking any development of such land in urban areas. Minster can 
declare any area to be planning area in consultation with the local government authority. 
Land Registration Ordinance  No.35 of 1961 
Law of Contract Ordinance of 1961 (No.1 of 1961) 
1962 National Housing Corporation Act No.45 of 1962 
An Act to establish a National Housing Corporation for the purpose of facilitating the Provision 
of Houses and  
other buildings in Tanganyika by means of Financial Assistance and otherwise and for matters 
incidental thereto and connected therewith 
1963 Freehold Titles(Conversion) and Government Leases Act No. 24 of 1963 
All freeholds that had been granted by the German Administration and upheld by the British 
Administration were converted into government leases for a period of 99 years 
The Land (Settlement of Disputes) Act, 1963 (Act No. 25/1963) 
If there is a claim of dispute – and the Minister of land is satisfied that the dispute exists he can 
call for land a disputed land. 
Appoint a Commissioner to inquires on the causes and circumstances and report to Minister 
responsible of land for actions (3 stipulated action can be taken) 
1964 FORMATION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
1964 Urban Holdings Act 48 of 1964 
Makes provision for the Minister to declare urban area or any part of it to be ripe for 
development and annex it and such obtain right of occupancy over the same land for the 
unexpired term of the Government lease.  
Range Development Act No. 51 of 1964 
 Dealt with the provision for the conservation, development and improvement of grazing land. 
The objective was to cater and combat an increased land shortage and land tenure insecurity.  
Act 38 of 1964 
Dealing with land registrations 
1965 The Nyarubanja Enfranchisement Act  No.1 of 1965  
Government leaseholds 99 yrs rights of occupancy 
Enfranchised the Nyarubanja tenants in the parts of Tanganyika where the system existed 
especially in the Kagera region. 
Feudal kind of land holding – whereby one person or institution owned a large tract of land 
(called the Nyarubanja) on which were tenants or fiefs.  
The Public Land (Preserved Areas) Ordinance (Amendment) Act No.28 of 1965  
An Act to amend the Public Land (Preserved Areas) Ordinance. Provides for the compensation in 
cases the Minister  proposes a grant to the Rural Settlement Commission a right of occupancy, 
the holder of the preserved area will be offered compensation if he/she is not a beneficiary of the 
settlement right.  
The Land Tenure (Village Settlements) Act No.27 of  1965  
An Act to regulate the Tenure of Land in Village Settlements and for connected matters. Grants 
settlement rights free of premium or rent. The Commission provides the rules of cultivation and 
development of the land. Settlement rights can be transferred to others upon death.  
The Land Acquisition Ordinance (Amendment) Act No.3 of 1965  
An Act to extend and to amend the Land Acquisition Ordinance. 
The Land Acquisition Ordinance (Amendment) (No. 2) Act No.48 of 1965  
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An Act to amend the Land Acquisition Ordinance 
1966 The Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Re-grant) Act No. 8 of  1966 
An Act to make provision for the acquisition of certain farmlands in the occupation of persons 
other than their owner and for the re-grant of lands so acquired. Granted leases to tenants of land 
belonging to the absentee owners. 
The Land Transfer (Specified Corporations) Act No.20 of 1966 
An Act to provide for the Exemption of Specified Corporations from certain provisions of the 
Land Ordinance and  Regulations and the Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance 
relating to consent for the disposition of Land 
The Land Ordinance (Amendment) Act No.21 of 1966 
Restricts any alterations or development during the last 5 years before the elapses of any rights of 
occupancy to the land and buildings. If the rights of occupancy is 30 years (the restrictions is 10 
years). 
The Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Re-grant) (Amendment) Act No.53 of  1966  
An Act to amend the Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Re-grant) Act, 1965 
The Rural Farmlands (Acquisition Re-grant) (Amendment) Act No.30 of 1966 
An Act to amend the Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Re-grant) Act, 1965 
Registration of documents Rules of 1966 (Amendment to 1956) 
The Land Acquisition Ordinance (Amendment) Act No. 54 of 1966  
An Act to amend the Land Acquisition Ordinance 
1967 The Land Acquisition, Act  No.47 of 1967 
An Act to repeal and replace the Land Acquisition Ordinance, & to provide for compulsory 
acquisition of lands public purposes and in connection with housing schemes 
Arusha Declaration of 1967 
Main features: Placing all major means of production and exchange in the hands of the public. 
Massive nationalisations of private investments – both local and foreign. 
1968 Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act No.47 of 1968 
Abolish all types of feudal land holding in the country. Customary Land Tribunal was then 
formed. The duty of the tribunal is to ascertain the landlords and tenants in each such customary 
case. 
Urban Leaseholds (Acquisition and Re-grant) Act No.22 of 1968 
An Act to make provision for the acquisition of certain urban lands in the occupation of persons 
other than their owner and for the re-grant of lands so acquired. Granted leases to tenants of land 
belonging to the absentee owners. 
The Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Re-grant) (Amendment) Act No.26 of 1968  
An Act to amend the Rural Farmlands (Acquisition and Re-grant) Act, 1966 
Provided for the acquisition of other farms (maize, sugar, rice, etc.), the land titles of which were 
held by foreigners but which were run by local persons or societies who were accordingly 
enfranchised and given the de facto and de jure right to occupy the lands. 
The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act No.25 of 1968 
An Act to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 1967, deal with grammar errors – nothing of 
substance.  
1969 Government Leaseholds (Conversions Right of Occupation )Act  No.44 of 1969 
All the existing leasehold rights were extinguished and converted into rights of occupancy for a 
term "equal to the unexpired term of the government lease for 99 years. 
Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act No.43 of 1969 
Makes provision for the application of this law to Kagera region, and any other regions as might 
be announced. It extinguished all landlords’ rights with no compensation.  
1970 The Land Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No.28 of  1970 
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An Act to amend the Land Ordinance and the Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) 
Ordinance. The President might direct a no compensation if rights of occupancy on non-
ordinarily resident of the Republic of Tanzania is revoked.  
Act 4 of 1970 
Government Regulations No.85 of 1970 
Deals with Government leasehold Act of 1963 
1971 The Succession(Non-Christian Asiatic) Ordinance No.5 of 1971 
The succession to the movable property of a deceased non-Christian Asiatic shall be regulated by 
the law of the religion professed by that Non-Christian Asiatic at death, provided the creditors 
has the same rights as in case of estate of a deceased Christian.  
Acquisition of Buildings Act No.15 of 1971 
Act 10 of 1971 
Dealing with Land registration 
1972  
1973 The Rural Farm Lands (Planning and Utilization) Act No.14 of  1973 
Makes provision for the Government to seize land and declare it as a specified planning area for 
use as deemed appropriate. An Act to empower the Government to control and regulate 
Utilization of Land  & Enabled the Operation Vijiji -Rural population to live in villages before 
1976 
Coffee Estates (Acquisition and Re-grant) Act No. XX of 1973  
Granted leases to tenants of Coffee estate belonging to the absentee owners. 
1974 Sisal Estates (Acquisition and Re-grant) Act No. XXX of 1974 
Granted leases to tenants of Sisal estates belonging to the absentee owners. 
The Land (Rent and Service Charge) Act No. 19 of 1974  
An Act to provide for the levying and collection of Rent and Service Charge in respect of lands 
held under Rights of Occupancy  
The Land Ordinance (Amendment) Act No.10 of 1974  
An Act to amend the Land Ordinance, with regard to the compensation where the right of 
occupancy has been revoked, the Minister responsible for Finance will determine the 
compensation if deemed necessary.  
Wildlife Conservations Act No.12 of 1974 
Repealed and replace the Fauna Conservation Ordinance, but also maintained the co-existence of 
the rights of occupancy. However it restricted the rights to only residential rights and prohibited 
hunting rights to specific permits granted the specified authorities.  
1975 Ujamaa Villages (Registry, Design and Administration) Act No. 21 of 1975 
Makes provision for the planning areas lands to be granted to the villages and ujamaa villages to 
be developed cooperatively and communally 
1976  
1977 Constitution Act 
 Constitution came into force on   April 25, 1977 and established one-party state 
Tanzanian Investment Act 
Provision on land ownership with regard to foreign companies and association in line with 
investment 
1978 Government Regulations No. 68 of 1978 
Deals with Town and country planning 
1979 The Mining Act No.17 of  1979  
An Act to make provision with respect to searching for and mining minerals and  
For purposes incidental to or connected with searching for or mining minerals. 
1980  
1981 Disposition of Land Act 12 of 1981 
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No disposition shall be registered there is furnished to Registrar a certificate in writing by the 
Commissioner for Lands signifying his approval to the disposition. 
1982 Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. XX  of 1982 
It empowers village governments to design approved by-laws in accordance with their position as 
land managers 
Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. XX of 1982 
1983 The Urban Authority (Rating) Act of  1983  
Tanzanian Agricultural Policy Act No. XXX of 1983 
1984 Bill of Rights Constitution, vide Act No. 16 of 1984 (M) 
Article 24 of the Constitution – Makes provision for the Right to possess a Property and get 
protection for the property acquired in accordance with the law.  
The National Land Use Planning Commission Act No.3 of 1984 
An Act to provide for the establishment of the National Land Use Planning Commission,  
to provide for its functions and for other matters related to and incidental to the establishment of 
the mission 
Village titling Programme 
Rent restriction Act, No.14 of 1984 
Establish the tribunal that determines the increases of rent to be charged and it applies to all 
dwelling houses and commercial premises. 
1985 Government Regulations No.433 of 1985 
Deals with rent restrictions 
1986 Act 10 of 1986 
Deals with rent restrictions 
1987-1988  
1989 Act 10 of 1989 
Deals with rent restrictions 
1990 National Housing Corporation Act No.5 of  1990 
The regional Housing Tribunal Regulation Act No. XX of 1990 
**Presidential Inquiry into Land Issues 
1991 **Appointment of Land Commission 
1992 The Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages)Act No.22 of 1992 
An Act to regulate land tenure in villages established pursuant to Operation Vijiji to provide for 
the settlement of land disputes and for connected purposes. Customary tenure was abolished in 
Ujamaa Village/Operation Vijiji areas with no compensation offered.  
Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act No.19 of 1992 
1993-1994  
1995 National Land Policy   -published in June of 1995 
The objectives were to safeguard the security of tenure for smallholders and pastoralist, 
maximize the efficiency of land use among others.  
1996-1998  
1999 The Land Act No.4 of 1999 
An Act to provide for the basic law in relation to land other than the village land, the 
management of land, settlement of disputes and for connected purposes.  
Repelled the Land Ordinance of 1923 Plus 10 existing laws 
Amend six others 
The Village Act No. 5 of  1999 
An Act to provide for the management and administration of land in villages and for more related 
matters. 
Provides for the customary land rights  - Customary Right Occupancy (without time limit) 
2000  
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2001 Government Regulation No. 485 of 2001 
Deals with the Land Act 4 of 1999 
2002 Courts(Land Dispute settlements) Act  No. 2 of 2002 
An act to provide for the establishment of land dispute settlement machinery and for matters 
incidental thereto. 
Repeal the Nyarubanja Tenure (Enfranchisement) Act No.1 of 1965. 
Forest Act of 2002 
Enables villages to declare their village forest reserves on land within the village area. 
2003  
2004 The Land (Amendment) Act No. 2 of  2004 
Amends the section of 19 Land Act of 1999, by allowing non-citizens obtain rights of occupancy 
for the purpose of investment as approved under the Tanzania Investment Act of 1997. 
2005-2009  
 
A.2 Political Rights and Civil liberties Indicator 
This includes all relevant legislation passed during the year under consideration – Constitution /Act/Bills 
that comprises of the following rights:  
 Voting Rights / Franchise  
 Freedom of Association   
 Freedom of Assembly  
 Freedom of Expression  
 Extension of Arbitrary Executive Power  
 Freedom of Movement  
 Independence of the judiciary and Legislature  
 Academic Freedom  
 Government Secrecy/ indemnity  
 Due process of law  
 Religious Freedom  
 others  
Table B. 2 Lists of Laws  
Year Ordinance/Act/Amendments/Proclamations and Regulations 
1884-1885  
1885  
1886 Protectorate Law of 1886 
Stated that the Kaiser exercises protective power over the German Citizens in the German 
Protectorate in the name of empire. It also rule that the private law applicable to non-natives was to 
be imperial law as enforced in consular courts. 
The Law applied to natives could also be defined by the Kaiser. 
1887 Protectorate Law (Amendments) of 1887 
1888 Protectorate Law (Amendments) of 1888 
1889-1894  
1895 German imperial decree 
1896 Native Jurisdiction Order of 1896 
Provided for the punishment and disciplinary control of blacks. The offences that were punished 
included among others laziness, negligence, vagrancy, insolence and disobedience.  Employers 
were to report to the nearest police who determine the number of lashes depending on the police’s 
assessment of the serious of the offence. 
1897-1899  
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1900 Schutzgebietsgesets September of 1900 
Amended the Protectorate Law 
1901  
1902  
1903 Governor’s Council Ordinance of 1903 
Provision for the establishment of an advisory body consisting of white unofficial members 
nominated by the Governor to advice on matters of interest such the budget, proposed ordinances 
etc. 
1904 Germany Tanganyika Memorandum of 1904-1905 
Recommended on the review of the corporal punishment orders. It reported an average of 4783 
floggings a year ordered by courts in the colony. 
1905-1907  
1908 Civil Procedure Code 1908 
Specified ways and procedures of conducting civil cases. 
1909 Labour and Recruiting Ordinances of 1909 
Establish a standard contract with a maximum contract period of seven months or 180 working 
days. 
1910  
1911 District Councils Ordinance of 1911 
1912  
1913 Labour and Recruiting Ordinances of 1913 
1914 WORLD WAR I STARTED 
1914-1917  
1918 Whipping Regulation dated 5th October 1918 
Provided corporal punishment to offenders up to 12 strokes, and exceeding that to be approved by 
the lower courts. 
1919 Criminal Procedure Code of India 
This featured civil and economic rights, together the procedures in enforcing the same in the 
colony as it were in India. Under this code, the charge against the accused was not framed by the 
police until the magistrate had heard all the evidence for the prosecution.  
1920 British Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 – came into force 
Define the territory boundaries, established the Office of the Governor and Commander in Chief 
Established an Executive Council – composition according to Government Notice No.100 of 1920 
The Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 (c.63 28_and _29 Vict) 
1921 Deportation Ordinance of 1921- CAP 38 
This authorises the Governor to deport a person from one point to another within the country, it the 
Governor is satisfied that the particular person is a threat to peace and good order of Tanganyika. It 
makes provision for the deportee to be held in custody while he waits for the deportation 
formalities to be finalizes. 
Amended by Act No.3 of 1991 
Collective Punishment Ordinance No.24 of 1921 
An ordinance to make provision for collective punishment for certain offences – i.e at villages, 
district members, tribal members or community members. 
Repealed by the written laws Amendment Act No.32 of 1994 
The Marriage Ordinance No.12 of 1921 
 An Ordinance to solemnization of marriages in the Tanganyika Territory. Repealed by the Law of 
Marriages Act No.5 of 1971 
1922 BRITISH MANDATE UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES SYSTEMS - 
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TANGANYIKA 
1922 Official Secrets Ordinance NO.10 of 1922 
This termed all government communications and documents confidential under His Majesty’s 
orders, and any person who tried to obtain such as found guilty of a spying offence under the Act. 
Witchcraft Ordinance No.39 of 1922 
Provide for the punishment of persons practising or making use of so called Witchcraft. Penalty on 
convictions not exceeding 20 pounds ; or imprisonment not exceeding two years. 
Hut and Poll Tact Act of 1922 
Catered for the mandatory payment of tax for each household and adult members of the society. 
This made sure that all able members found work on plantations so as to pay tax.  
**Formation of the Tanganyika Territory Civil Servants Association  
1923 Destitute Persons Ordinance No.1 of 1923 
Makes for the control any person without employment through imprisonment for a period of one 
month with a view of work to be found for him. Or deported to his original place of residence. 
Master and Native Servants Ordinance No.32 of 1923 
Regulate the relations between employers and native servants, and to the engagement of natives. 
Repealed by the Employment Ordinance CAP 366 
Intoxicating Liquor Ordinance No. 24 of 1923 
Made it an offence to supply intoxicating liquor to natives. Prohibited even the employment of 
natives in intoxicating liquors business. 
Native Christian(Divorce) Ordinance No.17 of 1923 
Marriage Divorce and Succession (Non-Christian Asiatic)Ordinance, No.12 of 1923 
To be guided by the religion and customs of the person divorced. 
Repealed by the divorce Ordinance No.8 of 1929 
1924  
1925 Whipping Ordinance No.3 of 1925 
The Governor to direct instrument and the no. of whipping. If strokes exceed 12 only the High 
Court can order so. 
Repealed by Act No.14 of 1930 
1926 Master and Native Servants Ordinance No.11 of 1926 
Legislative Council was established 
20 members representative from the White and Asian Communities appointed by the Governor 
1927 African Education Ordinance No.11 of 1927 
Enacted to assist in the education of Africans and provided for the establishment of government 
school by the Director of Education. 
1928 Masters and Native Servants Ordinance No. 24 of 1928 
Makes provision for the licensing of labour agents. All natives are subjected to medical 
examination, if contemplating work exceeding 60days period. Power is also given to employers to 
impose small fines on their employees for offences against sanitary rules.  
Witchcraft Ordinance No.33 of 1928 
The penalty on conviction is increased to imprisonment not exceeding 7 seven years or fine not 
exceeding four thousand shillings or to both. 
Repealed the Ordinance No.39 of 1922 
1929 Divorce Ordinance No.8 of 1929 
It provided for jurisdiction to Courts in Matrimonial causes. 
Repealed the Native Christian (Divorce) Ordinance No.17 of 1923 & Marriage Divorce and 
Succession (Non-Christian Asiatic) Ordinance, No.12 of 1923. 
1930 Criminal Procedure Code Ordinance No.12 of 1930 
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Amended the Criminal procedure Code of India as it was applied to the territory. This made 
provision for accused to give evidence on his own behalf. Further it provide for police upon the 
arrest of accused to frame charges.  
Corporal Punishment Ordinance No.14 of 1930 
The Penal Code Ordinance No.11 of 1930 
1931 Masters and Native Servants(Amendment) Ordinance No.35 of 1931 
Makes provision for compensation for injuries and also made it an offence for an employer to 
engage or continue to employ labour without a reasonable prospect of paying wages when due. 
1932 Official Oaths Ordinance, Cap 44 of 1932 
This established the orders of confidentiality and secrecy of government works and proceedings. 
No transparency was allowed and divulging any information on such communication was an 
offence against the territory. 
Trade Union Ordinance No. 23 of 1932 
Established the framework and regulation of the relationship between workers and masters and also 
imposed restrictions conditions on the conducts of trade unions including the benefits of members.  
It also declared that trade unions were neither criminal nor were they unlawful for all purposes.  
Corporal Punishment(Amendment) Ordinance No.23 of 1932 
1933 Police Ordinance No.23 of 1933 
Segregated punishments orders to officers due to their race and origin. Native officers faced 
maximum punishment of dismissal, forfeiture of all due payments and rights whereas European 
officers only got maximum punishment of forfeiting their monthly pay and severe reprimand for 
similar offences. See section 39. 
Prisons Ordinance No.24 of 1933 
1934  
1935 Identification Ordinance No.13 of 1935 
1936 Criminal Procedures Code(Amendment) No.11 of 1936 
It made sure that the charges and evidence obtained before the court were read in the language of 
the accused in order to facilitate justice and ensure due process of the law.  
 Penal Code (Amendment) No.10 of 1936  
Introduced provision to confer punishment for the violation of rights to life etc. wrongs such as 
indecent assault of boys under fourteen, indecent practices between males and child destruction 
were created.  
Proclamation No.3 of 1936 
This prohibited any importation of a book and newspapers published in England titles “The 
Tragedy of White man Injustice and the Black man”. 
1937 Children and Youth Persons Ordinance No. 3 of 1937 
Established juvenile courts to try cases involving children (under 12 years) and young persons 
(under 16). Also these courts could try all cases except those of homicide nature. 
1938 Police Amendment Ordinance No.16 of 1938 
Section3: made sure that in case of corporal punishment it was only to be administered in the 
presence of a commissioned officer or the officer in charge of the police. 
Provided that the disposal of unclaimed property by the police should be done after six months 
from the day it was found. 
Employment of women Ordinance No.14 of 1938 
Enabled the employment of women of age above fourteen into manual work i.e industrial 
undertakings. It excluded women in managerial positions not allowed to be employed in night shift.  
1939 WORLD WAR II STARTED 
1939 The Penal Code (Amendment) Ordinance No. 24 of 1939 
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Section 48 and 49 therein gave the Governor power to prohibit the importation of any publication 
in his discretion if he was of the opinion that such publication was contrary to public interest. 
1940 Compulsory Military and Other Service Ordinance No.23 of 1940 
Subject every male between the age of 18 – age 45 to be enrolled for military service or to be 
required to do any work or render any personal service which the Governor may think necessary or 
expedient to order for the purpose of securing the Public safety. 
Employment of Women and Young Ordinance of 1940 
1941 Master and Native Servant (Amendment) Ordinance No.29 of 1941 
Makes provision for penalty for procuring breach of contract by servants – penalty for leaving 
services is a fine not exceeding 50 shillings or imprisonment for three months. 
1942 Master and Native Servants (Written Contracts) Ordinance No.28 of 1942 
To regulate contracts of employment of native servants 
Repealed by Employment Ordinance 366 
1943 Master and Native Servant (Amendment) Ordinance No.20 of 1943 
Employment of Women and Young Persons(Amendment) Ordinance No.4 of 1943 
Prohibits  the employment of children under twelve years of age 
1944 Townships(Removal of undesirable Persons)Ordinance of 1944 – CAP 104 
Still applicable by 1991 
1945 Penal Code Ordinance No. 21 of 1945 
This Ordinance establishes a code of criminal law. 
Section 176 provides vagrancy a penal offence, any persons shall be deemed to be idle and 
disorderly persons as defined in the section. (Prostitution, begging, playing games of chance of 
winning money etc.). 
It makes provision for the formation of the Legislative Council (2 then 4 Africans3 Asian and 4 
European Reps). 
1946 TRUST TERRITORY ADMINISTERED BY THE UK - TANGANYIKA 
1946 Master and Native Servants (Recruitment) Ordinance of 1946 
Makes provision for the regulation and control of recruitment of native servants. 
1947 The Township(Compulsory Education) Rules No. of 1947 
Makes provision for natives under the age of 16 years, to attend school under directions of the 
headmaster regularly.  
The African Education(Registration of Schools and Teaches) Amendment Regulation No. of 
1947 
Empowers the Director of Education to issue a Grade II Teacher’s Certificate to a licensed teacher 
or an African Women Teacher’s who had proven proficiency and ability to teach the full 
Government course. 
1948  
1949 Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance No.41 of 1949 
This provides for compensation to workers for injuries suffered in the course of their employment. 
1950 The Factories Ordinance Cap 297 of 1950 
The occupier of every factory must hold a certificate of registration issued by the Chief Inspector 
of Factories. 
1951-1952  
1953 Police Force Ordinance of 1953 
1954 Societies Ordinance of 1954 
Section 7 of the ordinance requires that all local societies operating in Tanzania must apply to the 
Registrar for registration who has the power to determine whether the local society is in the opinion 
of the Registrar desirable or not.  
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The Penal Code 
1955 The National Assembly(Powers and Privileges) Ordinance Cap359 of 1955 
Defines and ensures on traditional lines, the privileges immunities and powers necessary for the 
proper functioning of the Assembly. 
Legislative Council was reformed 
10 Reps from each group were chosen – improved representation by the black natives. 
1956 Trustees Incorporation Ordinance of 1956 ;Cap 376 
1957 Employment Ordinance Cap.366 of 1957 
An act to consolidate the law relating to labour and regulate conditions of employment for 
employers and employees. Repeal all laws related to Master and Servants. 
1958  
1959 Territorial Election Ordinance 
Made provision for black Africans to cast their votes 
Council of Ministers (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance Cap 415 of 1959 
Legal provision was made for the allocation among individual Ministers responsibility, permanent 
or temporary for various topics and the delegation by Ministers of their statutory powers.  
1960 Employment Ordinance No. 10 of 1960 
This makes provision for the establishment of the Labour Advisory Board whose responsibility is 
to advise the Minister on any matter affecting employment. 
1961  FULL INDEPENDENCE - TANGANYIKA 
1961 Independence Constitution of Tanzania of 1961  
Provision for Multi-party democracy : 7 Political Parties registered for election on the main 
Tanganyika 
Education Ordinance No.37 of 1961 
Makes provision for a single system of education in the Territory – repealed discrimination laws in 
the provision of education. 
1962 The Republican Constitution of Tanzania of 1962 
Laid foundation for imperial presidency – combing the powers of head of state and Government 
Local Government Elections (Rural Areas) Act No. of 1962 
Made provision for rural black Africans to vote 
Areas Commissioners Act No.18 of 1962 
This act gives areas commissioners power to arrest and detain 
Preventive Detention Act No. 60 of 1962 
Allowed the president to detain any person without bail for an indefinite duration if the person 
conducted himself to be dangerous to peace and good order, even when the conduct itself was yet 
to occur. Later amended by Act No. 2 of 1985. 
Regional and Regional Commissioners Act of 1962 
This act gives regional and district commissioners power to arrest and detain a person for 48 hours 
if they have reason to believe that such a person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb 
public tranquillity. 
Posts and Telecommunications Act of 1962 
It makes provision for the controlling of broadcasting activities in the country and sets out the legal 
mechanism for the granting of broadcasting licences to aspiring applicants. It grants the Minster the 
power to revoke or suspend any licence where it appears that such revocation is expedient and in 
the public interest. 
1963 The Minimum Sentences Act of 1963(No.29 /1963) 
24 strokes of corporal punishment (12 strokes at commencement of sentences; 12 strokes at release 
day; (All above 45 yrs excluded as well as below 16 yrs) 
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In addition in certain condition – the court must order the payment of compensation 
Minimum sentences vary between 6 month and 3 years. 
1964 FORMATION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
1964 The Interim Constitution of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar of 1964  
Modification of the Republic Constitution 
**Freedom of Association 
In 1964, the government banned independent trade unions and formed the National Union of 
Tanzanian Workers Association (NUTA), a state controlled trade union. 
Employment Act No.62 of 1964 
It makes provision for an employer to be exempted from paying wages to any employee in respect 
of any period during which the employee is imprisoned under any law. 
1965 The Interim Constitution of 1965 Act 18/65  
Formalize the one party state and re-enacted all changes brought about by the Union 
The Probate and Administration Ordinance (Amendment) Act No.9 of 1965 
1966 Local Government Elections (Rural Areas) Act No. 47  of 1966 
Repeal the Act of 1962. 
Civil Procedure Code Act No. 49 of  1966 
Section 74 of the Penal Code 
Section 55 
The Workers’ Compensation Act No. 60 of 1966 
It makes provision for the employer to be liable to pay compensation to a worker or the dependants 
for death or incapacity resulting from an accident. 
1967  The Workers Compensation Act No.43 of 9167 
This makes provision for the compensation of the workers for injuries suffered in the course of 
their employment. 
1968 Cooperative Societies Act No.27 of 1968 
Act enacted to regulate cooperative activities which repealed the Cooperative Societies Act 
Cap.211 of 1923 
1969 Election(Age of Voting) Act.No.34 of 1969 
Provide for reduction of age of persons qualified to vote at elections from 21 to 18 years. 
Education Act No.50 of 1969 
An Act to repeal and replace the Education Ordinance and to provide for the development of a 
system of education, in conformity with the political social and cultural ideas of the United 
Republic. 
1970 National Security Act of 1970 
Limits freedom of public information by the government being able to control the dissemination of 
information that goes to the public. 
Election Act  No.25 of 1970 
An act to consolidated the laws relating to the Election of President, the elections to the National 
Assembly and the elections to the local authorities. 
Repealed by Election Act No.1 of 1985 
1971  
1972 Police Force Ordinance, Act No 13 of 1972 
Section 40 required permits to be obtained in order to hold meetings or to organize processions.  
1973  
1974  
1975 The 1975 Amendment (Act 8 of 1975) 
Declared the supremacy of the National Executive Committee of the party by providing that all 
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functions of the all state organs were to be performed under the auspices of the party.  
1976 Newspaper Act No.3 of 1976 
This act imposes a fine or a jail sentence of up to four years on any person who prints or publishes 
a newspaper without registering it with the Registrar of Newspapers. 
Tanzania News Agency Act No.14 of 1976 
Films and Stage Plays Act of 1976 
An act to regulate the film, video and theatre industries. Section three of the Act prohibits any 
person from taking part or assisting in making a film unless the minister has granted him/her 
permission. 
1977 Permanent Constitution Act of 1977 
Constitution came into force on April 25, 1977 and established one-party state – it rested on 3 main 
pillars namely imperial presidency, the two union government and the one party state 
Elections:  
Article 74 of the 1977 Constitution – Establishment of  the National Electoral Commission 
**Report of the Judicial System Review Commission, 1977. 
Recommended that an increased people’s participation in administration of justice could be 
achieved through the electoral process of representatives. 
1978 Education Act No. 25 of 1978 
This act makes provision for better development of the system of education. It repeals the 
Education Act No. 50 of 1969.  It authorises the Minister to extend the period of primary education 
to any number of years not more than seven years, as he may deem desirable in the public interest, 
1979 Local Authorities Amendment (Elections) Act 1979 
Section 39: Required one to belong to, or to be sponsored by a political party in order to stand for 
elections to political office both local and national level. 
1980 Law Reform Commission of Tanzania Act No.11 of 1980 
It makes provision for the establishment of the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania. The 
functions of the Commission shall be to take and keep under review all the laws of the United 
Republic with a view to its systematic development and reform. 
The Penal Code(Amendment) Act No.14 of 1980 
Under this act, any person who does any unlawful act of violence against a ship or vessels 
registered in Tanzania shall be guilty of the piracy offence and shall be liable on conviction to 
imprisonment for life. 
1981-1982  
1983 
 
Workers’ Compensation Act No.17 of 1983 
It states the amount that an employer is obliged to pay a worker in the case of permanent or total 
incapacity resulting from an accident at work. It also provides for the compensation in the case of 
permanent partial incapacity. 
1984 Bill of Rights Constitution, vide Act No. 16 of 1984  
Article 15 of the Constitutions guarantees the right of every person to be free and to live like a free 
person.  
The Economic and Organized Crime Control Act of 1984 
Introduced Economic crimes court and crimes with severe sentences of which maximum sentences 
was enhanced to 15 years in prison. Under the Penal Code maximum sentence for similar offences 
was 3 years.  
1985 National Election Act No.1 of 1985 
Article 74 of the 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania provides for the 
establishment of the National Electoral Commission (NEC). 
In terms of Article 74(7) the commission is NEC its independence from other state structures. 
It provides for the law regulating the elections of a President and elections to the National 
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Assembly. 
Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act of 1985 (No.2/1985) 
Clarified the rights of the detainee and grounds of detention should be in writing 
1986  
1987 The Criminal Procedure Act No.9 of 1987 
It provides for the procedure to be followed in the investigation of crimes and the conduct of 
criminal trials. It repeals the Criminal Procedure Code with savings. 
1988 The Criminal Procedure(Amendment) Act No.5 of 1988 
This amends the Criminal Procedure Act No. 9 of 1987 by making provision for good behavior 
from persons disseminating seditious matter. 
1989 Civil Service Act of 1989 
Under this act all civil servants are required to take an oath of secrecy. It prohibits public servants 
from communicating with the media on issues relating to their work or official policy without due 
permission. 
1990 Election (Amendment )Act No.13 of 1990 
Provide for the identification and resolution of election complaints and for other matters related to 
elections. 
1991 The Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions Act No.20 of 1991 
Provision designated OTTU as the only sole representative organization of workers in Tanzania. 
No freedom of association as stipulated under international labour were guaranteed. 
Deportation(Amendment) Act of 1991 No.3 of 1991 
It gives the President the power to vary, revoke order or to grant permission to a person deported to 
leave for a temporary purpose the part of the country to which he has been deported for some other 
part named in the permission. 
1992 Constitution Amendment Act No.8 of 1992 
Article 20 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of assembly, association and 
expression.  
Election Amendment Act No.21 of 1992 
It amends the National Election Act No. of 1985 
Political Parties Act No.5 of 1992 
It provides for the registration of parties through the establishment of the Office of the Registrar of 
Political Parties – who is to be appointed by the President  
Registrar of Political Parties operates under the Prime Minister’s Office 
The powers include granting of provisional and permanent registration, overseeing subsidies given 
to political parties   
1993 Tanzania Communication Act No. 18 of 1993 
It makes provision for the establishment of the Tanzania Communications Commission to be 
responsible for the regulation of postal and telecommunications services in the United Republic of 
Tanzania. It provides for the designation of public postal and telecommunications licensees and for 
related matters. 
Organisation of Tanzania Trade Unions (OTTU) Act no.3 of 1993 
Broadcasting Services Act of 1993 
It makes provision for the establishment of the Tanzania Broadcasting Commission whose main 
responsibility is to issue licences to private broadcasters. 
1994 Basic Rights and duties Enforcement Act of 1994 
The Vocational Education and Training Act No. 1 of 1994 
It repeals and replaces the Apprenticeships Ordinance No.28 of 1974 and the Housing Levy Act. It 
makes further and better provision for the regulation of the training of apprentices and other 
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persons in industry. 
Act No.32 of 1994 
This amends the Criminal Procedure Act No. 9 of 1987. 
Employment Act No. 10 of 1994 
It makes it unlawful for an employee to work for his employer for more than five consecutive days 
without a day’s rest. 
1995 Education Act No, 10 of 1995 
It gives the Minister the responsibility of promoting the education of the people of Tanzania and 
the progressive development of institutions devoted to that purpose. It makes provision for the 
establishment of Educational Advisory Council. The Advisory council is responsible for advising 
the Minister upon matters relating to the execution of the national policy on education. 
This act makes a written approval of the Commissioner a prerequisite for the establishment of any 
school. 
1996  
1997  
1998 Constitution Amendments of 1998 
Article 20(1) of the 1998 edition of the Constitution entitles very person to, inter alia, freedom of 
association and more specifically to form or join interest-based associations or organizations. 
The Free Trade Unions Act No.10 1998, 
The act gives the Trade Union Registrar extensive powers to interfere into trade union affairs.  
Unions that fail to register face massive fines, imprisonment or both.  
Moreover, the Registrar has wide powers to suspend trade unions. 
Only one trade union can exist in any establishment or trade or industry.  
Where there is more than one union, the smaller one can be de-registered 
Repelled all other previous Act 
1999 Law Reform Commission of Tanzania Amendment Act No. 10 of 1999 
It repealed the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania 
2000 Tanzania News Agency Act No. 7 of 2000 
It repeals the Tanzania News Agency Act No. 14 of 1976. It makes provision for the transfer of 
powers, functions and other duties. 
2001 The Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act, No. 7 of 2001. 
Established the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance with functions to safeguard 
and inquire into human right and leadership issues. 
2002 The Community  Service Act No.6 of 2002 
It makes provision for the introduction and regulation of community service on offenders in certain 
cases. 
The Penal Code, Cap 16,  RE 2002 
Gives power to the police under section 74 to determine whether the assembly of several people is 
lawful or unlawful 
2003  
2004 The Employment and Labour Institutions Act, 2004 
Reflects Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of Tanzania however restricts the right to organize 
associations that at least 20 employees should be present under section 46 of the Act. 
2005-2009  
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This includes all relevant legislation passed during the year under consideration – Constitution /Act/Bills 
governing the status of the de jure judicial independence. This covers the following issues:  
6. Establishment of courts according to law ( Constitutional separations of power from arms 
of Government in law 
7. Appointment procedures, including compensation 
8. Impartiality: Judicial decisions are not influenced by the judge’s personal interest in the 
outcome of the case. Judges selections are primarily based on merits not because of their 
political views or affiliations.  
9. Access to Courts and Courts record: The people rely on courts to protect their access to 
justice and to protect their legal rights; Public access to court information.  
10. Judicial Accountability: Ability to do what is right, for instance the ability of High Courts 
to reverse erroneous lower court decisions on appeal. Enforcement of ethical standards and 
administrative rules between judges and their peers.  
 
Table B. 3 Lists of Laws  
Year Ordinance/Act/Amendments/Proclamations and Regulations 
1884 GERMAN EMPIRE – GERMAN EAST AFRICA 
1884  
1885 General Act of Berlin of 1885 
1886-1889  
1890  
1891 German Ordinance of 1891 
Made provision for the establishment of District and Superior Court 
Application of  German laws  
1892-1894  
1895 German imperial decree 
1896 Criminal Jurisdiction and Disciplinary Powers over the Natives of 22 April of 1896 
Made provision for the justice functions to be performed by the Local Administrative Authorities. 
1897-1903  
1904 Germany Tanganyika Memorandum of 1904-1905 
Recommended on the review of the corporal punishment orders. It reported an average of 4783 
floggings a year ordered by courts in the colony. 
1905  
1906 Decree of the Governor No.105 of 1906 :with regards to Administration of Criminal Jurisdiction over 
Natives  
Made provision for improved administration of fines and sentencing as well as the application of 
corporal punishment.  
1907  
1908 Civil Procedure Code 1908 
Specified ways and procedures of conducting civil cases. Establishes civil registries of the High Court. 
Limitation Act  (Adopted) No. 9 of 1908 
This barred the entertaining of suits which exceeds maximum of two years by the courts. 
1909-1910  
1911 Regulation to An Advisory Council for Tanganyika 
This established the council which consisted of the Governor as assisted by 3 officials and 5 non-
government officials, all to be Germany natives. 
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1912  
1913  
1914 WORLD WAR I STARTED 
1914-1919  
1920 British Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 – came into force 
Define the territory boundaries, established the Office of the Governor and Commander in Chief 
Established an Executive Council – composition according to Government Notice No.100 of 1920 
Tanganyika Order –in-Council of 1920 
Provides for the establishment of the High Court who has Jurisdiction, both Civil and Criminal over all 
persons and over all matters in the Territory. 
Article 19(2) provides for the appointment of Judges in the Highest Court by Governor in accordance 
with instructions receive from His Majesty through the State Secretary. 
The tenure is based on His Majesty’s pleasure. 
The appointments of Magistrates is covered by Article 9 of the Order in Council of 1920 
Provides for the appointment of magistrae by Governor in accordance with instructions receive from 
His Majesty through the State Secretary. 
The tenure is based on His Majesty’s pleasure. 
Subordinate Courts Ordinance No.6 of 1920 
Establishment of Courts of various classes under the jurisdiction of the High Court 
1921 The Judgements Extension Ordinance No. 13 of 1921 
This makes provision for the execution of decrees and warrants of civil courts of neighbouring 
countries. 
1922 BRITISH MANDATE UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES SYSTEMS - 
TANGANYIKA 
1922 Court Ordinance (Amendment) No. 15 of 1922 
Conferred extended jurisdiction to subordinate courts to try and pass sentence in any class of offences 
ordinarily triable by the High Court, if such court is on extended jurisdiction. 
Court of Appeal Ordinance No. 11 of 1922 
This gave the right to appeal to the court of appeal but only on the question of law. 
Court of Appeal (Amendment) Ordinance No. 38 of 1922 
It opened a further leeway to appeal by specifying that additional grounds to appeal were to be 
allowed only by the leave of the court. 
Formation of the Tanganyika Territory Civil Servants Association  
1923 Native Authority Ordinance of 1923 ( No.25/1923) 
The limitation of suit Ordinance No. 22 of 1922 
Prolonged certain suits two years especially those dealing with administration of probate property under 
trusteeship and the Administrator General. 
Native Liquor Ordinance No. 24 of 1923 
Gave powers to the lower courts to revoke and cancel licence of defaulting liquor licencees. Note that no 
provisions for appeal were incorporated thereon. 
Intoxicating Liquor Ordinance No. 24 of 1923 
Section 78 directed appeals from the subordinate courts to the High Court. 
1924  
1925 Courts (Proclamation /supplement) of 1925 
Established Jurisdiction of the native courts – Made provision for supervision and appeal to the High 
court. 
Appeals to the High Court (Sentences of Death) Ordinance No. 4 of 1925 
Limited the time limit for appeal to 30 days after passing of the sentence under section 2. 
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1926 Native Authority Ordinance of 1926 ( No.18/1926) 
Legislative Council was established 
20 members representative from the White and Asian Communities appointed by the Governor 
1927  
1928 Notaries Public and Commissioner of Oaths Ordinance (Cap12) 1928 
It states the persons entitled to practise as notaries public and commissioners of oaths. 
Justices of Peace Ordinance No. 3 of 1928 
Established the justices of peace and they had powers to arrest, administering oaths, and compelling 
appearance of cognizable offenders into courts. 
Interpretation of General Clauses Ordinance No. 36 of 1928 
This defined and directed the courts on the ways to construe and interpret laws and clauses enacted by the 
legislative council or thus, adopted. 
1929 Native Courts Ordinance No.5 of 1929 
Native courts were divorced from the High Court and were placed under the Provincial Administration 
except the Liwalis Courts. Parallel court system based on the policy of indirect rule. 
1930 Criminal Procedure Code Ordinance OF 1930 (No.12 /1930) 
Amended the Criminal procedure Code of India as it was applied to the territory. This made provision for 
accused to give evidence on his own behalf. Further it provide for police upon the arrest of accused to 
frame charges.  
Courts Ordinance of  1930 ( No.13/1930) 
Redefined the Liwalis courts as native subordinate courts under jurisdiction of the High court 
Legal practitioners Rules of 1930 ( No.82/1930) 
1931 Indian Contract and specific Relief Acts of 1931 
Arbitration Ordinance No. 26 of 1931 
Gave courts mandate to sit as arbitrators and settle matters between parties who submitted themselves to 
arbitration. 
1932 Arbitration Ordinance No. 32 of 1932 
Gave mandate to courts to stay proceedings and suits of which parties had initially referred them to 
arbitration by submission clauses. 
Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) of 1932 
It conferred powers to the High Court to make rules to be incorporated to the schedule of the Civil 
Procedure Code. 
1933 Native Courts (Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Ordinance No. 2 of 1933 
It gave powers and jurisdiction of native courts in civil matters by extending the jurisdiction of 
native courts to the recovery of civil debts. 
Police Ordinance No. 23 of 1933 
It gave wide powers to police officers. However it directed those powers conferred therein did not 
affect the powers of magistrates in applying the Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code to 
such officers. 
1934  
1935 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) No. 12 of 1935 
It directed courts to recognize and enforce foreign judgments from courts of competent jurisdiction 
from other countries. 
Subordinate Courts (Civil Appeals) Ordinance No. 38 of 1935 
It established that all civil appeals originating from subordinate courts should lie/go before the high 
court. 
1936 Penal Code (Amendment) Ordinance No. 10 of 1936 
Restricted institution of suits of all kinds and nature to the approval of the Attorney General. 
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Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Ordinance No. 11 of 1936 
Section 7 and 8 empowered the Governor and the Chief Justice to extend the jurisdiction of 
subordinate courts to try cases otherwise triable by the high court. Judges were also allowed to 
combine sentences for offenders charged with multiple offences. 
1937 Children and Young Persons Ordinance No. 3 of 1937 
Established juvenile courts to try juvenile offenders.  
*In real sense, these were subordinate courts sitting as juvenile courts. 
Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) No. 15 of 1937 
Subordinate courts were required to inform persons sentenced to death of their right to appeal to the 
East Africa Court of Appeal. Record of appeal was to be sent to the governor, whether the appeal 
was granted or not. (Freedom of the courts from the governor was not absolute.) 
1938 The Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Rules GN. No. 39 of 1938 
Governed the admission and conduct of legal practitioners in the bar. 
Subordinate Courts Practice and Procedure Rules. GN No. 72 of 1938. 
Required subordinate courts to make records of every depositions and proceedings going on in 
courts. 
1939 Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Ordinance No. 23 of 1939 
Gave powers to the court to summon material witnesses not called by the parties before, powers to 
convict attempted offences and also give alternative verdicts. Also the High Court was empowered 
under Section 31 to reject appeals summarily without giving reasons for the rejection. 
The Penal Code (Amendment) Ordinance No. 24 of 1939. 
Subordinate courts empowered to dismiss charges facing offenders of inferior characters based on 
their age, mental and health conditions, which are unsound. 
1940 Native Courts (Appeals) (Amendment) No. 28 of 1940 
Governor was empowered to establish a board by order, to entertain appeals originating from native 
courts and later District Officer. 
Children and Young Persons Ordinance (Amendment) No. 36 of 1940  
Directed the high court to send juvenile offenders to approved schools while the considerations of 
their matters were still pending in the court in while exercising its appellate or revisional 
jurisdiction. 
1941 Subordinate Courts Ordinance of  1941 (No.15 / 1941) 
Governed all districts courts subordinate to the High Court, and replaced the Courts Ordinance 
No.13 of 1930. Provided for the removal of the Liwalis Courts from the High Court jurisdiction. 
1942 Native Courts (Appeals) Rules of 1942 
1943-1944  
1945 Criminal Procedure Code of 1945 
Section 4 &5empowers the Governor on recommendation from the Chief Justice to conferred on 
Magistrates extended jurisdiction to impose any sentence which could lawfully be imposed by the 
High Court., in districts where it is difficult to access High Court without undue expenditure of time 
and money.  
**Legislative Council was reformed 
2 then 4 Africans3 Asian and 4 European Reps. 
1946 TRUST TERRITORY ADMINISTERED BY THE UK - TANGANYIKA 
1946-1950  
1951 The Local Courts Ordinance Cap299 of 1951 
Reversed the earlier Native courts provision by including them in the general judicial system of the 
territory. 
Native title change to local and were place under the Central Court of appeal over which a High 
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Court judge was to preside and permitted the appearance of advocates for the first time at the 
hearing appeals. 
1952  
1953  
1954 Advocates Ordinance No.25 of 1954 
1955 The National Assembly(Powers and Privileges) Ordinance Cap359 of 1955 
Defines and ensures on traditional lines, the privileges immunities and powers necessary for the 
proper functioning of the Assembly. 
Legislative Council was reformed 
10 Reps from each group 
1956 Trustees Incorporation Ordinance of 1956 (Cap 376) 
1957  
1958  
1959 Council of Ministers (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance Cap 415 of 1959 
Legal provision was made for the allocation among individual Ministers responsibility, permanent 
or temporary for various topics and the delegation by Ministers of their statutory powers.  
1960  
1961 FULL INDEPENDENCE - TANGANYIKA 
1961 Independence Constitution of Tanzania  
Made provision for the independence of the judiciary. Article 58 made provision for broad-based 
appointment procedures. 
Local courts (Amendment) Ordinance of 1961 
Made provision for the reintegration of local courts under the High Court 
Judicature and Application of laws Act No.51 of 1961 
An act to declare the jurisdiction of the High Court to cover local courts 
Judicial Service Commission Regulations No.239 of 1961 
1962 The Republican Constitution of Tanzania 
Laid foundation for imperial presidency – combing the powers of head of state and Government 
Local Courts (Minister for Justice and Regional Local Courts Officers) Act No.16 of 1962) 
Transferred to the Minister of Justice all powers of establishing, defining the jurisdiction of, and 
revoking or suspending the warrants of, local courts which had hitherto been vested in the Governor. 
Preventive Detention Act No. 60 of 1962 
Allowed the president to detain any person for an indefinite duration if the person conducted himself 
to be dangerous to peace and good order, even when the conduct itself was yet to occur. Later 
amended by Act No. 2 of 1985. 
1963 Magistrates’ Courts Act No.55 of 1963 
Subject to the provisions of any other written law, and to the limits of its jurisdiction, a magistrate’s 
court shall exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with It makes provision for the applicability of 
customary law and it provides for the Customary Courts to exercise jurisdiction in matters of civil 
nature. 
1964 FORMATION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
1964 The Interim Constitution of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar   
Modification of the Republic Constitution 
Judicature and Application of Laws Act No.46 of 1964 
It gives the High Court judges all powers and the authority to exercise the powers of magistrates. 
 Security of Employment Act, Cap 574 of 1964. 
Section 27 gave wide powers that ousted courts, that all appeals from conciliation boards  relating to 
summary dismissal were to be heard by the Minister for Labour and his decision was final and 
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conclusive for that matter. 
1965 The Interim Constitution of 1965 Act 18/65  
Formalize the one party state and re-enacted all changes brought about by the UnionNational 
Executive Committee Powers and Privileges Act No.49 of 1965 
1966 Civil Procedure Code Act No. 49 of  1966 
It repeals the Indian Code of Civil procedure and it outlines the procedure to be followed where the 
person to be arrested or property to be attached is outside jurisdiction. It authorises the court to call 
for a separate trial where necessary. 
Judicature and Application of Laws Act No. 31 of 1966 
This act makes provision for the High Court to have full jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. 
1967 The Government Proceedings Act, No. 46 of 1967. 
Required ministerial consent for all suits against the government. Later in Para 608 of the Nyalali 
Commission Report (1992) this shield used by the government was recommended to be removed. 
1968  
1969 The Legal Aid Act No. 21 of 1969 
It provides for the rendering of free legal aid in criminal proceedings involving indigent persons. 
Magistrates Court (Amendment) Act, No. 18 of 1969 
Empowered assessors to be judges of fact and law, thus their opinions became binding on acquittal, 
conviction and sentence. 
1970 National Security Act No. 3 of 1970 
Limits freedom of  public information 
An Act to make better provision relating to State Security; to deal with espionage, sabotage and 
other activities prejudicial to the interests of the United Republic; and for purposes incidental thereto 
or connected therewith. 
1971-1974  
1975 The 1975 Amendment Act No. 8 of 1975 
Declared the supremacy of the National Executive Committee of the party by providing that all 
functions of the all state organs were to be performed under the auspices of the party.  
1976  
1977 Permanent Constitution Act 
Constitution came into force on April 25, 1977 and established one-party state – it rested on 3 main 
pillars namely imperial presidency, the two union governments and the one party state. Article 117 
establishes the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. 
1978  
1979  Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, GN. No 102 of 1979 
Required judges sitting in an appeal to prepare and record separate judgments. Also gave powers to 
the Chief Justice to elect quorum of the Court for purposes of any hearing. 
1980 Law Reform Commission of Tanzania Act  No. 11 of 1980 
It provides for the establishment of the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania 
The Penal Code(Amendment) Act No.14 of 1980 
It authorises any person to use only reasonable force as may be necessary for defence in self defence 
or in defence of another or in defence of a property. 
**Attorney General vs Lesinoi Ndeinai (1980) TLR 214 at pg 247. 
The court ruled that the powers of the president to detain were very wide and subjective. It was thus 
held unconstitutional. 
1981-1983  
1984 Bill of Rights Constitution, vide Act No. 16 of 1984  
Article 15 of the Constitutions guarantees the right of every person to be free and to live like a free 
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person.  
The Magistrates Courts Act No.2 of 1984 
Provided that in every sitting the court shall sit with not less than two assessors. Thus it gave 
discretion to the magistrate to choose the maximum number of assessors hence repealing the 
position of Magistrate Courts Act, Cap 357 of 1863. 
1985 The Criminal Procedure Act No.9 of 1985 
It repeals the Criminal Procedure Code and it makes provision for procedure to be followed in the 
investigation of crimes and the conduct of criminal trials. 
The Ward Tribunal Act No. 7 of 1982(cap206) 
It makes provision for the establishment of the Ward Tribunals and their jurisdiction, powers, 
practice and procedure. 
1986  
1987 The criminal Procedure Act No. 9 of 1987(C20) 
It makes provision for the procedure to be followed in the investigation of crimes and the conduct of 
criminal trials. Any court issuing a warrant of arrest of any person in respect of any offence other 
than murder or treason may in its discretion direct security to be taken. 
1988 The Criminal Procedure(Amendment) Act No.5 of 1988 
Amendment of the criminal procedure Act No. 9 of 1987.It authorizes the High Court to vary terms 
of bail by lower court. 
1989-1991  
1992 Constitution Amendment Act No.8 of 1992 
Article 20 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of assembly, association and 
expression.  
Magistrate’s Courts Act No. 3 of 1992 
Amendment of the Magistrate’s Court Act No of 1984. It makes provision for a primary court to 
exercise jurisdiction in all proceedings of a civil nature. The practice and procedure of primary 
courts to be regulated by the Primary Courts Procedure Code in the exercise of the criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Report of Presidential Commission on One Party or Multiparty System in Tanzania, 1992. 
Recommended that there should be clear demarcation of responsibilities among the organs of the 
government. It averred that the courts should be free to perform its functions without interference 
from other organs under Paras 350, 359 and 365.  
1993-1994  
1995 Judicial Administration Act No. 18 of 1995 
This makes provision for the Chief Justice to be in charge of the administration of the judicial 
service. It allows the Chief Justice to authorise any judge and any judicial officers to exercise his 
functions on his behalf. 
1996 Regulations Act No. 11 of 1996 
Pensions (Additional Retirement Benefits to Specified Public Officers) Order, 1996 
This by-law gave the Judges and Justices of Appeal several rights on their retirement. 
1997 The Judicial Service Act No. 29 of 1997 
It makes provision for the establishment of a Special Commission for matters relating to primary 
court magistrates. It provides for the Chief Justice to be Chairman of the Commission and for the 
Justice of appeal and Principal Judge to be members of the Special Commission. It authorises the 
President of the Republic to appoint the other two members of the Special Commission. 
1998 Constitution Amendments of 1998 
Article 20(1) of the 1998 edition of the Constitution entitles very person to, inter alia, freedom of 
association and more specifically to form or join interest-based associations or organizations. 
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The Institute of Judicial Management Lushoto Act No. 3 of 1998 
It establishes the Institute of Judicial Administration Lushoto and to provide for the functions, 
management and control of the Institute. 
1999 Public Service Retirement Benefits Act, 1999 
Provides a new package for judges of the High Court of Tanzania, Justices of Appeal and the Chief 
Justice. According to Section 20 (3) a Judge and a Justice of Appeal shall retire on a pension, which 
shall be equal to eighty per cent of the salary of the incumbent holder of the office in which he was 
serving and from which he retires. 
Commercial Court Act of 1999 
 
2000 Constitution 13th Amendments of 2000 
Article 107B of the 2000 edition of the Constitution  made provision for all courts of law in the 
performing of their work of dispensing justice to be independent and only to follow the 
Constitutions and the Law of the country 
2001-2003  
2004 The Attorney General Act of 2004 
This provides for the discharge of duties and the exercise of powers of the attorney general and to 
provide for the relationship of the office of the Attorney General with other public offices and 
officers performing legal functions in the Government and other local government authorities. 
Article 59 of the Constitution establishes the office of the Attorney General as the advisor of the 
Government of the Republic in all legal matters. It also provides for the appointment of the Law 
Officers, State Attorneys and legal officers in the public office, registration, maintenance and 
custody of the Register of State Attorneys by Deputy Attorney General. 
2005 Judicial Service Act 2005 
Repeal the Judicial Service Act, 1962; to enact the Judicial Service Act 2005,  
to provide for the administration, discipline of Judges, Judicial officers and magistrates in the 
Judiciary and for related matters 
2006  
2007 The Judges(Remuneration and Terminal Benefits) Act 
An act to provide for remuneration, terminal benefits and survivors benefits to a person holding the 
office of Chief Justice, Justice of Appeal, Principal Judge and Judge. It provides the procedure 
though which the Commission shall proposals for review of emoluments and other benefits  for the 
Chief Justice, Justice of Appeal, Principal Judge and Judges by the Judicial Service Commission. 
2008-2009  
 
Primary Sources 
Laws and decrees: 
 Germany. Overseas gazette. 1890-1921. Deutsches Kolonialblatt. Issued by Kolonial-Abtheilung 
des Auswärtigen Amts (1890-1907); Reichs-Kolonialamt (1907-1919); 
Reichskolonialministerium (1919-1920); Kolonialzentralverwaltung, Reichsministerium für 
Wiederaufbau (1920-1921). Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn. 
 Germany. 1892-1910. Die deutsche Kolonialgesetzgebung. Sammlung der auf die deutschen 
Schutzgebiete bezüüglichen Gesetze, Verordnungen, Erlasse, und internationale Vereinbarungen 
mit Anmerkungen und Sachregister. Edited by various persons. Berlin: D. Reimer, later Ernst 
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Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, later Alfred Zimmermann. (The first volume was published in 1898 
but covers the period starting in 1892.) 
 Great Britain (United Kingdom). Gazette. 1665-present. Oxford Gazette (1996-1666); London 
Gazette (1666-present). Oxford (1665-1666); London (1666-present): His/Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office from 1903. Online at <http://www.gazettes.online.co.uk>; as of September 
2005, gazettes since 1900 are available. 
 Tanganyika. Gazette. 1919-1964. The Tanganyika Territory Gazette (1919-1956); The 
Tanganyika Gazette (1956-1964). Dar Es Salaam. (Successor to Tanganyika [German East 
Africa] gazette.) 
 Tanganyika (German East Africa). Gazette. 1900-1914. Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, with 
supplement Amtliche Anzeigen für Deutsch-Ostafrika and Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Rundschau, 
with supplement Amtlicher Anzeiger für Deutsch-Ostafrika. Dar Es Salaam: Deutsch-
Ostafrikanische Zeitung. (Succeeded by Tanganyika gazette.) 
 Tanzania. Gazette. 1964-present. The Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzahyia and Zanzibar 
(The Gazette of the United Republoic of Tanzania) (1964-1964); Gazette of the United Republic 
of Tanzania (1964-1970, with contents in Swahili);Gazeti la jamhuri ya muungano wa Tanzania 
(1970-present). Dar Es Salaam: Government Printer. (There are also supplements to the current 
gazette.) 
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Appendices C - Impulse response for Namibia: Just-identified Model 
 
Figure C.1:  Persistence Profile of CV’s to system –wide 
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Figure C.2:  Shocks in the equation of capital 
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Figure C.3:  Shocks in the equation of output  
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Figure C.4:  Shocks in the equation of Political Instability  
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Appendices D - Impulse responses for Tanzania: Just-identified Model 
Figure D.1 Persistence Profile of CV’s to system –wide shock 
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Figure D.2:  Shocks in the equation of capital stock 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
0 13 26 39 50
 Orthogonalized Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for LKT 
CV1 CV2 CV3  
 
  
232 
 
Figure D.3:  Shocks in the equation of output  
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Figure D.4:  Shocks in the equation of Judicial Independence 
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